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Author SHA1 Message Date
Daniel Alves Rösel
9843c5deab Merge pull request #51 from velocitatem/feat-strong-learning-implementation-with-data-contamination
Feat strong learning implementation with data contamination
2026-01-31 10:15:09 +01:00
13959e4b28 chore: bug fixes 2026-01-31 10:13:07 +01:00
Daniel Alves Rösel
2f481bd94b Merge branch 'agent-behavior-loader-developemen' into feat-strong-learning-implementation-with-data-contamination 2026-01-31 10:08:59 +01:00
72877439ca feat: contaminator and training 2026-01-31 09:48:20 +01:00
0f5f8affab chore: make lib backwards compatible 2026-01-31 09:48:20 +01:00
ee70f02a1f chore: export repeated methods into lib 2026-01-31 09:48:20 +01:00
22a2c255bd chore: remove boilerplate 2026-01-31 09:48:20 +01:00
ccc19f3493 acapting some architectures 2026-01-31 09:48:20 +01:00
00e3eff2fa migrating weak learning 2026-01-31 09:48:20 +01:00
440371dba4 feat: initial feature engineering of trajectories 2026-01-31 09:48:20 +01:00
b05b510f70 strong dataset gathering 2026-01-31 09:48:20 +01:00
04907df393 feat: weak train scaffold 2026-01-31 09:48:20 +01:00
b2f0746c01 chore: extra commenting 2026-01-31 09:48:20 +01:00
7b2d80ac4c feat: wip contaminator 2026-01-31 09:48:20 +01:00
0ce12fbc3b chore: ignores 2026-01-31 09:48:17 +01:00
e9cf5f0736 refactor models computations 2026-01-31 09:46:44 +01:00
82b54428b7 chore: refactor the loader class 2026-01-31 09:46:44 +01:00
87a35fad2c feat: joint loader 2026-01-31 09:46:44 +01:00
af23d2f736 feat: introduction of agentinc MDPs and KL divergence of > 2 2026-01-31 09:46:44 +01:00
9cb2b0fc44 feat: forgot airflow helper staging 2026-01-31 09:46:44 +01:00
7c330a19c6 feat: added a runner script for agent orchestration 2026-01-31 09:46:44 +01:00
Daniel Alves Rösel
eb95060380 Pre run web refactors (#43)
* chore: refactor date utilities

* feat: improve images of hotel rooms

* fix: adding date utils
2026-01-31 09:46:44 +01:00
61dd621532 chore: styling and title updates 2026-01-31 09:46:44 +01:00
4c368d48f2 chore: fixing visual bugs in cart 2026-01-31 09:46:44 +01:00
3c141a4b6c chore: better test consistency before agnet 2026-01-31 09:46:44 +01:00
e89cb263d4 planning 2026-01-31 09:46:44 +01:00
62a4008c29 feat: integration of pipeline hooks into testing 2026-01-31 09:46:44 +01:00
8b429b7a8e chore: refactor to better map end to end 2026-01-31 09:46:44 +01:00
f9bf3de71e pdf rendering 2026-01-31 09:46:44 +01:00
131323ef56 featuer: dot exporter 2026-01-31 09:46:44 +01:00
ec4cf074e6 feature: MDP behavior mappers (unlinked) 2026-01-31 09:46:44 +01:00
6a06a8af4a simple code cleanup 2026-01-31 09:46:44 +01:00
3fa98f375d refactor to align moer with research in the env sims 2026-01-31 09:46:44 +01:00
201c98bcac improved implementation 2026-01-31 09:46:44 +01:00
8a08458478 formlating the reward simply 2026-01-31 09:46:44 +01:00
7d09232e48 high level defintion 2026-01-31 09:46:44 +01:00
20132c084c initial environemnt definitions 2026-01-31 09:46:41 +01:00
26abff5864 chore: fixing tests with seed determinism 2026-01-30 13:57:40 +01:00
4c7d9362af chore: envs for e2e 2026-01-30 13:55:22 +01:00
ea45801845 chore: removing the lab byproduct 2026-01-30 13:22:22 +01:00
Daniel Alves Rösel
574e05d9e0 Merge pull request #50 from velocitatem/new-simulation-environment-development
New simulation environment development
2026-01-30 13:19:53 +01:00
Daniel Alves Rösel
a9d73ccce5 Paper first fillout (#39)
* initial environemnt definitions

* high level defintion

* formlating the reward simply

* improved implementation

* tailored docker compose image for secondary tenaordboard

* preliminary desriptions and babble

* details on formulation and defintion of agent and its loop

* typos one

* more grammar issues

* fluidity improvements and refactors

* more decluttering and dnoising

* finalizing introduction review

* some methodology

* somehow this disappeared

* bit more of this and that

* methodology of how we do architectuer and online DP

* fix: compilation

* expanding on the taxonomy and economic references

* authoer notes

* acks + google GCP

* making space w new format nada lit review

* stronger lit review and more sources

* forgot about tables and graphs

* dedupe citations

* adding cloudflare

* fixing env vars

* updating docs with url

* upating embed

* fixing the url

* paper badge

* formaliztaion of rewards and adding definitions

* noisy formulations

* connecting some more dots here

* adding significant weight in prices

* fixing error

* fixing typos and consistency

* extra math formulations and refferenceot DRO

* fixing diagram of loops

* github mindmap

* fixing erro and thiknig about big picture

* enhancing the website

* goals methodology and gitignore

* some more references and theory links

* talking about some wtp

* feature: added wordcounter

* forcing latex builds and fixining the bib #

* refactor: update Cost of Information equations and notation for clarity

* some more math and refactors

* refactor: unify notation and improve clarity in COI equations

* refactor: generalize master function for demand estimation and pricing strategies

* we dont like math but we have to do it :(

* refactor: enhance Cost of Information framework with additional context and illustration

* refactor: enhance literature review and methodology sections with economic theory insights and system architecture details

* alining format to fit the rubric

* refactoring bibliography

* fix: align

* mdp additionally

* trying different title

* adding balance figure

* agentic givergence, finally

* fix: figure fonts adjusted to match
2026-01-13 17:07:29 +01:00
71 changed files with 1216 additions and 4466 deletions

View File

@@ -19,10 +19,56 @@ jobs:
with: with:
root_file: main.tex root_file: main.tex
working_directory: paper/src working_directory: paper/src
args: -pdf -interaction=nonstopmode -file-line-error -outdir=../build args: -pdf -f -interaction=nonstopmode -file-line-error -outdir=../build
pre_compile: bash ../concat_code.sh pre_compile: bash ../concat_code.sh
- name: Upload PDF - name: Upload PDF
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4 uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
with: with:
name: thesis-pdf name: thesis-pdf
path: paper/build/main.pdf path: paper/build/main.pdf
- name: Get current date
id: date
run: echo "date=$(date +'%Y-%m-%d')" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
- name: Upload to Cloudflare R2
env:
AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID: ${{ secrets.R2_ACCESS_KEY_ID }}
AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY: ${{ secrets.R2_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY }}
AWS_ENDPOINT_URL: ${{ secrets.R2_ENDPOINT }}
DATE: ${{ steps.date.outputs.date }}
BUCKET_NAME: ${{ secrets.R2_BUCKET_NAME }}
run: |
pip install boto3
python3 << 'EOF'
import boto3
import os
s3 = boto3.client('s3',
endpoint_url=os.environ['AWS_ENDPOINT_URL'],
aws_access_key_id=os.environ['AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID'],
aws_secret_access_key=os.environ['AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY']
)
date = os.environ['DATE']
bucket = os.environ['BUCKET_NAME']
# upload dated version
dated_filename = f"thesis-{date}.pdf"
s3.upload_file(
'paper/build/main.pdf',
bucket,
dated_filename,
ExtraArgs={'ContentType': 'application/pdf'}
)
print(f"Uploaded {dated_filename}")
# upload latest version
s3.upload_file(
'paper/build/main.pdf',
bucket,
'thesis-latest.pdf',
ExtraArgs={'ContentType': 'application/pdf'}
)
print(f"Uploaded thesis-latest.pdf")
EOF

6
.gitignore vendored
View File

@@ -12,6 +12,12 @@
**/_build/ **/_build/
paper/src/bib/auto paper/src/bib/auto
=======
**/_build/
paper/src/auto/*
paper/src/bib/auto
docs/goals/*.md
PHANTOM.wiki/
experiments/airflow/logs/* experiments/airflow/logs/*
experiments/airflow/logs/scheduler/ experiments/airflow/logs/scheduler/
experiments/airflow/logs/dag_processor_manager/ experiments/airflow/logs/dag_processor_manager/

View File

@@ -22,14 +22,15 @@ $(BUILDDIR):
pdf.build: $(BUILDDIR) pdf.build: $(BUILDDIR)
@bash paper/concat_code.sh @bash paper/concat_code.sh
@cd $(SRCDIR) && \ @cd $(SRCDIR) && \
$(LATEXMK) -pdf -jobname=$(JOBNAME) \ $(LATEXMK) -pdf -jobname=$(JOBNAME) -f \
-interaction=nonstopmode -file-line-error \ -interaction=nonstopmode -file-line-error \
-r ../.latexmkrc \
-outdir=../$(BUILDDIR) $(TEX) -outdir=../$(BUILDDIR) $(TEX)
.PHONY: pdf.watch .PHONY: pdf.watch
pdf.watch: $(BUILDDIR) pdf.watch: $(BUILDDIR)
@cd $(SRCDIR) && \ @cd $(SRCDIR) && \
$(LATEXMK) -pvc -pdf -jobname=$(JOBNAME) \ $(LATEXMK) -pvc -pdf -jobname=$(JOBNAME) -f \
-interaction=nonstopmode -file-line-error \ -interaction=nonstopmode -file-line-error \
-r ../.latexmkrc \ -r ../.latexmkrc \
-outdir=../$(BUILDDIR) $(TEX) -outdir=../$(BUILDDIR) $(TEX)
@@ -74,6 +75,18 @@ stats.lines:
@find . \( -path '*/node_modules' -o -path '*/.venv' -o -path '*/venv' \) -prune -o \ @find . \( -path '*/node_modules' -o -path '*/.venv' -o -path '*/venv' \) -prune -o \
\( -name "*.ts" -o -name "*.py" \) -type f -print0 | xargs -0 cat | wc -l \( -name "*.ts" -o -name "*.py" \) -type f -print0 | xargs -0 cat | wc -l
.PHONY wordcount
wordcount:
@echo "Counting words in main text (excluding appendix)..."
@texcount -nosub -total -sum -1 \
$(SRCDIR)/chapters/01-intro.tex \
$(SRCDIR)/chapters/02-literature-review.tex \
$(SRCDIR)/chapters/03-methodology.tex \
$(SRCDIR)/chapters/04-results.tex \
$(SRCDIR)/chapters/05-discussion.tex \
$(SRCDIR)/chapters/06-conclusion.tex
.PHONY: pdf clean watch run.webapp test count-lines all .PHONY: pdf clean watch run.webapp test count-lines all
pdf: pdf.build pdf: pdf.build
clean: pdf.clean clean: pdf.clean

View File

@@ -3,10 +3,92 @@
### PHANTOM ### PHANTOM
[![Build PDF](https://github.com/velocitatem/PHANTOM/actions/workflows/latex.yml/badge.svg)](https://github.com/velocitatem/PHANTOM/actions/workflows/latex.yml) [![Build PDF](https://github.com/velocitatem/PHANTOM/actions/workflows/latex.yml/badge.svg)](https://github.com/velocitatem/PHANTOM/actions/workflows/latex.yml)
[![Paper](https://img.shields.io/badge/Paper-PDF-red?logo=adobe-acrobat-reader)](https://pub-d5b94a3c29fd40c6b3881946e463fdb7.r2.dev/thesis-latest.pdf)
[![TPU Research Cloud](https://img.shields.io/badge/TPU%20Research%20Cloud-TRC%20supported-4285F4?logo=googlecloud&logoColor=white)](https://sites.research.google/trc/faq/) [![TPU Research Cloud](https://img.shields.io/badge/TPU%20Research%20Cloud-TRC%20supported-4285F4?logo=googlecloud&logoColor=white)](https://sites.research.google/trc/faq/)
[![Vercel Deploy](https://deploy-badge.vercel.app/?url=https://phantom-hotel.vercel.app&name=Hotel)](https://phantom-hotel.vercel.app) [![Vercel Deploy](https://deploy-badge.vercel.app/?url=https://phantom-hotel.vercel.app&name=Hotel)](https://phantom-hotel.vercel.app)
[![Vercel Deploy](https://deploy-badge.vercel.app/?url=https://phantom-airline.vercel.app&name=Airline)](https://phantom-airline.vercel.app) [![Vercel Deploy](https://deploy-badge.vercel.app/?url=https://phantom-airline.vercel.app&name=Airline)](https://phantom-airline.vercel.app)
```mermaid
mindmap
PHANTOM((PHANTOM Project))
North Star
Study how automated actors change markets
Build an experimentation platform for real-world-like commerce
Two-loop learning system
Online observation loop
Offline "defense gym" loop
Core Economic Questions
Price Discovery
How prices respond to demand signals
How signal quality changes with bots/agents
Demand & Elasticity
Shifts in willingness-to-pay
Short-run vs long-run elasticity
Market Efficiency & Welfare
Consumer surplus vs producer surplus
Deadweight loss from frictions/manipulation
Price Discrimination & Segmentation
Behavioral feature-based segmentation
Fairness vs profitability tradeoffs
Information Asymmetry
Agents amplify search and arbitrage
Sellers infer more about buyers; buyers infer more about sellers
Strategic Interaction
Consumers vs firms vs agents
Feedback loops: policy ↔ behavior ↔ price
Market Power & Competition
Algorithmic pricing as competitive tool
Risks: tacit coordination / "algorithmic collusion"
Externalities
Congestion and attention costs
Spillovers: one segments behavior affects others prices
System-Level View
Participants
Humans
Agents (automated buyers/actors)
Firms (pricing decision-makers)
Platform (measurement + control layer)
Markets Simulated
Repeated transactions
Limited inventory / capacity constraints (conceptually)
Time dynamics (learning over time)
Interventions
Pricing policies
Experiment assignment / randomized exposure
Agent behavioral policies (task-driven)
Measurement & Causal Inference
What is observed
Actions (search, click, purchase intent)
Context (product attributes, time, exposure)
Outcomes (conversion, revenue, churn proxies)
Identification strategy
A/B tests and randomization
Counterfactual baselines
Robustness checks (offline replay)
Key metrics
Revenue / profit proxies
Conversion & bounce
Price volatility / stability
Welfare proxies (e.g., dispersion, access)
Risk, Governance, and Ethics
Manipulation & Integrity
Bot-driven demand distortion
Measurement contamination
Fairness & Transparency
Differential pricing concerns
Explainability and auditability
Safety Constraints
Guardrails on price moves
Monitoring for runaway feedback loops
Outputs
Insights
When do agents raise/lower prices via behavior shifts?
Which market designs are robust to automation?
Defenses
Agent-aware pricing policies (robust control)
Detection + mitigation strategies (feature-level separability)
Platform Value
Reusable testbed for market + AI-agent research
```

