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isbn = {978-1-292-40117-1},
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isbn = {978-1-292-40117-1},
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title = {Artificial Intelligence A Modern Approach Fourth Edition Global Edition}
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title = {Artificial Intelligence A Modern Approach Fourth Edition Global Edition}
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}
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}
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@misc{Parkes2015,
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abstract = {The field of artificial intelligence (AI) strives to build rational agents capable of perceiving the world around them and taking actions to advance specified goals. Put another way, AI researchers aim to construct a synthetic homo economicus, the mythical perfectly rational agent of neoclassical economics.We review progress toward creating this new species of machine, machina economicus, and discuss some challenges in designing AIs that can reason effectively in economic contexts. Supposing that AI succeeds in this quest, or at least comes close enough that it is useful to think about AIs in rationalistic terms, we ask how to design the rules of interaction in multi-agent systems that come to represent an economy of AIs.Theories of normative design from economics may prove more relevant for artificial agents than human agents, with AIs that better respect idealized assumptions of rationality than people, interacting through novel rules and incentive systems quite distinct from those tailored for people.},
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author = {David C. Parkes and Michael P. Wellman},
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doi = {10.1126/science.aaa8403},
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issn = {10959203},
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issue = {6245},
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journal = {Science},
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month = {7},
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pages = {267-272},
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pmid = {26185245},
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publisher = {American Association for the Advancement of Science},
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title = {Economic reasoning and artificial intelligence},
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volume = {349},
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year = {2015}
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}
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@article{Xia2025,
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abstract = {Large Language Models (LLMs) have enabled the emergence of LLM agents, systems capable of pursuing under-specified goals and adapting after deployment. Evaluating such agents is challenging because their behavior is open ended, probabilistic, and shaped by system-level interactions over time. Traditional evaluation methods, built around fixed benchmarks and static test suites, fail to capture emergent behaviors or support continuous adaptation across the lifecycle. To ground a more systematic approach, we conduct a multivocal literature review (MLR) synthesizing academic and industrial evaluation practices. The findings directly inform two empirically derived artifacts: a process model and a reference architecture that embed evaluation as a continuous, governing function rather than a terminal checkpoint. Together they constitute the evaluation-driven development and operations (EDDOps) approach, which unifies offline (development-time) and online (runtime) evaluation within a closed feedback loop. By making evaluation evidence drive both runtime adaptation and governed redevelopment, EDDOps supports safer, more traceable evolution of LLM agents aligned with changing objectives, user needs, and governance constraints.},
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author = {Boming Xia and Qinghua Lu and Liming Zhu and Zhenchang Xing and Dehai Zhao and Hao Zhang},
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month = {11},
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title = {Evaluation-Driven Development and Operations of LLM Agents: A Process Model and Reference Architecture},
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url = {http://arxiv.org/abs/2411.13768},
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year = {2025}
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}
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@techReport{Varian,
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@techReport{Varian,
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abstract = {The eeld of economic mechanism design has been an active area of research in economics for at least 20 years. This eld uses the tools of economics and game theory to design \rules of interaction" for economic transactions that will, in principle , yield some desired outcome. In this paper I provide an overview of this subject for an audience interested in applications to electronic commerce and discuss some special problems that arise in this context.},
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abstract = {The eeld of economic mechanism design has been an active area of research in economics for at least 20 years. This eld uses the tools of economics and game theory to design \rules of interaction" for economic transactions that will, in principle , yield some desired outcome. In this paper I provide an overview of this subject for an audience interested in applications to electronic commerce and discuss some special problems that arise in this context.},
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