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32 lines
2.8 KiB
TeX
32 lines
2.8 KiB
TeX
\section{Discussion}
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\subsection{Transition to Agentic Market Microstructure}
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Our analysis of interaction dynamics between the platform and non-human actors suggests that static posted-price models are a weak match for an economy in which software agents mediate search and purchase. If one pushes toward direct-revelation or auction-like pricing, volatility rises: prices behave more like traded claims than like sticky retail quotes, though without the fungibility of securities.
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E-commerce goods differ from financial assets in a hard way: unit economics and reservation values set a floor. The market might ``want'' an iPhone at \$1; the platform cannot honor that. Pricing therefore needs an anchor $P_{0}$ (cost plus target margin) around which offers may move. In that setting, large language model (LLM) agents resemble institutional liquidity providers: they quote, probe, and clear subsets of flow. As autonomy of agentic systems increases, end users may delegate browsing and checkout to assistants rather than to retailer sites directly, which shifts where demand signals originate. The scenario presumes agents eventually hold delegated payment authority; until then, our results bound a near-term reconnaissance-heavy regime.
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\subsection{Risk Assessment and Limitations}
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\label{sec:limitations_risks}
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Behavior-based pricing raises predictable ethics questions when models are opaque: a behavioral profile can become a basis for price discrimination or exclusion if deployed without governance. Universal behavioral profile modeling (UBPM) in recommendation already shows how fine-grained traces enable strong personalization; the same machinery applied to prices needs guardrails.
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In our experiments participants are randomized to platform mode and task. Figure~\ref{fig:exp_design_tree} summarizes the assignment tree.
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\begin{figure}[ht]
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\centering
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\resizebox{0.92\columnwidth}{!}{%
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\input{chapters/figures/experiment_design_tree.tex}
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}
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\caption{Experimental design decision tree for participant assignment.}
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\label{fig:exp_design_tree}
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\end{figure}
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The human sample is small but each session is long-form; we balance human and agent sessions one-to-one so cohorts are comparable despite different population sizes. The row-level dataset still contains thousands of events.
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Rapid change in agent capabilities and user expectations induces model drift; the UX term in reward shaping was included partly to penalize policies that sacrifice legitimate users for short-run revenue. Reinforcement learning adds its own risks---reward hacking and limited interpretability---which matter when policies touch live revenue; deployment would require monitoring and constraints beyond what we exercised here.
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% \subsection{Implications of Findings} Interpretation of results and altenrative scenarios with broader market implications.
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