21
docs/goals/goals.csv Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
store_mode,task_name,task_description,definition_of_done
airline,The Indecisive Executive (SEA-LAX),"You are traveling SEA to LAX for business. You prefer Business Class for the comfort, but you need to justify the expense to your company. 1) Find the Business Class option and check its price. 2) Compare it against the Economy option on the same route to see how much money you are saving or spending. 3) Spend some time weighing the pros and cons of the ""Flexible"" fare rule vs the standard one. 4) Ultimately, decide that your comfort is worth it and book the Business Class ticket.","Booking for SEA-LAX Business Class is completed."
airline,The Cross-Country Splurge (LAX-JFK),"You are flying LAX to JFK and want to treat yourself to First Class, but only if it's the right flight. 1) Find the First Class option. 2) thoroughly check the details (duration, arrival time). 3) Compare it with the Business Class option if available, or just look at other departure times to ensure this is the best schedule. 4) After confirming this is the absolute best option, proceed to book First Class.","Booking for LAX-JFK First Class is completed."
airline,The Budget Student (DFW-ORD),"You are a broke student flying DFW to ORD. You have a budget of roughly $200. 1) Find the cheapest Economy flight. 2) Before booking, frantically check if there are any other flights or if the ""Premium"" economy is somehow cheaper (it won't be, but you should check). 3) Hesitate for a moment to consider if you should just drive instead. 4) Resign yourself to the flight and book the Economy ticket.","Booking for DFW-ORD Economy Class is completed."
airline,The Quick Hop Commuter (LAX-SFO),"You need to get from LAX to SFO as fast as possible. Price is secondary to speed. 1) Search for flights and identify the one with the shortest duration (1h 30m). 2) Click into the details to verify the arrival time fits your schedule. 3) briefly explore if there's a Business Class upgrade available for this short flight. 4) Decide to stick with Economy since it's such a short trip and book it.","Booking for LAX-SFO is completed."
airline,The Status Chaser (SFO-SEA),"You are trying to earn airline points and need a ""Premium"" class ticket specifically. 1) Search SFO to SEA. 2) Filter or look for the Premium Economy option. 3) Compare the price gap between Premium and Standard Economy. 4) Browse the details to see if the ""Premium"" fare includes better baggage allowance. 5) Conclude it's worth the points and book the Premium seat.","Booking for SFO-SEA Premium Economy is completed."
airline,The Family Reunion (MIA-ATL),"You are booking for a family of 4 (2 adults, 2 children) flying MIA to ATL. 1) Search for 4 passengers. 2) You prefer Premium, but if the total is too high, you might settle for Economy. 3) Add Premium to your cart, look at the total, and hesitate. 4) Go back and check the Economy price for 4 people. 5) Decide to treat your family and go back to book the Premium option.","Booking for MIA-ATL (Premium) is completed."
airline,The Red Eye Skeptic (LAX-JFK),"You need to fly LAX to JFK but hate late arrivals. 1) Search for the flight and check the arrival time of the First Class option. 2) It arrives early morning (02:15), which worries you. 3) Spend some time looking for other flight options on different days to see if there's a better schedule. 4) Realize this is the only direct option that works and proceed to book it despite the time.","Booking for LAX-JFK is completed."
airline,The Refundable Requirement (ATL-DFW),"Your meeting in Dallas might get cancelled, so you strictly need a ""Refundable"" ticket. 1) Search ATL to DFW. 2) Find the First Class option and verify it lists ""Refundable"". 3) Check the Economy option to see if it is also refundable (it might not be). 4) Weigh the cost difference. 5) Choose the First Class Refundable option for peace of mind.","Booking for ATL-DFW First Class is completed."
airline,The Hub Connector (ORD-MIA),"You are flying ORD to MIA to catch a cruise. You cannot be late. 1) Search for the flight. 2) Verify the ""stops"" is 0 (Direct). 3) Click into details to check the duration. 4) Worry that 3h 30m might be too long in Economy. 5) Look for a Business class option. 6) Decide to save money for the cruise and book Economy.","Booking for ORD-MIA Economy is completed."
airline,The West Coast Hopper (SEA-LAX Business),"You fly this route often and usually pay around $700. 1) Search SEA to LAX. 2) Find the Business Class ticket. 3) Check if the price is near your usual $720 or if it's surged. 4) If it looks expensive, browse other dates to compare. 5) Return to your original desired date and book the Business Class seat.","Booking for SEA-LAX Business is completed."
hotel,The Honeymoon Suite (Presidential),"It is your honeymoon. You want the best room available, specifically one with a ""jacuzzi"". 1) Search for a room for 2 people. 2) Identify the ""Presidential Suite"". 3) Click details to confirm the amenities include a jacuzzi. 4) Browse the ""Executive Suite"" just to see what you are upgrading from. 5) Go back to the Presidential Suite, confirm it's the one you want, and book it.","Booking for the Presidential Suite is completed."
hotel,The Digital Nomad (Executive),"You are working remotely and strictly need a ""workspace"". 1) Search for a room. 2) Check the ""Executive Suite"" details for a workspace. 3) Check the ""Deluxe Room"" to see if it also has a workspace and is cheaper. 4) Compare the images (if available) or amenity lists of both. 5) Decide the Executive Suite looks more comfortable for a week of work and book it.","Booking for the Executive Suite is completed."
hotel,The Safety First (Superior),"You are traveling with valuables and need a ""safe"" in the room. 1) Search for a room. 2) Look at the ""Standard Room"" amenities. Does it have a safe? 3) Look at the ""Superior Room"". Verify it has a safe. 4) Compare the price difference. Is safety worth the extra cost? 5) Decide it is, and book the Superior Room.","Booking for the Superior Room is completed."
hotel,The Bachelor Party (Max Occupancy),"You are booking for 4 guys. You want everyone in one room if possible. 1) Search for 4 adults. 2) Find the room that fits 4 people (Presidential). 3) It looks expensive. Go back and search for 2 adults to see the price of a ""Standard Room"". 4) Calculate if booking two Standard Rooms is cheaper than one Presidential. 5) Decide it's too much hassle to manage two bookings and book the Presidential Suite.","Booking for the Presidential Suite is completed."
hotel,The Budget Refundable (Junior),"You want a cheap room but your dates might change, so it MUST be refundable. 1) Search for a room. 2) Sort by price or find the cheapest options. 3) Check the ""Standard"" and ""Superior"" rooms. Notice they are likely Non-Refundable. 4) Find the ""Junior Suite"" which is Refundable. 5) Grumble about the price difference but book the Junior Suite because you need the flexibility.","Booking for the Junior Suite is completed."
hotel,The View Hunter (Executive),"You want a room with a ""city_view"" or balcony. 1) Search for a room. 2) Check the amenities of the ""Deluxe Room"". 3) Check the amenities of the ""Executive Suite"". 4) Compare the prices. 5) Decide to treat yourself to the Executive Suite for the better view/balcony and book it.","Booking for the Executive Suite is completed."
hotel,The Just-A-Bed (Standard),"You just need a place to crash. Lowest price wins. 1) Search for a room. 2) Identify the absolute cheapest option (Standard Room). 3) Click details just to make sure it has ""wifi"". 4) Briefly glance at the ""Superior Room"" to see if the upgrade is <$10. 5) If not, go back and book the Standard Room immediately.","Booking for the Standard Room is completed."
hotel,The Family Vacation (Deluxe),"You are traveling with a child. You need a room that isn't too cramped but not a suite. 1) Search for 2 adults, 1 child. 2) Look at the ""Deluxe Room"". 3) Check the amenities for ""coffee_maker"" (parents need coffee). 4) Compare it with the ""Junior Suite"". 5) Decide the Deluxe Room is sufficient value and book it.","Booking for the Deluxe Room is completed."
hotel,The Long Stay (Junior),"You are staying for 7 nights. You want something nicer than a standard room but affordable. 1) Search for a room. 2) Look at the ""Junior Suite"". 3) Check the amenities for a ""mini_fridge"" or similar. 4) Compare the total cost for 7 nights against your budget. 5) Hesitate and look at the ""Standard Room"" price. 6) Decide the extra space of the Junior Suite is worth it for a long stay and book it.","Booking for the Junior Suite is completed."
hotel,The Last Minute Panic (Superior),"It's late and you need a room for tonight. 1) Search for a room for 1 person. 2) You recognize the ""Superior Room"" brand. 3) Click it. 4) Quickly verify check-in times or details. 5) Don't overthink it—book the Superior Room as fast as possible.","Booking for the Superior Room is completed."
1 store_mode task_name task_description definition_of_done
2 airline The Indecisive Executive (SEA-LAX) You are traveling SEA to LAX for business. You prefer Business Class for the comfort, but you need to justify the expense to your company. 1) Find the Business Class option and check its price. 2) Compare it against the Economy option on the same route to see how much money you are saving or spending. 3) Spend some time weighing the pros and cons of the "Flexible" fare rule vs the standard one. 4) Ultimately, decide that your comfort is worth it and book the Business Class ticket. Booking for SEA-LAX Business Class is completed.
3 airline The Cross-Country Splurge (LAX-JFK) You are flying LAX to JFK and want to treat yourself to First Class, but only if it's the right flight. 1) Find the First Class option. 2) thoroughly check the details (duration, arrival time). 3) Compare it with the Business Class option if available, or just look at other departure times to ensure this is the best schedule. 4) After confirming this is the absolute best option, proceed to book First Class. Booking for LAX-JFK First Class is completed.
4 airline The Budget Student (DFW-ORD) You are a broke student flying DFW to ORD. You have a budget of roughly $200. 1) Find the cheapest Economy flight. 2) Before booking, frantically check if there are any other flights or if the "Premium" economy is somehow cheaper (it won't be, but you should check). 3) Hesitate for a moment to consider if you should just drive instead. 4) Resign yourself to the flight and book the Economy ticket. Booking for DFW-ORD Economy Class is completed.
5 airline The Quick Hop Commuter (LAX-SFO) You need to get from LAX to SFO as fast as possible. Price is secondary to speed. 1) Search for flights and identify the one with the shortest duration (1h 30m). 2) Click into the details to verify the arrival time fits your schedule. 3) briefly explore if there's a Business Class upgrade available for this short flight. 4) Decide to stick with Economy since it's such a short trip and book it. Booking for LAX-SFO is completed.
6 airline The Status Chaser (SFO-SEA) You are trying to earn airline points and need a "Premium" class ticket specifically. 1) Search SFO to SEA. 2) Filter or look for the Premium Economy option. 3) Compare the price gap between Premium and Standard Economy. 4) Browse the details to see if the "Premium" fare includes better baggage allowance. 5) Conclude it's worth the points and book the Premium seat. Booking for SFO-SEA Premium Economy is completed.
7 airline The Family Reunion (MIA-ATL) You are booking for a family of 4 (2 adults, 2 children) flying MIA to ATL. 1) Search for 4 passengers. 2) You prefer Premium, but if the total is too high, you might settle for Economy. 3) Add Premium to your cart, look at the total, and hesitate. 4) Go back and check the Economy price for 4 people. 5) Decide to treat your family and go back to book the Premium option. Booking for MIA-ATL (Premium) is completed.
8 airline The Red Eye Skeptic (LAX-JFK) You need to fly LAX to JFK but hate late arrivals. 1) Search for the flight and check the arrival time of the First Class option. 2) It arrives early morning (02:15), which worries you. 3) Spend some time looking for other flight options on different days to see if there's a better schedule. 4) Realize this is the only direct option that works and proceed to book it despite the time. Booking for LAX-JFK is completed.
9 airline The Refundable Requirement (ATL-DFW) Your meeting in Dallas might get cancelled, so you strictly need a "Refundable" ticket. 1) Search ATL to DFW. 2) Find the First Class option and verify it lists "Refundable". 3) Check the Economy option to see if it is also refundable (it might not be). 4) Weigh the cost difference. 5) Choose the First Class Refundable option for peace of mind. Booking for ATL-DFW First Class is completed.
10 airline The Hub Connector (ORD-MIA) You are flying ORD to MIA to catch a cruise. You cannot be late. 1) Search for the flight. 2) Verify the "stops" is 0 (Direct). 3) Click into details to check the duration. 4) Worry that 3h 30m might be too long in Economy. 5) Look for a Business class option. 6) Decide to save money for the cruise and book Economy. Booking for ORD-MIA Economy is completed.
11 airline The West Coast Hopper (SEA-LAX Business) You fly this route often and usually pay around $700. 1) Search SEA to LAX. 2) Find the Business Class ticket. 3) Check if the price is near your usual $720 or if it's surged. 4) If it looks expensive, browse other dates to compare. 5) Return to your original desired date and book the Business Class seat. Booking for SEA-LAX Business is completed.
12 hotel The Honeymoon Suite (Presidential) It is your honeymoon. You want the best room available, specifically one with a "jacuzzi". 1) Search for a room for 2 people. 2) Identify the "Presidential Suite". 3) Click details to confirm the amenities include a jacuzzi. 4) Browse the "Executive Suite" just to see what you are upgrading from. 5) Go back to the Presidential Suite, confirm it's the one you want, and book it. Booking for the Presidential Suite is completed.
13 hotel The Digital Nomad (Executive) You are working remotely and strictly need a "workspace". 1) Search for a room. 2) Check the "Executive Suite" details for a workspace. 3) Check the "Deluxe Room" to see if it also has a workspace and is cheaper. 4) Compare the images (if available) or amenity lists of both. 5) Decide the Executive Suite looks more comfortable for a week of work and book it. Booking for the Executive Suite is completed.
14 hotel The Safety First (Superior) You are traveling with valuables and need a "safe" in the room. 1) Search for a room. 2) Look at the "Standard Room" amenities. Does it have a safe? 3) Look at the "Superior Room". Verify it has a safe. 4) Compare the price difference. Is safety worth the extra cost? 5) Decide it is, and book the Superior Room. Booking for the Superior Room is completed.
15 hotel The Bachelor Party (Max Occupancy) You are booking for 4 guys. You want everyone in one room if possible. 1) Search for 4 adults. 2) Find the room that fits 4 people (Presidential). 3) It looks expensive. Go back and search for 2 adults to see the price of a "Standard Room". 4) Calculate if booking two Standard Rooms is cheaper than one Presidential. 5) Decide it's too much hassle to manage two bookings and book the Presidential Suite. Booking for the Presidential Suite is completed.
16 hotel The Budget Refundable (Junior) You want a cheap room but your dates might change, so it MUST be refundable. 1) Search for a room. 2) Sort by price or find the cheapest options. 3) Check the "Standard" and "Superior" rooms. Notice they are likely Non-Refundable. 4) Find the "Junior Suite" which is Refundable. 5) Grumble about the price difference but book the Junior Suite because you need the flexibility. Booking for the Junior Suite is completed.
17 hotel The View Hunter (Executive) You want a room with a "city_view" or balcony. 1) Search for a room. 2) Check the amenities of the "Deluxe Room". 3) Check the amenities of the "Executive Suite". 4) Compare the prices. 5) Decide to treat yourself to the Executive Suite for the better view/balcony and book it. Booking for the Executive Suite is completed.
18 hotel The Just-A-Bed (Standard) You just need a place to crash. Lowest price wins. 1) Search for a room. 2) Identify the absolute cheapest option (Standard Room). 3) Click details just to make sure it has "wifi". 4) Briefly glance at the "Superior Room" to see if the upgrade is <$10. 5) If not, go back and book the Standard Room immediately. Booking for the Standard Room is completed.
19 hotel The Family Vacation (Deluxe) You are traveling with a child. You need a room that isn't too cramped but not a suite. 1) Search for 2 adults, 1 child. 2) Look at the "Deluxe Room". 3) Check the amenities for "coffee_maker" (parents need coffee). 4) Compare it with the "Junior Suite". 5) Decide the Deluxe Room is sufficient value and book it. Booking for the Deluxe Room is completed.
20 hotel The Long Stay (Junior) You are staying for 7 nights. You want something nicer than a standard room but affordable. 1) Search for a room. 2) Look at the "Junior Suite". 3) Check the amenities for a "mini_fridge" or similar. 4) Compare the total cost for 7 nights against your budget. 5) Hesitate and look at the "Standard Room" price. 6) Decide the extra space of the Junior Suite is worth it for a long stay and book it. Booking for the Junior Suite is completed.
21 hotel The Last Minute Panic (Superior) It's late and you need a room for tonight. 1) Search for a room for 1 person. 2) You recognize the "Superior Room" brand. 3) Click it. 4) Quickly verify check-in times or details. 5) Don't overthink it—book the Superior Room as fast as possible. Booking for the Superior Room is completed.

