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     \large\today
 \end{titlepage}
 
+\begin{center}
+    \includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{graphics/banner.png}
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+\vspace{1em}
+
 \begin{abstract}
 With accelerated growth of Lager Language Model agents in e-commerce a novel adversarial dynamic to digital markets emerges. This paper address the vulnerability of dynamic pricing systems to AI intermediaries that decouple the information gather stages from the transaction execution. By conducing reconnaissance isolates sessions, agents circumvent the ``Cost of Information'' (COI) defined as the accumulated price premium typically thought demand expression estimators.
 We formally define this phenomenon and derive the Cost of Information Theorem, proving that as the saturation of independent, utility-maximizing agents increases, the platform’s ability to sustain a COI converges to zero, rendering standard dynamic pricing mechanisms incentive-incompatible.