From 1e04a928aae051729f28c441c0f0dfe62f9c2a4b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Daniel Rosel Date: Sun, 15 Feb 2026 17:31:31 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] migrated new banner --- paper/src/main.tex | 8 +------- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/paper/src/main.tex b/paper/src/main.tex index abb87a8..49828f6 100644 --- a/paper/src/main.tex +++ b/paper/src/main.tex @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ \begin{titlepage} \centering - \includegraphics[width=0.3\textwidth]{graphics/SST.png}\\[1cm] + \includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{graphics/banner.png}\\[0.8cm] \LARGE\textbf{PHANTOM: Pricing Heuristics Against Non-human Transaction Orchestration Mechanisms}\\[0.5cm] \Large\textbf{Daniel Rösel}\\ \large\textit{Bachelor of Computer Science \& Artificial Intelligence}\\[0.5cm] @@ -17,12 +17,6 @@ \large\today \end{titlepage} -\begin{center} - \includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{graphics/banner.png} -\end{center} - -\vspace{1em} - \begin{abstract} With accelerated growth of Lager Language Model agents in e-commerce a novel adversarial dynamic to digital markets emerges. This paper address the vulnerability of dynamic pricing systems to AI intermediaries that decouple the information gather stages from the transaction execution. By conducing reconnaissance isolates sessions, agents circumvent the ``Cost of Information'' (COI) defined as the accumulated price premium typically thought demand expression estimators. We formally define this phenomenon and derive the Cost of Information Theorem, proving that as the saturation of independent, utility-maximizing agents increases, the platform’s ability to sustain a COI converges to zero, rendering standard dynamic pricing mechanisms incentive-incompatible.