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@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@
<meta name="citation_author" content="Rösel, Daniel"> <meta name="citation_author" content="Rösel, Daniel">
<meta name="citation_publication_date" content="2025"> <meta name="citation_publication_date" content="2025">
<meta name="citation_conference_title" content="IE University Bachelor's Thesis"> <meta name="citation_conference_title" content="IE University Bachelor's Thesis">
<meta name="citation_pdf_url" content="TODO"> <meta name="citation_pdf_url" content="https://pub-d5b94a3c29fd40c6b3881946e463fdb7.r2.dev/thesis-latest.pdf">
<!-- Additional SEO --> <!-- Additional SEO -->
<meta name="theme-color" content="#2563eb"> <meta name="theme-color" content="#2563eb">
@@ -233,14 +233,13 @@
<div class="is-size-5 publication-authors"> <div class="is-size-5 publication-authors">
<span class="author-block">IE University<br>Bachelor's Thesis 2025</span> <span class="author-block">IE University<br>Bachelor's Thesis 2025</span>
<span class="eql-cntrb"><small><br>Advisor: <a href="SECOND AUTHOR PERSONAL LINK" target="_blank">Alberto Martín Izquierdo</a></small></span> <span class="eql-cntrb"><small><br>Advisor: Alberto Martín Izquierdo</small></span>
</div> </div>
<div class="column has-text-centered"> <div class="column has-text-centered">
<div class="publication-links"> <div class="publication-links">
<!-- TODO: Update with your arXiv paper ID -->
<span class="link-block"> <span class="link-block">
<a href="https://arxiv.org/pdf/<ARXIV PAPER ID>.pdf" target="_blank" <a href="https://pub-d5b94a3c29fd40c6b3881946e463fdb7.r2.dev/thesis-latest.pdf" target="_blank"
class="external-link button is-normal is-rounded is-dark"> class="external-link button is-normal is-rounded is-dark">
<span class="icon"> <span class="icon">
<i class="fas fa-file-pdf"></i> <i class="fas fa-file-pdf"></i>
@@ -315,7 +314,10 @@
<h2 class="title is-3">Abstract</h2> <h2 class="title is-3">Abstract</h2>
<div class="content has-text-justified"> <div class="content has-text-justified">
<p> <p>
The primary objective of this thesis is to develop and validate pricing heuristics that protect e-commerce platforms from systematic exploitation by Large Language Model (LLM) agents within dynamic pricing environments. As AI agents increasingly mediate consumer transactions, they enable users to circumvent the Cost of Information (the price premium accumulated through demand signal expression) by conducting reconnaissance in isolated sessions before executing purchases through clean sessions at base prices. This research will make an anticipatory contribution by adapting recommendation system methodologies to distinguish between genuine human browsing behaviour and agent-orchestrated information gathering, thereby enabling pricing systems to maintain margin integrity without degrading the user experience for legitimate customers or getting rid of leads generated by LLMs. This research establishes the following contributions: definition and formalization of non-human transactors in e-commerce platforms, development of a testing-ground for capturing the behavioral essence of these transactors across a large variety of digital systems, construction of a discriminative model to prove separability as a strong learner for downstream mitigation of contamination by non-human entities, translation of such learned separability into existing dynamic pricing machine learning loops, and establishment of a high-level KPI-affecting causal effect and cost-saving framework for the future of internet commerce in the presence of such non-human learners.
</p>
<p>
This work develops behavioral signature models using recommendation system techniques to profile session-level interaction, temporal engagement, and cross-session correlation. The AI Agent market is forecasted to grow from around USD 5-8 billion in 2025 to USD 42-52 billion by 2030, raising the question of how these systems should be designed for future robustness and how to maintain a competitive edge in the analytical components of e-commerce platforms.
</p> </p>
</div> </div>
</div> </div>
@@ -433,8 +435,7 @@
<div class="container"> <div class="container">
<h2 class="title">Poster</h2> <h2 class="title">Poster</h2>
<!-- TODO: Replace with your poster PDF --> <iframe src="https://pub-d5b94a3c29fd40c6b3881946e463fdb7.r2.dev/thesis-latest.pdf" width="100%" height="550">
<iframe src="static/pdfs/sample.pdf" width="100%" height="550">
</iframe> </iframe>
</div> </div>

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@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ class MarketEngine():
def act(self, prices): def act(self, prices):
demand = generate_demand(prices, *self.demand) demand = generate_demand(prices, *self.demand)
sample_n = lambda n, human: [sample_behavior(demand, human=human) for _ in range(n)] sample_n = lambda n, human: [sample_behavior(demand, human=human) for _ in range(n)]
human_t, agent_t = sample_n(100, True), sample_n(100, False) human_t, agent_t = sample_n(self.Nhumans, True), sample_n(self.Nagents, False)
trajectories = human_t + agent_t trajectories = human_t + agent_t
demand_estimate = estimate_demand(trajectories) demand_estimate = estimate_demand(trajectories)
return demand_estimate return demand_estimate

View File

@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ def run_single(cfg: dict) -> dict:
"id": cfg["id"], "id": cfg["id"],
"config": cfg, "config": cfg,
"total_reward": total_reward, "total_reward": total_reward,
"avg_reward": total_reward / steps, "avg_reward": total_reward / steps if steps > 0 else 0.0,
"steps": steps, "steps": steps,
} }

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@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ import pandas as pd
from lib.separability import estimate_alpha, load_artifacts, score_session from lib.separability import estimate_alpha, load_artifacts, score_session
# use relative import when in package context, fallback for standalone # use relative import when in package context, fallback for standalone
try: try:
from sim.rl.behavior_loader.models import AgentBehaviorModel from sim.rl.behavior_loader.models import AgentBehaviorModel
@@ -51,7 +52,6 @@ def _states_to_events(states: list[str]) -> list[SimpleNamespace]:
) )
return events return events
def contaminate_dataset(df: pd.DataFrame, on: str = "event_type", def contaminate_dataset(df: pd.DataFrame, on: str = "event_type",
contamination_rate: float = 0.1, contamination_rate: float = 0.1,
agent_data_dir: Path = None) -> pd.DataFrame: agent_data_dir: Path = None) -> pd.DataFrame:
@@ -78,6 +78,7 @@ def contaminate_dataset(df: pd.DataFrame, on: str = "event_type",
# generate synthetic trajectories # generate synthetic trajectories
new_rows = [] new_rows = []
alpha_estimates = [] alpha_estimates = []
for start_event in start_events: for start_event in start_events:
# sample trajectory from agent model, using a state that contains the event type # sample trajectory from agent model, using a state that contains the event type
mdp_states = model.mdp.get('states', []) if model.mdp else [] mdp_states = model.mdp.get('states', []) if model.mdp else []

View File

@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ from procesing.steps import (
) )
def test_compute_demand(pipeline_context): def test_compute_demand(pipeline_context):
random.seed(42) # deterministic test
step = ComputeDemandStep(context=pipeline_context) step = ComputeDemandStep(context=pipeline_context)
# Test with normal interaction data # Test with normal interaction data
@@ -26,6 +27,7 @@ def test_compute_demand(pipeline_context):
def test_compute_demand_skewed(pipeline_context): def test_compute_demand_skewed(pipeline_context):
random.seed(42) # deterministic test
step = ComputeDemandStep(context=pipeline_context) step = ComputeDemandStep(context=pipeline_context)
# Test with normal interaction data # Test with normal interaction data

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@@ -1,75 +0,0 @@
# MOS (Money Operating System)
Research-grade quote-control simulator for studying dynamic pricing and market making policies.
The system models pricing as a closed loop of **Quote → Arrival → Execution → Position**, enabling
controlled experimentation with demand models, inventory constraints, and reward shaping.
## Core Loop
1. **Quote** the policy posts prices (one-sided or two-sided depending on the mechanism).
2. **Arrival** a population model generates purchase opportunities or market orders.
3. **Execution** an execution model decides whether an arrival converts at the quoted price.
4. **Position** inventory/position limits censor fills and generate holding/shortage costs.
5. **Observation & Reward** censored fills and aggregate metrics are exposed to the agent, while
objectives turn metrics into a scalar reward.
Each stage is pluggable via light-weight protocols so you can swap in alternative mechanisms,
demand models, or objectives without rewriting the rest of the simulator.
## Package Layout
| Module | Purpose |
|-------------------|---------|
| `lab.outlet` | Core simulation engine, domain types, pricing mechanisms, objectives. |
| `lab.population` | Demand arrival models, execution probability models, competitor/market dynamics. |
| `lab.experiments` | Rollout utilities, baseline policies, and off-policy evaluation helpers. |
| `lab.config` | Convenience factories for preconfigured retail and market-making environments. |
## Preconfigured Scenarios
### Retail Dynamic Pricing
- Mechanism: posted prices with margin and delta constraints.
- Arrivals: browsing sessions with contamination support (scrapers).
- Execution: elasticity model with competitor cross-effects.
- Position: inventory tracking with holding and shortage costs.
- Market: reactive competitor that can trigger price wars.
- Objective: PnL minus volatility, holding cost, and lost opportunity penalties.
```python
from lab.config import make_retail_platform
from lab.experiments import rollout, fixed_price_policy
platform = make_retail_platform()
policy = fixed_price_policy(platform.instruments.refs)
result = rollout(platform, policy, n_steps=100)
print(result.total_pnl)
```
### Market Making
- Mechanism: two-sided quoting with bid/ask spreads.
- Arrivals: Hawkes order flow for clustered demand.
- Execution: AvellanedaStoikov style intensity model.
- Position: inventory risk limits and quadratic penalty objective.
- Market: geometric Brownian motion mid-price process.
- Objective: PnL plus spread capture minus inventory risk.
```python
from lab.config import make_market_making_platform
from lab.experiments import rollout
platform = make_market_making_platform()
mm_policy = lambda obs, t: (platform.instruments.refs, 1.0)
result = rollout(platform, mm_policy, n_steps=200, seed=42)
print(result.total_pnl)
```
## Extending the Simulator
- Implement `lab.outlet.protocols.Mechanism` or `ArrivalModel` to introduce new pricing
domains or demand processes.
- Compose objectives with `lab.outlet.objectives.factory.make_composite` to study alternate
reward formulations.
- Use `lab.experiments.compare_policies` to benchmark candidate policies across multiple
random seeds.
Comprehensive API documentation lives in `lab/docs` (build with `make html`).

