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    \LARGE\textbf{PHANTOM: Pricing Heuristics Against Non-human Transaction Orchestration Mechanisms}\\[0.5cm]
    \Large\textbf{Daniel Rösel}\\
    \large\textit{Bachelor of Computer Science \& Artificial Intelligence}\\[0.5cm]
    \Large\textit{Supervised by:}\\
    \Large\textbf{Alberto Martín Izquierdo}\\
    \large\textit{IE University, Madrid, Spain}\\[1cm]
    \large\today
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\begin{abstract}
With accelerated growth of Lager Language Model agents in e-commerce a novel adversarial dynamic to digital markets emerges. This paper address the vulnerability of dynamic pricing systems to AI intermediaries that decouple the information gather stages from the transaction execution. By conducing reconnaissance isolates sessions, agents circumvent the ``Cost of Information'' (COI) defined as the accumulated price premium typically thought demand expression estimators.
We formally define this phenomenon and derive the Cost of Information Theorem, proving that as the saturation of independent, utility-maximizing agents increases, the platform’s ability to sustain a COI converges to zero, rendering standard dynamic pricing mechanisms incentive-incompatible.
To respond to this threat we propose a defensive framework which integrates behavioral economics with Adversarially Distributionally Robust Optimization (DRO). We introduce a custom e-commerce research platform built on hybrid Kappa-Lambda architecture, designed to capture and simulate high-fidelity controlled interaction trajectories. We further demonstrate through modeling that human and agent behaviors exhibit distinct transition probability kernels, enabling the construction of discriminative models based on Kullback-Leibler divergence.
These behavioral signals serve as inputs for a Distributionally Robust Reinforcement Learning (DR-RL) agent. We formulate the pricing problem as a Stackelberg game where the learner optimizes against an ambiguity set of demand distributions defined by the Wasserstein distance. This approach allows the pricing policy to remain robust against non-stationary contamination without overfitting to deterministic demand curves. The research validates a mechanism for preserving margin integrity and market equilibrium in an agent-mediated economy, while minimizing degradation to the legitimate human user experience (UX).
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\noindent\textbf{Keywords:} Dynamic Pricing, LLM Agents, Adversarial Machine Learning, E-commerce, Behavioral Detection, Reinforcement Learning

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\noindent\textbf{Acknowledgments:} This research was supported by the TPU Research Cloud program, which provided access to Google Cloud TPU accelerators (including TPU v2/v3/v4).

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\appendix
\section{Terminology}
\begin{description}
\item[Agent $A$] An actor of non-human nature, powered by an LLM.
\item[Human $H$] An individual human with some job to be done.
\end{description}
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