\section{Discussion}

% TODO: Gpdr here


\subsection{Transition to Agentic Market Microstructure}

Our analysis of the interaction dynamics between the platform and non-human actors suggests that the current static pricing models are insufficient for an agent-mediated economy. If we assume a transition toward a direct revelation mechanism, where actors must reveal their true valuation of a good through bidding dynamics, we inevitably introduce significant stochasticity into the pricing system. Unlike traditional e-commerce where prices are relatively sticky, such a mechanism implies a high volatility characteristic of financial equity markets (without the fungibility however).

However, e-commerce commodities differ fundamentally from financial securities: they possess a hard floor defined by unit economics and reservation prices. The market might react enthusiastically to an iPhone priced at \$1. Such a transaction is not permissible. The platform must establish an initial valuation anchor ($P_0$) defined by the marginal cost plus a target margin, around which the market price is permitted to fluctuate.

We float the introduction of GenAI Agents as Institutional Market Makers. As the arms race for greater autonomy of agentic systems grows, the commercial viability of AI agents has the potential to disseminate into everyday users directly interacting with them rather than e-commerce platforms. This is also under the assumption of expected transactional capabilities being given to AI Agents.

\subsection{Risk Assessment and Limitations}
\label{sec:limitations_risks}

Behavior-based pricing raises predictable ethics questions when models are opaque: a behavioral profile can become a basis for price discrimination or exclusion if deployed without governance. Universal behavioral profile modeling (UBPM) in recommendation already shows how fine-grained traces enable strong personalization. The same machinery applied to prices needs guardrails.


We balance human and agent sessions near one-to-one so cohorts are comparable despite different population sizes. The row-level dataset still contains thousands of events.

% Rapid change in agent capabilities and user expectations induces model drift; the UX term in reward shaping was included partly to penalize policies that sacrifice legitimate users for short-run revenue. Reinforcement learning adds its own risks---reward hacking and limited interpretability---which matter when policies touch live revenue; deployment would require monitoring and constraints beyond what we exercised here.
With the exponential growth in capability of agents aswell as user expectations, a degree of model drift is expected in this setting. The computational requirements for continuous extraction of margin as demonstrated by our work are required by the persistent speed of the market. Reinforcement learning that sacrifices legitimate user experience for short run revenue does not hold up in the long run. Reward hacking, to which pricing algorithms are not impervious due to their limited interpretability is a significant risk for a company if live revenue is in play. Deployment requires consistent monitoring and constraints beyond what was done as exercise in this work.

% \subsection{Implications of Findings} Interpretation of results and altenrative scenarios with broader market implications.