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@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
"""
Quote-Control Simulator: Research-grade platform for dynamic pricing and market making
The platform abstracts pricing as: Quote -> Arrival -> Execution -> Position
Supports multiple mechanisms:
- PostedPrice: retail dynamic pricing
- TwoSided: market making with bid-ask spreads
- Auction: reserve/shading for auction settings
Example usage:
from lab.config import make_retail_platform
from lab.experiments import rollout, fixed_price_policy
platform = make_retail_platform()
policy = fixed_price_policy(platform.instruments.refs)
result = rollout(platform, policy, n_steps=100)
print(f"Total PnL: {result.total_pnl:.2f}")
"""
from .config import make_retail_platform, make_market_making_platform, RetailConfig, MarketMakingConfig
from .outlet import Platform, PlatformConfig, Quote, Observation, StepResult
__all__ = [
'make_retail_platform', 'make_market_making_platform',
'RetailConfig', 'MarketMakingConfig',
'Platform', 'PlatformConfig', 'Quote', 'Observation', 'StepResult',
]

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@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
"""
Case studies implementing specific research scenarios.
Available cases:
- thesis: PHANTOM thesis implementation with contaminated demand and DR-RL
"""

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@@ -1,25 +0,0 @@
"""
Thesis-specific implementation of the PHANTOM pricing defense framework.
This module implements the mathematical models from the thesis:
- ContaminatedArrivalModel: Mixture demand Q(p) = (1-α)d_H + αd_A (Eq 3)
- HybridExecutionModel: Divergent H/A behavior with separability (Section 2.1)
- RobustStackelbergObjective: Maximin objective with COI penalty (Eq 23)
- COIMetrics: Cost of Information tracking (Definition 1)
The platform configuration creates a research environment that directly
maps to the thesis mathematical framework for DR-RL experiments.
"""
from .arrivals import ContaminatedArrivalModel, ContaminatedArrivalConfig
from .execution import HybridExecutionModel, HybridExecutionConfig
from .objectives import RobustStackelbergObjective, COIObjective
from .platform import make_thesis_platform, ThesisConfig
from .metrics import COIMetrics, compute_coi, compute_separability
__all__ = [
'ContaminatedArrivalModel', 'ContaminatedArrivalConfig',
'HybridExecutionModel', 'HybridExecutionConfig',
'RobustStackelbergObjective', 'COIObjective',
'make_thesis_platform', 'ThesisConfig',
'COIMetrics', 'compute_coi', 'compute_separability',
]

View File

@@ -1,327 +0,0 @@
"""Contaminated arrivals using learned MDP kernels from behavior_loader.
Implements thesis demand model (Section 3.1):
- Aggregate demand Q(p) = (1-α)E[d(p;θ_H)] + αE[d(p;θ_A)] + ε_t (Eq 3)
- Demand proxy q̂_{t,i} = Σ_s Σ_k ω(a_{s,k}) · 1[i_{s,k} = i] (Eq 2)
- Per-session separability via KL divergence Δ_H, Δ_A (Eq 20-21)
The arrival model samples sessions from a mixture of human/agent behavioral profiles,
each session produces a trajectory τ_s and associated demand computation q(τ').
"""
from __future__ import annotations
from dataclasses import dataclass, field
from types import SimpleNamespace
from typing import Dict, List, Tuple, Optional
import numpy as np
from ...outlet.types import Opportunity, InstrumentSet, MarketState, HiddenState
from ...outlet.constants import Side, OpportunityType
from ...outlet.math_util import poisson_arrivals
try:
import sys
from pathlib import Path
sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).parent.parent.parent.parent))
from sim.rl.behavior_loader.models import (
BehaviorModel, AgentBehaviorModel, aggregate_event_transitions, kl_divergence
)
REAL_MDP = True
except ImportError:
REAL_MDP = False
kl_divergence = None
EVENT_PAGE = {"session_start": "/", "view_item_page": "/products", "learn_more_about_item": "/products/details",
"add_item_to_cart": "/cart", "purchase_complete": "/checkout", "session_end": "/checkout/success"}
EVENT_CANON = {"page_view": "session_start", "hover_over_paragraph": "view_item_page", "hover_over_title": "view_item_page",
"view_item_page": "view_item_page", "learn_more_about_item": "learn_more_about_item",
"add_item_to_cart": "add_item_to_cart", "checkout_start": "purchase_complete", "remove_item": "view_item_page"}
# action space partition A = A_nav A_cart A_filter A_dwell with signal weights ω (Table 1)
ACTION_WEIGHTS: Dict[str, float] = {
"add_item_to_cart": 0.8, "remove_item": 0.6, "checkout_start": 0.9, "purchase_complete": 1.0, # A_cart
"hover_over_title": 0.3, "hover_over_paragraph": 0.35, "hover_over_link": 0.25, # A_dwell
"page_view": 0.1, "session_start": 0.05, "view_item_page": 0.15, "learn_more_about_item": 0.2, # A_nav
"search": 0.05, "filter_date": 0.05, "filter_price": 0.08, "sort": 0.03, "session_end": 0.0, # A_filter
}
@dataclass
class SessionDemand:
"""Per-session demand computation per thesis formulation (Section 3.1).
Each session s ∈ S produces trajectory τ_s and demand proxy q̂. The platform uses
divergence signals Δ_H, Δ_A to estimate per-session contamination α̂(τ').
"""
session_id: str
q: Dict[int, float] # q̂_i demand proxy per product (Eq 2)
trajectory: List[Dict] # τ_s = (e_{s,1}, ..., e_{s,L_s})
delta_h: float = 0.0 # D_KL(T̂' || T̄_H) (Eq 20)
delta_a: float = 0.0 # D_KL(T̂' || T̄_A) (Eq 21)
alpha_hat: float = 0.0 # per-session contamination estimate
actor_class: str = "H" # ground truth Y_s ∈ {H, A}
theta: Dict[str, float] = field(default_factory=dict)
def compute_demand_proxy(events: List[Dict], n_products: int) -> Dict[int, float]:
"""Compute q̂_{t,i} = Σ_k ω(a_{s,k}) · 1[i_{s,k} = i] per Eq 2."""
q = {i: 0.0 for i in range(n_products)}
for e in events:
action, pidx = e.get("eventName", ""), e.get("product_idx")
if pidx is not None and 0 <= pidx < n_products:
q[pidx] += ACTION_WEIGHTS.get(action, 0.1)
return q
def compute_session_divergence(events: List[Dict], ref_h: Dict, ref_a: Dict) -> Tuple[float, float]:
"""Compute Δ_H, Δ_A divergence signals from trajectory (Eq 20-21)."""
if not events or kl_divergence is None:
return 0.0, 0.0
# build empirical transition kernel from trajectory
trans: Dict[str, Dict[str, int]] = {}
prev = "session_start"
for e in events:
curr = e.get("eventName", "session_end")
trans.setdefault(prev, {})
trans[prev][curr] = trans[prev].get(curr, 0) + 1
prev = curr
# normalize to probabilities
kernel = {}
for s, dests in trans.items():
total = sum(dests.values())
kernel[s] = {d: c / total for d, c in dests.items()} if total > 0 else {}
# aggregate to event-level and compute KL divergence against reference kernels
delta_h = sum(kl_divergence(kernel.get(s, {}), ref_h.get(s, {})) for s in kernel) / max(len(kernel), 1)
delta_a = sum(kl_divergence(kernel.get(s, {}), ref_a.get(s, {})) for s in kernel) / max(len(kernel), 1)
return delta_h, delta_a
def _canonicalize(raw: Dict) -> Dict:
out = {}
for src, dsts in raw.items():
sc = EVENT_CANON.get(src, src)
out.setdefault(sc, {})
for dst, p in dsts.items():
dc = EVENT_CANON.get(dst, dst)
out[sc][dc] = out[sc].get(dc, 0.0) + p
return {s: {k: v/sum(d.values()) for k, v in d.items()} for s, d in out.items() if sum(d.values()) > 0}
class BehavioralProfile:
"""Markov profile from learned MDP kernels (Section 3.5.2).
Transition kernel T̂_Y estimated via MLE: P̂(s'|s) = N(s,s') / Σ_k N(s,k) (Eq 19)
"""
STATES = ["session_start", "view_item_page", "learn_more_about_item", "add_item_to_cart", "purchase_complete", "session_end"]
# fallback kernels T̄_H, T̄_A when real data unavailable
FALLBACK_H = {"session_start": {"view_item_page": 0.85, "session_end": 0.15},
"view_item_page": {"learn_more_about_item": 0.4, "add_item_to_cart": 0.3, "view_item_page": 0.2, "session_end": 0.1},
"learn_more_about_item": {"add_item_to_cart": 0.5, "view_item_page": 0.3, "session_end": 0.2},
"add_item_to_cart": {"purchase_complete": 0.6, "view_item_page": 0.25, "session_end": 0.15},
"purchase_complete": {"session_end": 1.0}}
FALLBACK_A = {"session_start": {"view_item_page": 0.95, "session_end": 0.05},
"view_item_page": {"learn_more_about_item": 0.6, "view_item_page": 0.25, "add_item_to_cart": 0.1, "session_end": 0.05},
"learn_more_about_item": {"view_item_page": 0.5, "add_item_to_cart": 0.15, "learn_more_about_item": 0.3, "session_end": 0.05},
"add_item_to_cart": {"view_item_page": 0.4, "purchase_complete": 0.2, "session_end": 0.4},
"purchase_complete": {"session_end": 1.0}}
def __init__(self, actor: str, pprobs: np.ndarray, data_dir: str = ""):
self.actor, self.pprobs = actor, np.clip(pprobs, 0.0, 0.95)
self.trans = self._load(data_dir) # T̂_Y transition kernel
self._ensure_terminal()
self.dwell = {s: (1.2, 0.5) if actor == "agents" else (2.0, 1.2) for s in self.STATES}
def _load(self, data_dir: str) -> Dict:
if not REAL_MDP or not data_dir:
print("using fallback")
return dict(self.FALLBACK_A if self.actor == "agents" else self.FALLBACK_H)
try:
mdp = (AgentBehaviorModel if self.actor == "agents" else BehaviorModel)(data_dir).build_MDP()
raw = aggregate_event_transitions(mdp) if mdp.get("transitions") else {}
return _canonicalize(raw) if raw else dict(self.FALLBACK_A if self.actor == "agents" else self.FALLBACK_H)
except Exception:
print("using fallback")
return dict(self.FALLBACK_A if self.actor == "agents" else self.FALLBACK_H)
def _ensure_terminal(self):
self.trans.setdefault("purchase_complete", {})["session_end"] = self.trans.get("purchase_complete", {}).get("session_end", 1.0)
self.trans.setdefault("session_start", {"view_item_page": 0.7, "learn_more_about_item": 0.2, "session_end": 0.1})
def _tprobs(self, state: str, pidx: int) -> Dict[str, float]:
probs = dict(self.trans.get(state, {"session_end": 1.0}))
if state == "add_item_to_cart":
base = probs.get("purchase_complete", 0.0)
df = float(self.pprobs[pidx]) * (0.3 if self.actor == "agents" else 1.0)
adj = np.clip(base * 0.5 + df * 0.5, 0.0, 0.95)
rem = max(1e-6, 1.0 - adj)
other = sum(v for k, v in probs.items() if k != "purchase_complete")
probs = {k: (adj if k == "purchase_complete" else v * rem / max(other, 1e-6)) for k, v in probs.items()}
total = sum(probs.values())
return {k: v/total for k, v in probs.items()} if total > 0 else {"session_end": 1.0}
def sample(self, rng: np.random.Generator, sid: str, prices: np.ndarray, costs: np.ndarray) -> Tuple[List[Dict], List[SimpleNamespace]]:
events, fevts = [], []
state, t, pidx = "session_start", 0.0, int(rng.integers(0, len(prices)))
cost, cprice = float(costs[pidx]), max(float(prices[pidx]), float(costs[pidx]) * 1.05)
while state != "session_end" and len(events) < 40:
if state != "session_start":
row = {"session_id": sid, "actor": "agent" if self.actor == "agents" else "human",
"eventName": state, "product_idx": pidx, "productId": f"product-{pidx:04d}",
"price_offered": cprice, "price_paid": 0.0, "page": EVENT_PAGE.get(state, "/"),
"ts": t, "unit_cost": cost, "base_price": float(prices[pidx])}
if state == "purchase_complete":
row["price_paid"] = max(cprice * (1.0 + rng.normal(0.0, 0.015)), cost)
events.append(row)
fevts.append(SimpleNamespace(eventName=state, page=row["page"], productId=row["productId"], ts=t))
probs = self._tprobs(state, pidx)
state = rng.choice(list(probs.keys()), p=list(probs.values()))
sh, sc = self.dwell.get(state, (2.0, 1.0))
t += max(0.3, rng.gamma(shape=sh, scale=sc))
return events, fevts
@dataclass
class ContaminatedArrivalConfig:
base_rate: float = 20.0
alpha_contamination: float = 0.2
alpha_drift: float = 0.0
alpha_bounds: tuple[float, float] = (0.0, 0.5)
human_views_range: tuple[int, int] = (1, 4)
agent_views_range: tuple[int, int] = (3, 10)
agent_systematic: bool = True
use_real_behavior: bool = True
human_data_dir: str = ""
agent_data_dir: str = ""
class ContaminatedArrivalModel:
"""Mixture model Q(p) = (1-α)E[d(p;θ_H)] + αE[d(p;θ_A)] + ε_t (Eq 3).
Samples sessions from human/agent behavioral profiles, computes per-session
demand proxy q̂ and divergence signals Δ_H, Δ_A for separability.
"""
def __init__(self, cfg: ContaminatedArrivalConfig | None = None):
self.cfg = cfg or ContaminatedArrivalConfig()
self._alpha = self.cfg.alpha_contamination
self._scount = 0
self._profiles: Dict[str, BehavioralProfile] = {}
self._ref_kernels: Dict[str, Dict] = {} # T̄_H, T̄_A reference kernels
self._session_demands: List[SessionDemand] = [] # collected session demands
@property
def alpha(self) -> float:
return self._alpha
def _profile(self, actor: str, pprobs: np.ndarray) -> BehavioralProfile:
key = actor
if key not in self._profiles:
ddir = self.cfg.agent_data_dir if actor == "agents" else self.cfg.human_data_dir
if not ddir and self.cfg.use_real_behavior:
base = Path(__file__).parent.parent.parent.parent / "experiments"
ddir = str(base / ("agents/collected_data" if actor == "agents" else "collected_data"))
profile = BehavioralProfile(actor, pprobs, ddir if self.cfg.use_real_behavior else "")
self._profiles[key] = profile
self._ref_kernels[key] = profile.trans # cache T̄_Y for divergence
return self._profiles[key]
def get_ref_kernels(self) -> Tuple[Dict, Dict]:
"""Return reference transition kernels T̄_H, T̄_A for divergence computation."""
return (self._ref_kernels.get("humans", BehavioralProfile.FALLBACK_H),
self._ref_kernels.get("agents", BehavioralProfile.FALLBACK_A))
def get_session_demands(self) -> List[SessionDemand]:
"""Return collected session demands for downstream analysis."""
return self._session_demands
def sample(self, t: float, dt: float, instruments: InstrumentSet,
market: MarketState | None, hidden: HiddenState, rng: np.random.Generator) -> list[Opportunity]:
"""Sample arrivals as per Eq 3: mixture of human/agent demand distributions.
For each session s, computes:
- Trajectory τ_s from behavioral profile sampling
- Demand proxy q̂ via weighted action aggregation (Eq 2)
- Divergence signals Δ_H, Δ_A for separability (Eq 20-21)
- Per-session contamination estimate α̂(τ')
"""
cfg = self.cfg
if cfg.alpha_drift != 0:
self._alpha = np.clip(self._alpha + cfg.alpha_drift * rng.normal(), *cfg.alpha_bounds)
hidden.contamination = self._alpha
n_sess = poisson_arrivals(cfg.base_rate * hidden.true_demand_intensity, dt, rng)
prices, costs = instruments.refs, instruments.costs
margin = np.clip((prices - costs) / np.maximum(costs, 1e-3), -0.9, 2.0)
hprob, aprob = 0.08 * np.exp(-1.2 * margin), 0.05 * np.exp(-0.6 * margin)
ref_h, ref_a = self.get_ref_kernels()
opps = []
for _ in range(n_sess):
self._scount += 1
sid = f"s{self._scount:06d}"
is_agent = rng.random() < self._alpha
actor, probs = ("agents", aprob) if is_agent else ("humans", hprob)
profile = self._profile(actor, probs)
events, fevts = profile.sample(rng, sid, prices, costs)
# compute demand proxy q̂ per Eq 2
q = compute_demand_proxy(events, instruments.n)
# compute divergence signals Δ_H, Δ_A per Eq 20-21
delta_h, delta_a = compute_session_divergence(events, ref_h, ref_a)
# per-session contamination estimate α̂(τ') = σ(β(Δ_H - Δ_A))
alpha_hat = 1.0 / (1.0 + np.exp(-2.0 * (delta_h - delta_a))) if (delta_h + delta_a) > 0 else 0.5
theta = ({'price_sensitivity': rng.uniform(0.05, 0.2), 'base_conversion': 0.01, 'info_value': 1.0} if is_agent
else {'price_sensitivity': rng.uniform(1.5, 4.0), 'base_conversion': rng.uniform(0.2, 0.5), 'info_value': 0.0})
# store session demand for downstream analysis
self._session_demands.append(SessionDemand(
session_id=sid, q=q, trajectory=events, delta_h=delta_h, delta_a=delta_a,
alpha_hat=alpha_hat, actor_class="A" if is_agent else "H", theta=theta))
viewed = list({e["product_idx"] for e in events if "product_idx" in e})
if not viewed:
vr = cfg.agent_views_range if is_agent else cfg.human_views_range
viewed = list(rng.choice(instruments.n, size=min(rng.integers(*vr), instruments.n), replace=False))
for vi, iid in enumerate(viewed):
opps.append(Opportunity(
id=f"{sid}-{iid}", type=OpportunityType.SESSION, side=Side.BUY,
instrument_id=int(iid), size=1.0, t=t + rng.uniform(0, dt),
context={'session_id': sid, 'actor_class': 'AGENT' if is_agent else 'HUMAN', 'is_agent': is_agent,
'reconnaissance_intent': is_agent, 'view_index': vi, 'total_views': len(viewed),
'theta': theta, 'trajectory_events': fevts, 'mdp_trajectory': events,
'demand_proxy': q, 'alpha_hat': alpha_hat, 'delta_h': delta_h, 'delta_a': delta_a}))
return opps
@dataclass
class AdversarialArrivalConfig:
base_rate: float = 5.0
n_parallel_agents: int = 3
query_all_products: bool = True
class AdversarialArrivalModel:
"""Adversarial coordination (Theorem 1): as N->inf, COI->0."""
def __init__(self, cfg: AdversarialArrivalConfig | None = None):
self.cfg = cfg or AdversarialArrivalConfig()
self._qcount = 0
def sample(self, t: float, dt: float, instruments: InstrumentSet,
market: MarketState | None, hidden: HiddenState, rng: np.random.Generator) -> list[Opportunity]:
cfg, opps = self.cfg, []
for _ in range(poisson_arrivals(cfg.base_rate, dt, rng)):
self._qcount += 1
for ai in range(cfg.n_parallel_agents):
sid = f"adv{self._qcount:06d}-{ai}"
prods = np.arange(instruments.n) if cfg.query_all_products else rng.choice(instruments.n, size=1)
for iid in prods:
opps.append(Opportunity(
id=f"{sid}-{iid}", type=OpportunityType.SESSION, side=Side.BUY,
instrument_id=int(iid), size=1.0, t=t,
context={'session_id': sid, 'actor_class': 'AGENT', 'is_agent': True, 'adversarial': True,
'agent_index': ai, 'query_group': self._qcount,
'theta': {'price_sensitivity': 0.0, 'base_conversion': 0.0, 'info_value': 1.0}}))
return opps

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@@ -1,91 +0,0 @@
"""Execution models with divergent H/A behavior using ground truth labels."""
from __future__ import annotations
from dataclasses import dataclass
from typing import Any, Dict
import numpy as np
from ...outlet.types import Opportunity, Quote, InstrumentSet, MarketState
from ...outlet.math_util import sigmoid, safe_log, EPS
@dataclass
class HybridExecutionConfig:
human_base_prob: float = 0.3
human_elasticity: float = 2.5
agent_conversion: float = 0.01
cross_elasticity: float = 0.4
quality_weight: float = 0.2
use_separability: bool = False
class HybridExecutionModel:
"""Execution with divergent H/A behavior using ground truth labels."""
def __init__(self, cfg: HybridExecutionConfig | None = None):
self.cfg = cfg or HybridExecutionConfig()
def prob(self, opp: Opportunity, quote: Quote, instruments: InstrumentSet,
market: MarketState | None, rng: np.random.Generator) -> float:
cfg, idx = self.cfg, int(opp.instrument_id)
price, ref, cost = float(quote.prices[idx]), float(instruments.refs[idx]), float(instruments.costs[idx])
ctx = opp.context
theta = ctx.get('theta', {})
is_agent = ctx.get('is_agent', False)
if is_agent:
return cfg.agent_conversion * theta.get('base_conversion', 1.0)
# human logit discrete choice
sens = theta.get('price_sensitivity', cfg.human_elasticity)
base = theta.get('base_conversion', cfg.human_base_prob)
u_price = -sens * safe_log(price / (ref + EPS))
quality = instruments.instruments[idx].attrs.get('quality', 0.5)
u_quality = cfg.quality_weight * quality
u_comp = 0.0
if market and market.competitor_quotes is not None:
cp = market.competitor_quotes[idx]
if cp < price:
u_comp = -cfg.cross_elasticity * (price - cp) / ref
utility = safe_log(base / (1 - base + EPS)) + u_price + u_quality + u_comp
return float(sigmoid(utility))
def uncensor(self, fills: np.ndarray, instruments: InstrumentSet, context: dict[str, Any] | None = None) -> np.ndarray:
if context is None:
return fills / (self.cfg.human_base_prob + EPS)
agent_frac = context.get('contamination', 0.0)
return fills / (self.cfg.human_base_prob * (1 - agent_frac) + EPS)
@dataclass
class SeparableExecutionConfig:
human_funnel: Dict[str, float] = None
agent_funnel: Dict[str, float] = None
def __post_init__(self):
self.human_funnel = self.human_funnel or {'view_to_detail': 0.4, 'detail_to_cart': 0.3, 'cart_to_purchase': 0.6}
self.agent_funnel = self.agent_funnel or {'view_to_detail': 0.8, 'detail_to_cart': 0.05, 'cart_to_purchase': 0.1}
class SeparableExecutionModel:
"""Execution with Markov funnel kernels using ground truth labels."""
def __init__(self, cfg: SeparableExecutionConfig | None = None):
self.cfg = cfg or SeparableExecutionConfig()
def prob(self, opp: Opportunity, quote: Quote, instruments: InstrumentSet,
market: MarketState | None, rng: np.random.Generator) -> float:
is_agent = opp.context.get('is_agent', False)
probs = self.cfg.agent_funnel if is_agent else self.cfg.human_funnel
p = probs['view_to_detail'] * probs['detail_to_cart'] * probs['cart_to_purchase']
if not is_agent:
idx = int(opp.instrument_id)
price_ratio = quote.prices[idx] / (instruments.refs[idx] + EPS)
p *= np.exp(-0.5 * (price_ratio - 1.0))
return float(np.clip(p, 0, 1))
def uncensor(self, fills: np.ndarray, instruments: InstrumentSet, context: dict[str, Any] | None = None) -> np.ndarray:
h = self.cfg.human_funnel
exp_conv = h['view_to_detail'] * h['detail_to_cart'] * h['cart_to_purchase']
return fills / (exp_conv + EPS)

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@@ -1,102 +0,0 @@
"""Thesis metrics for COI and behavioral analysis using ground truth labels."""
from __future__ import annotations
from dataclasses import dataclass, field
from typing import Dict
import numpy as np
from ...outlet.types import StepLogs, StepMetrics, Quote, InstrumentSet
from ...outlet.math_util import safe_log, EPS
@dataclass
class COIMetrics:
coi_level: float = 0.0
coi_leakage: float = 0.0
realized_premium: float = 0.0
theoretical_max: float = 0.0
erosion_rate: float = 0.0
def to_dict(self) -> dict[str, float]:
return {k: getattr(self, k) for k in ['coi_level', 'coi_leakage', 'realized_premium', 'theoretical_max', 'erosion_rate']}
def compute_coi(quote: Quote, instruments: InstrumentSet, metrics: StepMetrics, contamination: float) -> COIMetrics:
prices, costs, refs = quote.prices, instruments.costs, instruments.refs
margins = prices - costs
coi_level = float(np.mean(margins))
theoretical_max = float(np.mean(costs))
realized_premium = (metrics.revenue - metrics.cost) / metrics.units_traded if metrics.units_traded > 0 else 0.0
price_var = float(np.var(prices / refs))
coi_leakage = contamination * (coi_level + price_var)
erosion_rate = contamination * coi_level / (theoretical_max + EPS)
return COIMetrics(coi_level=coi_level, coi_leakage=coi_leakage, realized_premium=realized_premium,
theoretical_max=theoretical_max, erosion_rate=erosion_rate)
@dataclass
class SeparabilityMetrics:
classification_accuracy: float = 0.0
estimated_alpha: float = 0.0
n_human_sessions: int = 0
n_agent_sessions: int = 0
def compute_separability(logs: StepLogs, true_alpha: float) -> SeparabilityMetrics:
"""Compute separability using ground truth labels only."""
if logs.events is None or len(logs.events) == 0:
return SeparabilityMetrics(estimated_alpha=true_alpha)
sessions: Dict[str, bool] = {}
for evt in logs.events:
sid = evt.metadata.get('session_id', evt.opportunity_id)
if sid not in sessions:
sessions[sid] = evt.metadata.get('is_agent', False)
n_agent = sum(1 for is_agent in sessions.values() if is_agent)
n_human = len(sessions) - n_agent
est_alpha = n_agent / len(sessions) if sessions else 0.0
return SeparabilityMetrics(
classification_accuracy=1.0, # ground truth is always correct
estimated_alpha=est_alpha,
n_human_sessions=n_human,
n_agent_sessions=n_agent)
@dataclass
class RevenueAttribution:
total_revenue: float = 0.0
human_revenue: float = 0.0
agent_revenue: float = 0.0
human_conversion: float = 0.0
agent_conversion: float = 0.0
def compute_attribution(logs: StepLogs, metrics: StepMetrics) -> RevenueAttribution:
if logs.executions is None:
return RevenueAttribution(total_revenue=metrics.revenue)
human_rev, agent_rev, human_cnt, agent_cnt = 0.0, 0.0, 0, 0
for exe in logs.executions:
if exe.propensity < 0.05:
agent_rev += exe.price * exe.size_filled
agent_cnt += 1
else:
human_rev += exe.price * exe.size_filled
human_cnt += 1
total_exp = logs.aggregates.get('n_arrivals', 1)
return RevenueAttribution(
total_revenue=metrics.revenue, human_revenue=human_rev, agent_revenue=agent_rev,
human_conversion=human_cnt / (total_exp * 0.8 + EPS),
agent_conversion=agent_cnt / (total_exp * 0.2 + EPS))
def order_statistic_erosion(n_agents: int, price_variance: float) -> float:
"""COI erosion from Theorem 1: as N->inf, min(p_1..p_N)->p_min."""
if n_agents <= 1:
return 0.0
sigma, log_n = np.sqrt(price_variance), safe_log(n_agents)
if log_n < 1:
return 0.0
shift = sigma * (np.sqrt(2 * log_n) - (safe_log(log_n) + safe_log(4 * np.pi)) / (2 * np.sqrt(2 * log_n) + EPS))
return float(min(shift / (sigma * 2 + EPS), 1.0))

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@@ -1,228 +0,0 @@
"""
Thesis-specific objectives implementing robust pricing under contamination.
Implements the Maximin objective from Eq 23:
π* = argmax_π min_{Q ∈ U_ε} E_d~Q[R(p,d) - λ·COI(p)]
Key components:
- COIObjective: Cost of Information penalty (Definition 1)
- RobustStackelbergObjective: Full maximin objective with Wasserstein robustness
- UXPenalty: User experience degradation from volatility
"""
from __future__ import annotations
from dataclasses import dataclass
import numpy as np
from ...outlet.objectives.base import BaseObjective, CompositeObjective
from ...outlet.types import Quote, InstrumentSet, StepMetrics, HiddenState, Observation
from ...outlet.math_util import safe_log, EPS
class COIObjective(BaseObjective):
"""Cost of Information penalty from Definition 1.
COI(π) = E[P] - p_min
The expected price premium over marginal cost represents the platform's
pricing power. Agent reconnaissance erodes this by revealing price
distribution to buyers.
We implement COI_leakage = f(τ') · InfoValue(p, τ')
where f(τ') is the estimated agent probability.
"""
def __init__(self, lambda_coi: float = 1.0, use_revelation: bool = False):
"""
Args:
lambda_coi: Weight on COI penalty
use_revelation: If True, use -log(π(p)) as info value (penalizes rare prices)
"""
self.lambda_coi = lambda_coi
self.use_revelation = use_revelation
def reward(self, quote: Quote, instruments: InstrumentSet,
metrics: StepMetrics, hidden: HiddenState, obs: Observation) -> float:
# COI_leakage = α · InfoValue
alpha = hidden.contamination
if self.use_revelation:
# revelation surrogate: rare prices reveal more about policy
# InfoValue = -log(π(p|τ')) ≈ surprise of the price
price_surprise = np.mean(np.abs(quote.prices - instruments.refs) / (instruments.refs + EPS))
info_value = price_surprise
else:
# query-tax surrogate: each agent query incurs constant leakage
info_value = 1.0
leakage = alpha * info_value
return -self.lambda_coi * leakage
def breakdown(self, quote: Quote, instruments: InstrumentSet,
metrics: StepMetrics, hidden: HiddenState, obs: Observation) -> dict[str, float]:
alpha = hidden.contamination
margins = (quote.prices - instruments.costs) / (instruments.costs + EPS)
return {
'coi_penalty': self.reward(quote, instruments, metrics, hidden, obs),
'contamination': alpha,
'avg_margin': float(np.mean(margins)),
}
@dataclass
class RobustObjectiveConfig:
"""Configuration for robust Stackelberg objective.
Attributes:
lambda_coi: Weight on COI penalty (λ in Eq 23)
lambda_ux: Weight on UX penalty
lambda_volatility: Weight on price volatility penalty
gamma_inventory: Inventory risk aversion
wasserstein_epsilon: Ambiguity set radius (ε in Eq 21)
"""
lambda_coi: float = 0.5
lambda_ux: float = 0.1
lambda_volatility: float = 0.2
gamma_inventory: float = 0.1
wasserstein_epsilon: float = 0.1
class RobustStackelbergObjective(BaseObjective):
"""Implements the Maximin Objective from thesis Eq 23.
π* = argmax_π min_{Q ∈ U_ε(P̂_N)} E_d~Q[R(p,d) - λ·COI(p)]
The objective balances:
1. Revenue R(p,d) from human purchases
2. COI penalty for information leakage to agents
3. UX penalty for price volatility
4. Inventory/holding costs
The min over ambiguity set U_ε is approximated by penalizing
high contamination scenarios more heavily.
"""
def __init__(self, cfg: RobustObjectiveConfig | None = None):
self.cfg = cfg or RobustObjectiveConfig()
def reward(self, quote: Quote, instruments: InstrumentSet,
metrics: StepMetrics, hidden: HiddenState, obs: Observation) -> float:
cfg = self.cfg
# 1. base revenue (R(p,d))
revenue = metrics.revenue
cost = metrics.cost
profit = revenue - cost
# 2. COI penalty: scales with contamination and margin extraction
# high margins + high contamination = high leakage
alpha = hidden.contamination
margins = quote.prices - instruments.costs
avg_margin = float(np.mean(margins))
coi_penalty = cfg.lambda_coi * avg_margin * alpha
# 3. UX penalty: price volatility harms legitimate users
volatility_penalty = cfg.lambda_volatility * metrics.volatility
# 4. inventory/position cost
position_penalty = cfg.gamma_inventory * metrics.position_cost
# 5. lost opportunity cost (stockouts)
lost_penalty = 0.1 * metrics.lost_opportunity
# robust adjustment: under adversarial distribution Q,
# expect lower revenue and higher costs
# approximate via worst-case contamination within ε-ball
worst_case_alpha = min(alpha + cfg.wasserstein_epsilon, 1.0)
robustness_penalty = cfg.wasserstein_epsilon * avg_margin * worst_case_alpha
total = profit - coi_penalty - volatility_penalty - position_penalty - lost_penalty - robustness_penalty
return total
def breakdown(self, quote: Quote, instruments: InstrumentSet,
metrics: StepMetrics, hidden: HiddenState, obs: Observation) -> dict[str, float]:
cfg = self.cfg
alpha = hidden.contamination
margins = quote.prices - instruments.costs
avg_margin = float(np.mean(margins))
return {
'revenue': metrics.revenue,
'cost': metrics.cost,
'profit': metrics.revenue - metrics.cost,
'coi_penalty': -cfg.lambda_coi * avg_margin * alpha,
'volatility_penalty': -cfg.lambda_volatility * metrics.volatility,
'position_penalty': -cfg.gamma_inventory * metrics.position_cost,
'lost_penalty': -0.1 * metrics.lost_opportunity,
'robustness_penalty': -cfg.wasserstein_epsilon * avg_margin * min(alpha + cfg.wasserstein_epsilon, 1.0),
'contamination': alpha,
'avg_margin_pct': avg_margin / (float(np.mean(instruments.costs)) + EPS),
}
class UXPenalty(BaseObjective):
"""User experience penalty from price volatility.
High price volatility degrades UX for legitimate human users.
This term ensures the defense doesn't harm real customers while
protecting against agent reconnaissance.
"""
def __init__(self, scale: float = 1.0, max_acceptable_volatility: float = 0.1):
self.scale = scale
self.max_vol = max_acceptable_volatility
def reward(self, quote: Quote, instruments: InstrumentSet,
metrics: StepMetrics, hidden: HiddenState, obs: Observation) -> float:
# penalty increases quadratically beyond threshold
excess_vol = max(0, metrics.volatility - self.max_vol)
return -self.scale * (excess_vol ** 2)
def breakdown(self, quote: Quote, instruments: InstrumentSet,
metrics: StepMetrics, hidden: HiddenState, obs: Observation) -> dict[str, float]:
return {
'ux_penalty': self.reward(quote, instruments, metrics, hidden, obs),
'volatility': metrics.volatility,
}
class AdaptiveObjective(BaseObjective):
"""Objective that adapts weights based on estimated contamination.
When contamination is low, focus on revenue maximization.
When contamination is high, increase COI defense weight.
"""
def __init__(self, base_lambda_coi: float = 0.3, max_lambda_coi: float = 2.0,
adaptation_rate: float = 2.0):
self.base_lambda = base_lambda_coi
self.max_lambda = max_lambda_coi
self.rate = adaptation_rate
def _adaptive_lambda(self, alpha: float) -> float:
# sigmoid scaling: λ(α) = base + (max-base) * sigmoid(rate*(α-0.5))
from ...outlet.math_util import sigmoid
scale = sigmoid(self.rate * (alpha - 0.3))
return self.base_lambda + (self.max_lambda - self.base_lambda) * scale
def reward(self, quote: Quote, instruments: InstrumentSet,
metrics: StepMetrics, hidden: HiddenState, obs: Observation) -> float:
alpha = hidden.contamination
lambda_coi = self._adaptive_lambda(alpha)
profit = metrics.revenue - metrics.cost
margins = quote.prices - instruments.costs
coi_penalty = lambda_coi * float(np.mean(margins)) * alpha
return profit - coi_penalty
def breakdown(self, quote: Quote, instruments: InstrumentSet,
metrics: StepMetrics, hidden: HiddenState, obs: Observation) -> dict[str, float]:
alpha = hidden.contamination
return {
'profit': metrics.revenue - metrics.cost,
'adaptive_lambda': self._adaptive_lambda(alpha),
'contamination': alpha,
}
def make_thesis_objective(lambda_coi: float = 0.5, lambda_ux: float = 0.1,
lambda_vol: float = 0.2) -> CompositeObjective:
"""Create the standard thesis objective composition."""
return CompositeObjective([
(RobustStackelbergObjective(RobustObjectiveConfig(
lambda_coi=lambda_coi, lambda_ux=lambda_ux, lambda_volatility=lambda_vol)), 1.0),
])

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@@ -1,176 +0,0 @@
"""Thesis platform with real MDP behavioral models and separability scoring."""
from __future__ import annotations
from dataclasses import dataclass
from pathlib import Path
import numpy as np
from ...outlet import (Platform, PlatformConfig, PositionModel, PositionConfig,
PostedPriceMechanism, make_instruments, InstrumentType, LogLevel)
from ...outlet.mechanisms.posted_price import PostedPriceConfig
from ...outlet.observation import DefaultObservationBuilder, ObservationConfig
from .arrivals import ContaminatedArrivalModel, ContaminatedArrivalConfig
from .execution import HybridExecutionModel, HybridExecutionConfig
from .objectives import RobustStackelbergObjective, RobustObjectiveConfig
@dataclass
class ThesisConfig:
# instruments
n_instruments: int = 10
cost_range: tuple[float, float] = (5.0, 50.0)
margin_range: tuple[float, float] = (0.2, 0.5)
# contamination (Section 3.1)
alpha_contamination: float = 0.2
alpha_drift: float = 0.0
alpha_bounds: tuple[float, float] = (0.0, 0.5)
# objectives (Eq 23)
lambda_coi: float = 0.5
lambda_ux: float = 0.1
lambda_volatility: float = 0.2
wasserstein_epsilon: float = 0.1
# arrivals
sessions_per_step: int = 30
human_views_range: tuple[int, int] = (1, 4)
agent_views_range: tuple[int, int] = (3, 10)
# inventory
initial_inventory: float = 100.0
holding_cost_rate: float = 0.002
# real behavioral models (from sim.rl)
use_real_behavior: bool = True
use_separability: bool = False # disabled until classifier trained
human_data_dir: str = "/home/velocitatem/Documents/Projects/PHANTOM/experiments/collected_data"
agent_data_dir: str = "/home/velocitatem/Documents/Projects/PHANTOM/experiments/agents/collected_data"
# simulation
max_steps: int = 500
seed: int | None = 24
log_level: LogLevel = LogLevel.AGG_ONLY
def _resolve_data_dirs(cfg: ThesisConfig) -> tuple[str, str]:
"""Resolve data directories for behavioral models."""
base = Path(__file__).parent.parent.parent.parent / "experiments"
human = cfg.human_data_dir or str(base / "collected_data")
agent = cfg.agent_data_dir or str(base / "agents/collected_data")
return human, agent
def make_thesis_platform(cfg: ThesisConfig | None = None) -> Platform:
"""Create platform with real MDP behavioral models.
Implements:
- Contaminated arrivals using learned MDP kernels from behavior_loader
- Hybrid execution with real separability scoring from lib.separability
- Robust Stackelberg objective (Eq 23)
"""
cfg = cfg or ThesisConfig()
rng = np.random.default_rng(cfg.seed)
human_dir, agent_dir = _resolve_data_dirs(cfg)
instruments = make_instruments(
n=cfg.n_instruments, cost_range=cfg.cost_range, margin_range=cfg.margin_range,
inst_type=InstrumentType.SKU, rng=rng)
instruments.position = np.full(cfg.n_instruments, cfg.initial_inventory)
arrival = ContaminatedArrivalModel(ContaminatedArrivalConfig(
base_rate=cfg.sessions_per_step,
alpha_contamination=cfg.alpha_contamination,
alpha_drift=cfg.alpha_drift,
alpha_bounds=cfg.alpha_bounds,
human_views_range=cfg.human_views_range,
agent_views_range=cfg.agent_views_range,
use_real_behavior=cfg.use_real_behavior,
human_data_dir=human_dir,
agent_data_dir=agent_dir,
))
execution = HybridExecutionModel(HybridExecutionConfig(
use_separability=cfg.use_separability,
))
mechanism = PostedPriceMechanism(PostedPriceConfig(max_delta_pct=0.15, min_margin_pct=0.05))
position = PositionModel(PositionConfig(initial_position=cfg.initial_inventory, holding_cost_rate=cfg.holding_cost_rate))
market = None
objective = RobustStackelbergObjective(RobustObjectiveConfig(
lambda_coi=cfg.lambda_coi, lambda_ux=cfg.lambda_ux,
lambda_volatility=cfg.lambda_volatility, wasserstein_epsilon=cfg.wasserstein_epsilon))
obs_builder = DefaultObservationBuilder(ObservationConfig(mask_true_demand=True))
platform_cfg = PlatformConfig(n_instruments=cfg.n_instruments, max_steps=cfg.max_steps,
seed=cfg.seed, log_level=cfg.log_level, mask_demand=True)
return Platform(instruments=instruments, mechanism=mechanism, arrival=arrival, execution=execution,
position=position, market=market, obs_builder=obs_builder, objective=objective, cfg=platform_cfg)
@dataclass
class AblationConfig(ThesisConfig):
disable_coi_penalty: bool = False
disable_ux_penalty: bool = False
disable_contamination: bool = False
disable_real_behavior: bool = False
def make_ablation_platform(cfg: AblationConfig) -> Platform:
if cfg.disable_coi_penalty:
cfg.lambda_coi = 0.0
if cfg.disable_ux_penalty:
cfg.lambda_ux = 0.0
if cfg.disable_contamination:
cfg.alpha_contamination = 0.0
if cfg.disable_real_behavior:
cfg.use_real_behavior = False
cfg.use_separability = False
return make_thesis_platform(cfg)
def sweep_contamination(alpha_values: list[float], base_cfg: ThesisConfig | None = None,
n_steps: int = 100, seed: int = 42) -> dict[float, dict]:
"""Test performance across contamination levels (Theorem 1 validation)."""
from ...experiments.eval import rollout, fixed_price_policy
results = {}
base_cfg = base_cfg or ThesisConfig()
for alpha in alpha_values:
cfg = ThesisConfig(**{k: v for k, v in base_cfg.__dict__.items() if k != 'alpha_contamination'},
alpha_contamination=alpha)
platform = make_thesis_platform(cfg)
policy = fixed_price_policy(platform.instruments.refs)
result = rollout(platform, policy, n_steps, seed=seed)
results[alpha] = {
'total_reward': result.total_reward,
'total_pnl': result.total_pnl,
'avg_conversion': result.avg_conversion,
'final_contamination': platform._hidden.contamination,
}
return results
def sweep_behavior_modes(base_cfg: ThesisConfig | None = None, n_steps: int = 100, seed: int = 42) -> dict[str, dict]:
"""Compare real vs synthetic behavioral models."""
from ...experiments.eval import rollout, fixed_price_policy
base_cfg = base_cfg or ThesisConfig()
modes = {
'real_mdp': ThesisConfig(**{**base_cfg.__dict__, 'use_real_behavior': True, 'use_separability': True}),
'synthetic': ThesisConfig(**{**base_cfg.__dict__, 'use_real_behavior': False, 'use_separability': False}),
'real_mdp_no_sep': ThesisConfig(**{**base_cfg.__dict__, 'use_real_behavior': True, 'use_separability': False}),
}
results = {}
for name, cfg in modes.items():
platform = make_thesis_platform(cfg)
policy = fixed_price_policy(platform.instruments.refs)
result = rollout(platform, policy, n_steps, seed=seed)
results[name] = {
'total_reward': result.total_reward,
'total_pnl': result.total_pnl,
'avg_conversion': result.avg_conversion,
}
return results

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@@ -1,136 +0,0 @@
#!/usr/bin/env python
"""Thesis simulation experiments with real MDP behavioral models."""
from __future__ import annotations
import sys
from pathlib import Path
if __name__ == '__main__':
sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).parent.parent.parent.parent))
from lab.case.thesis.platform import make_thesis_platform, ThesisConfig
from lab.case.thesis.metrics import compute_coi, compute_separability
from lab.experiments.eval import compare_policies
import numpy as np
def demo_basic_simulation():
print("=" * 70)
print("THESIS SIMULATION: Contaminated Dynamic Pricing (Real MDP Kernels)")
print("=" * 70)
cfg = ThesisConfig(n_instruments=5, alpha_contamination=0.3, lambda_coi=0.5,
max_steps=100, seed=42, use_real_behavior=True)
platform = make_thesis_platform(cfg)
print(f"\nInstruments: {platform.instruments.n}")
print(f"Reference prices: {platform.instruments.refs.round(2)}")
print(f"Costs: {platform.instruments.costs.round(2)}")
print(f"Initial contamination alpha={cfg.alpha_contamination}")
print(f"Using real behavior: {cfg.use_real_behavior}")
result = platform.reset(seed=42)
total_reward, coi_history = 0, []
print(f"\n{'Step':>5} {'Reward':>10} {'PnL':>10} {'COI':>8} {'alpha':>6} {'Conv':>8}")
print("-" * 55)
for t in range(cfg.max_steps):
action = platform.instruments.refs * np.random.uniform(0.95, 1.15, size=platform.instruments.n)
result = platform.step(action)
total_reward += result.reward
coi = compute_coi(platform._quote, platform.instruments, result.metrics, result.hidden.contamination)
coi_history.append(coi.coi_level)
if t % 20 == 0:
print(f"{t:5d} {result.reward:10.2f} {result.metrics.pnl:10.2f} "
f"{coi.coi_level:8.2f} {result.hidden.contamination:6.2f} {result.metrics.conversion:8.3f}")
print("-" * 55)
print(f"Total Reward: {total_reward:.2f}")
print(f"Average COI: {np.mean(coi_history):.2f}")
print(f"COI Trend: {coi_history[-1] - coi_history[0]:+.2f}")
def demo_contamination_sweep():
print("\n" + "=" * 70)
print("EXPERIMENT: COI Erosion vs Contamination (Theorem 1)")
print("=" * 70)
from lab.case.thesis.platform import sweep_contamination
trials = 20
alpha_values = [i/trials for i in range(trials)]
results = sweep_contamination(alpha_values, n_steps=100, seed=42)
print(f"\n{'alpha':>6} {'Reward':>12} {'PnL':>12} {'Conv':>10}")
print("-" * 45)
for alpha, m in sorted(results.items()):
print(f"{alpha:6.2f} {m['total_reward']:12.2f} {m['total_pnl']:12.2f} {m['avg_conversion']:10.3f}")
rewards = [results[a]['total_reward'] for a in sorted(results.keys())]
dataset = np.array([[a, r] for a, r in zip(alpha_values, rewards)])
trend = np.corrcoef(dataset[:, 0], dataset[:, 1])[0, 1]
print(f"Trend (alpha~reward correlation): {trend:.3f}")
def demo_policy_comparison():
print("\n" + "=" * 70)
print("EXPERIMENT: Policy Comparison under Contamination")
print("=" * 70)
cfg = ThesisConfig(n_instruments=5, alpha_contamination=0.25, max_steps=100, seed=42)
platform = make_thesis_platform(cfg)
def fixed_policy(obs, t): return platform.instruments.refs.copy(), 1.0
def aggressive_policy(obs, t): return platform.instruments.refs * 1.3, 1.0
def conservative_policy(obs, t): return platform.instruments.refs * 1.05, 1.0
def adaptive_policy(obs, t):
fills = obs[platform.instruments.n:2*platform.instruments.n]
exp = obs[2*platform.instruments.n:3*platform.instruments.n]
conv = np.sum(fills) / (np.sum(exp) + 1e-8)
return platform.instruments.refs * (1.0 + 0.2 * conv), 1.0
policies = {'fixed': fixed_policy, 'aggressive': aggressive_policy,
'conservative': conservative_policy, 'adaptive': adaptive_policy}
results = compare_policies(platform, policies, n_steps=100, n_runs=3, seed=42)
print(f"\n{'Policy':>15} {'Reward':>12} {'Std':>10} {'PnL':>12} {'Conv':>10}")
print("-" * 65)
for name, r in sorted(results.items(), key=lambda x: -x[1]['mean_reward']):
print(f"{name:>15} {r['mean_reward']:12.2f} {r['std_reward']:10.2f} "
f"{r['mean_pnl']:12.2f} {r['mean_conversion']:10.3f}")
def demo_session_analysis():
"""Analyze session-level behavior from MDP trajectories."""
print("\n" + "=" * 70)
print("EXPERIMENT: Session Analysis (Ground Truth)")
print("=" * 70)
from lab.outlet.constants import LogLevel
cfg = ThesisConfig(n_instruments=5, alpha_contamination=0.3, max_steps=50,
log_level=LogLevel.FULL, seed=42, use_real_behavior=True)
platform = make_thesis_platform(cfg)
result = platform.reset(seed=42)
human_sessions, agent_sessions = 0, 0
for t in range(cfg.max_steps):
action = platform.instruments.refs * 1.1
result = platform.step(action)
sep = compute_separability(result.logs, result.hidden.contamination)
human_sessions += sep.n_human_sessions
agent_sessions += sep.n_agent_sessions
total = human_sessions + agent_sessions
print(f"\nTotal sessions: {total}")
print(f"Human sessions: {human_sessions} ({100*human_sessions/total:.1f}%)")
print(f"Agent sessions: {agent_sessions} ({100*agent_sessions/total:.1f}%)")
print(f"True contamination: {cfg.alpha_contamination:.1%}")
print(f"Observed contamination: {agent_sessions/total:.1%}")
if __name__ == '__main__':
demo_basic_simulation()
demo_contamination_sweep()
# demo_policy_comparison()
# demo_session_analysis()

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@@ -1,156 +0,0 @@
"""
Configuration and factory functions for creating pre-configured platforms.
This module provides:
- RetailConfig, MarketMakingConfig: Configuration dataclasses
- make_retail_platform: Factory for retail dynamic pricing scenarios
- make_market_making_platform: Factory for market making scenarios
Example:
>>> from lab.config import make_retail_platform
>>> platform = make_retail_platform(RetailConfig(n_instruments=5))
>>> result = platform.reset(seed=42)
"""
from __future__ import annotations
from dataclasses import dataclass
import numpy as np
from .outlet import (Platform, PlatformConfig, PositionModel, PositionConfig,
PostedPriceMechanism, TwoSidedMechanism, make_instruments,
InstrumentType, LogLevel)
from .outlet.mechanisms.posted_price import PostedPriceConfig
from .outlet.mechanisms.two_sided import TwoSidedConfig
from .population import (SessionArrivalModel, PoissonArrivalModel, HawkesArrivalModel,
ElasticityExecutionModel, IntensityExecutionModel,
ReactiveCompetitorModel, GBMMarketModel)
from .population.arrivals import SessionArrivalConfig, PoissonArrivalConfig, HawkesArrivalConfig
from .population.execution import ElasticityConfig, IntensityConfig
from .population.competitors import ReactiveCompetitorConfig, GBMMarketConfig
from .outlet.objectives.factory import retail_objective, market_making_objective
@dataclass
class RetailConfig:
"""Configuration for retail dynamic pricing scenario.
Attributes:
n_instruments: Number of products to price
cost_range: (min, max) for random product costs
margin_range: (min, max) for random initial margins
initial_inventory: Starting inventory per product
holding_cost_rate: Cost per unit per step for holding
sessions_per_step: Number of browsing sessions per step
contamination: Fraction of sessions that are scrapers
max_steps: Maximum episode length
seed: Random seed for reproducibility
"""
n_instruments: int = 10
cost_range: tuple[float, float] = (5.0, 50.0)
margin_range: tuple[float, float] = (0.2, 0.5)
initial_inventory: float = 100.0
holding_cost_rate: float = 0.002
sessions_per_step: int = 30
contamination: float = 0.1
max_steps: int = 500
seed: int | None = None
def make_retail_platform(cfg: RetailConfig | None = None) -> Platform:
"""Create a pre-configured retail dynamic pricing platform.
Components:
- Mechanism: PostedPriceMechanism (single price per product)
- Arrivals: SessionArrivalModel (browsing sessions with views)
- Execution: ElasticityExecutionModel (price sensitivity)
- Market: ReactiveCompetitorModel (can trigger price wars)
- Objective: PnL - holding_cost - volatility - lost_opportunity
Args:
cfg: Configuration (uses defaults if None)
Returns:
Configured Platform instance
"""
cfg = cfg or RetailConfig()
rng = np.random.default_rng(cfg.seed)
instruments = make_instruments(cfg.n_instruments, cfg.cost_range, cfg.margin_range,
InstrumentType.SKU, rng)
instruments.position = np.full(cfg.n_instruments, cfg.initial_inventory)
mechanism = PostedPriceMechanism(PostedPriceConfig())
arrival = SessionArrivalModel(SessionArrivalConfig(
sessions_per_step=cfg.sessions_per_step, contamination=cfg.contamination))
execution = ElasticityExecutionModel(ElasticityConfig())
position = PositionModel(PositionConfig(
initial_position=cfg.initial_inventory,
holding_cost_rate=cfg.holding_cost_rate))
market = ReactiveCompetitorModel(ReactiveCompetitorConfig(), refs=instruments.refs)
objective = retail_objective()
return Platform(
instruments=instruments, mechanism=mechanism, arrival=arrival,
execution=execution, position=position, market=market, objective=objective,
cfg=PlatformConfig(n_instruments=cfg.n_instruments, max_steps=cfg.max_steps,
seed=cfg.seed, log_level=LogLevel.AGG_ONLY)
)
@dataclass
class MarketMakingConfig:
"""Configuration for market making scenario.
Attributes:
n_instruments: Number of assets to quote
initial_mid: Initial mid-price for assets
mu: Price drift (expected return)
sigma: Price volatility
gamma: Inventory risk aversion parameter
base_arrival_rate: Order arrival rate (Hawkes baseline)
max_steps: Maximum episode length
seed: Random seed for reproducibility
"""
n_instruments: int = 5
initial_mid: float = 100.0
mu: float = 0.0
sigma: float = 0.02
gamma: float = 0.1
base_arrival_rate: float = 20.0
max_steps: int = 1000
seed: int | None = None
def make_market_making_platform(cfg: MarketMakingConfig | None = None) -> Platform:
"""Create a pre-configured market making platform.
Components:
- Mechanism: TwoSidedMechanism (bid-ask spread quoting)
- Arrivals: HawkesArrivalModel (clustered order flow)
- Execution: IntensityExecutionModel (distance-based fills)
- Market: GBMMarketModel (geometric Brownian motion mid-prices)
- Objective: PnL + spread_capture - inventory_risk
Args:
cfg: Configuration (uses defaults if None)
Returns:
Configured Platform instance
"""
cfg = cfg or MarketMakingConfig()
rng = np.random.default_rng(cfg.seed)
instruments = make_instruments(cfg.n_instruments, (cfg.initial_mid*0.9, cfg.initial_mid*1.1),
(0.0, 0.0), InstrumentType.ASSET, rng)
instruments.position = np.zeros(cfg.n_instruments)
mechanism = TwoSidedMechanism(TwoSidedConfig())
arrival = HawkesArrivalModel(HawkesArrivalConfig(base_rate=cfg.base_arrival_rate))
execution = IntensityExecutionModel(IntensityConfig())
position = PositionModel(PositionConfig(
initial_position=0.0, min_position=-500, max_position=500,
holding_cost_rate=0.0)) # use inventory risk penalty instead
market = GBMMarketModel(GBMMarketConfig(mu=cfg.mu, sigma=cfg.sigma),
initial=instruments.refs)
objective = market_making_objective(gamma=cfg.gamma, sigma=cfg.sigma)
return Platform(
instruments=instruments, mechanism=mechanism, arrival=arrival,
execution=execution, position=position, market=market, objective=objective,
cfg=PlatformConfig(n_instruments=cfg.n_instruments, max_steps=cfg.max_steps,
seed=cfg.seed, log_level=LogLevel.AGG_ONLY)
)

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@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
SPHINXOPTS ?=
SPHINXBUILD ?= sphinx-build
SOURCEDIR = .
BUILDDIR = _build
help:
@$(SPHINXBUILD) -M help "$(SOURCEDIR)" "$(BUILDDIR)" $(SPHINXOPTS) $(O)
.PHONY: help Makefile
%: Makefile
@$(SPHINXBUILD) -M $@ "$(SOURCEDIR)" "$(BUILDDIR)" $(SPHINXOPTS) $(O)

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@@ -1,39 +0,0 @@
import os
import sys
sys.path.insert(0, os.path.abspath('../..'))
project = 'Quote-Control Simulator'
copyright = '2025, PHANTOM Research'
author = 'PHANTOM Research'
release = '0.1.0'
extensions = [
'sphinx.ext.autodoc',
'sphinx.ext.napoleon',
'sphinx.ext.viewcode',
'sphinx.ext.intersphinx',
'sphinx.ext.autosummary',
]
templates_path = ['_templates']
exclude_patterns = ['_build', 'Thumbs.db', '.DS_Store']
html_theme = 'alabaster'
html_static_path = ['_static']
autodoc_default_options = {
'members': True,
'undoc-members': True,
'show-inheritance': True,
}
napoleon_google_docstring = True
napoleon_numpy_docstring = True
napoleon_include_init_with_doc = True
intersphinx_mapping = {
'python': ('https://docs.python.org/3', None),
'numpy': ('https://numpy.org/doc/stable/', None),
}
autosummary_generate = True

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@@ -1,40 +0,0 @@
Quote-Control Simulator
=======================
Research-grade platform for dynamic pricing and market making experiments.
The platform abstracts pricing as: **Quote → Arrival → Execution → Position**
Supports multiple mechanisms:
* **PostedPrice**: retail dynamic pricing
* **TwoSided**: market making with bid-ask spreads
* **Auction**: reserve/shading for auction settings
Quick Start
-----------
.. code-block:: python
from lab.config import make_retail_platform
from lab.experiments import rollout, fixed_price_policy
platform = make_retail_platform()
policy = fixed_price_policy(platform.instruments.refs)
result = rollout(platform, policy, n_steps=100)
print(f"Total PnL: {result.total_pnl:.2f}")
.. toctree::
:maxdepth: 2
:caption: Contents:
system_overview
modules/outlet
modules/population
modules/experiments
Indices
-------
* :ref:`genindex`
* :ref:`modindex`

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@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
Experiments
===========
Evaluation & OPE
----------------
.. automodule:: lab.experiments.eval
:members:
Configuration
-------------
.. automodule:: lab.config
:members:

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@@ -1,77 +0,0 @@
Outlet (Core Simulator)
=======================
Types
-----
.. automodule:: lab.outlet.types
:members:
Constants
---------
.. automodule:: lab.outlet.constants
:members:
Protocols
---------
.. automodule:: lab.outlet.protocols
:members:
Platform
--------
.. automodule:: lab.outlet.platform
:members:
Stock & Position
----------------
.. automodule:: lab.outlet.stock
:members:
Observation
-----------
.. automodule:: lab.outlet.observation
:members:
Mechanisms
----------
Posted Price
~~~~~~~~~~~~
.. automodule:: lab.outlet.mechanisms.posted_price
:members:
Two-Sided (Market Making)
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
.. automodule:: lab.outlet.mechanisms.two_sided
:members:
Auction
~~~~~~~
.. automodule:: lab.outlet.mechanisms.auction
:members:
Objectives
----------
.. automodule:: lab.outlet.objectives.base
:members:
.. automodule:: lab.outlet.objectives.penalties
:members:
.. automodule:: lab.outlet.objectives.factory
:members:
Math Utilities
--------------
.. automodule:: lab.outlet.math_util
:members:

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@@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
Population Models
=================
Arrival Models
--------------
.. automodule:: lab.population.arrivals
:members:
Execution Models
----------------
.. automodule:: lab.population.execution
:members:
Competitor / Market Models
--------------------------
.. automodule:: lab.population.competitors
:members:

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@@ -1,97 +0,0 @@
System Overview
===============
The simulator organises dynamic pricing and market-making experiments as a
closed loop with the following stages:
* **Quote** a policy or agent emits a :class:`lab.outlet.types.Quote`. The
quote is normalised and validated by a concrete
:class:`lab.outlet.protocols.Mechanism` implementation
(posted-price, two-sided, auction).
* **Arrival** a :class:`lab.outlet.protocols.ArrivalModel` samples a stream of
:class:`lab.outlet.types.Opportunity` objects given the current time,
instrument catalogue, and market state.
* **Execution** the :class:`lab.outlet.protocols.ExecutionModel` converts an
opportunity into a probabilistic fill using the active quote, optional
competitor prices, and demand-side context.
* **Position** a :class:`lab.outlet.protocols.PositionModel` enforces
inventory or position constraints, censors oversized fills, and accrues
holding and shortage costs.
* **Observation & Reward** the
:class:`lab.outlet.protocols.ObservationBuilder` constructs the censored view
exposed to the agent, while a :class:`lab.outlet.protocols.Objective`
transforms :class:`lab.outlet.types.StepMetrics` into a scalar reward with an
optional breakdown per term.
These components are orchestrated by :class:`lab.outlet.platform.Platform`,
which manages internal hidden state, deterministic seeding, and logging.
Component Matrix
----------------
=============================== ==============================================
Layer Responsibilities / Examples
=============================== ==============================================
Mechanisms Quote normalisation, execution semantics
(`posted_price`, `two_sided`, `auction`).
Population models Arrivals (:mod:`lab.population.arrivals`),
execution probability models
(:mod:`lab.population.execution`), and
competitor or market dynamics
(:mod:`lab.population.competitors`).
Position management Inventory limits, replenishment, holding and
shortage costs (:mod:`lab.outlet.stock`).
Observation & logging Censored observations and optional event logs
(:mod:`lab.outlet.observation`).
Objectives Reward composition utilities
(:mod:`lab.outlet.objectives`).
Experiments Rollout helpers, baseline policies, off-policy
evaluation (:mod:`lab.experiments.eval`).
=============================== ==============================================
Preconfigured Platforms
-----------------------
Two high-level factories in :mod:`lab.config` wire common combinations of the
building blocks:
* **Retail dynamic pricing** posted-price mechanism, session arrivals with
contamination, elasticity-based executions, reactive competitor model, and a
composite objective that penalises volatility, holding costs, and lost
opportunities.
* **Market making** two-sided quoting, Hawkes order flow, intensity-based
executions, geometric Brownian motion mid-prices, and an objective combining
PnL, spread capture, and quadratic inventory risk.
State & Reset Behaviour
-----------------------
When you call :meth:`lab.outlet.platform.Platform.reset`, the platform resets
instrument positions, quotes, and hidden state, but component implementations
may maintain their own internal buffers. For reproducible experiments:
* Reuse freshly instantiated arrival/market models per episode, or add explicit
``reset`` methods if the model keeps history (for example,
:class:`lab.population.arrivals.HawkesArrivalModel` maintains an event
history, while :class:`lab.population.competitors.ReactiveCompetitorModel`
tracks prior competitor quotes).
* Seed randomness through the factory configuration (``RetailConfig.seed`` or
``MarketMakingConfig.seed``) or pass a seed to ``Platform.reset`` for
deterministic rollouts.
Extending the Platform
----------------------
To support a new domain:
1. Create custom Mechanism/Arrival/Execution/Market/Observation components by
implementing the respective protocol in :mod:`lab.outlet.protocols`.
2. Compose a new objective with
:func:`lab.outlet.objectives.factory.make_composite` or write a bespoke
:class:`lab.outlet.objectives.base.BaseObjective`.
3. Wire everything together via :class:`lab.outlet.platform.Platform` directly
or expose a helper factory in :mod:`lab.config`.
Use :func:`lab.experiments.rollout` and
:func:`lab.experiments.compare_policies` to benchmark candidate policies under
multiple random seeds, collecting per-step logs for analysis or OPE.

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@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
from .eval import (rollout, RolloutResult, compare_policies, compute_ips, OPEResult,
fixed_price_policy, cost_plus_margin_policy, random_walk_policy, epsilon_greedy_policy)
__all__ = [
'rollout', 'RolloutResult', 'compare_policies', 'compute_ips', 'OPEResult',
'fixed_price_policy', 'cost_plus_margin_policy', 'random_walk_policy', 'epsilon_greedy_policy',
]

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@@ -1,213 +0,0 @@
"""
Evaluation utilities for policy testing and off-policy evaluation.
This module provides:
- rollout: Run a policy on the platform for multiple steps
- compare_policies: Compare multiple policies with statistics
- Baseline policies: fixed_price, cost_plus_margin, random_walk, epsilon_greedy
- OPE estimators: IPS and SNIPS for off-policy evaluation
Example:
>>> from lab.config import make_retail_platform
>>> from lab.experiments.eval import rollout, fixed_price_policy
>>> platform = make_retail_platform()
>>> policy = fixed_price_policy(platform.instruments.refs)
>>> result = rollout(platform, policy, n_steps=100)
>>> print(f"Total PnL: {result.total_pnl:.2f}")
"""
from __future__ import annotations
from dataclasses import dataclass
from typing import Callable, Any
import numpy as np
from ..outlet.platform import Platform
from ..outlet.types import StepResult, StepLogs, Quote
# Policy signature: takes (observation_flat, timestep) -> (action_prices, propensity)
Policy = Callable[[np.ndarray, int], tuple[np.ndarray, float]]
@dataclass
class RolloutResult:
"""Results from a policy rollout.
Attributes:
rewards: Per-step rewards
metrics: Per-step StepMetrics objects
logs: Per-step StepLogs objects
total_reward: Sum of rewards
total_pnl: Sum of PnL from metrics
avg_conversion: Average conversion rate
"""
rewards: list[float]
metrics: list[Any]
logs: list[StepLogs]
total_reward: float
total_pnl: float
avg_conversion: float
def rollout(platform: Platform, policy: Policy, n_steps: int, seed: int | None = None) -> RolloutResult:
"""Execute a policy on the platform for n_steps.
Args:
platform: The simulation platform
policy: Function (obs, t) -> (action, propensity)
n_steps: Number of steps to run
seed: Random seed for reproducibility
Returns:
RolloutResult with rewards, metrics, and summary statistics
"""
result = platform.reset(seed)
rewards, metrics, logs = [], [], []
for t in range(n_steps):
obs_flat = result.obs.to_flat()
action, propensity = policy(obs_flat, t)
result = platform.step(action, propensity)
rewards.append(result.reward)
metrics.append(result.metrics)
logs.append(result.logs)
if result.terminated or result.truncated:
break
return RolloutResult(
rewards=rewards, metrics=metrics, logs=logs,
total_reward=sum(rewards),
total_pnl=sum(m.pnl for m in metrics),
avg_conversion=np.mean([m.conversion for m in metrics])
)
# Baseline policies for comparison
def fixed_price_policy(refs: np.ndarray) -> Policy:
"""Policy that always quotes at reference prices."""
def policy(obs: np.ndarray, t: int) -> tuple[np.ndarray, float]:
return refs.copy(), 1.0
return policy
def cost_plus_margin_policy(costs: np.ndarray, margin: float = 0.3) -> Policy:
"""Policy that quotes at cost * (1 + margin)."""
prices = costs * (1 + margin)
def policy(obs: np.ndarray, t: int) -> tuple[np.ndarray, float]:
return prices.copy(), 1.0
return policy
def random_walk_policy(refs: np.ndarray, volatility: float = 0.05,
rng: np.random.Generator | None = None) -> Policy:
"""Policy that performs a random walk around reference prices."""
rng = rng or np.random.default_rng()
prices = refs.copy()
def policy(obs: np.ndarray, t: int) -> tuple[np.ndarray, float]:
nonlocal prices
delta = rng.normal(0, volatility, len(prices))
prices = prices * (1 + delta)
prices = np.clip(prices, refs * 0.5, refs * 2.0)
return prices.copy(), 1.0
return policy
def epsilon_greedy_policy(base_policy: Policy, refs: np.ndarray,
epsilon: float = 0.1, rng: np.random.Generator | None = None) -> Policy:
"""Wrap a policy with epsilon-greedy exploration."""
rng = rng or np.random.default_rng()
def policy(obs: np.ndarray, t: int) -> tuple[np.ndarray, float]:
if rng.random() < epsilon:
action = refs * rng.uniform(0.8, 1.2, len(refs))
return action, epsilon / len(refs)
else:
action, _ = base_policy(obs, t)
return action, 1 - epsilon
return policy
# Off-Policy Evaluation (OPE)
@dataclass
class OPEResult:
"""Results from off-policy evaluation.
Attributes:
ips_estimate: Inverse Propensity Scoring estimate
snips_estimate: Self-normalized IPS estimate (more stable)
n_samples: Number of samples used
effective_samples: Effective sample size (accounts for variance)
"""
ips_estimate: float
snips_estimate: float
n_samples: int
effective_samples: float
def compute_ips(logs: list[StepLogs], rewards: list[float],
target_policy: Policy, behavior_propensities: list[float] | None = None) -> OPEResult:
"""Compute IPS and SNIPS estimators for off-policy evaluation.
Uses logged propensities to estimate expected reward under a target
policy from data collected under a behavior policy.
Args:
logs: Step logs containing propensities
rewards: Observed rewards from behavior policy
target_policy: Policy to evaluate (not currently used, assumes deterministic)
behavior_propensities: Override propensities if not in logs
Returns:
OPEResult with IPS, SNIPS estimates and sample statistics
"""
if behavior_propensities is None:
# extract from logs
behavior_propensities = []
for log in logs:
if log.executions:
avg_prop = np.mean([e.propensity for e in log.executions])
else:
avg_prop = 1.0
behavior_propensities.append(avg_prop)
# compute importance weights
weights = []
for i, (log, bp) in enumerate(zip(logs, behavior_propensities)):
# target propensity would need obs reconstruction - simplified here
tp = 1.0 # assume deterministic target
w = tp / (bp + 1e-8)
weights.append(w)
weights = np.array(weights)
rewards = np.array(rewards)
# IPS estimate
ips = np.sum(weights * rewards) / len(rewards)
# SNIPS (self-normalized)
snips = np.sum(weights * rewards) / (np.sum(weights) + 1e-8)
# effective sample size
ess = (np.sum(weights) ** 2) / (np.sum(weights ** 2) + 1e-8)
return OPEResult(ips_estimate=ips, snips_estimate=snips,
n_samples=len(rewards), effective_samples=ess)
def compare_policies(platform: Platform, policies: dict[str, Policy],
n_steps: int = 100, n_runs: int = 5, seed: int = 42) -> dict[str, dict]:
"""Compare multiple policies with statistical summary.
Args:
platform: Simulation platform
policies: Dict mapping policy names to policy functions
n_steps: Steps per rollout
n_runs: Number of rollouts per policy (different seeds)
seed: Base random seed
Returns:
Dict mapping policy names to result dicts with mean/std statistics
"""
results = {}
for name, policy in policies.items():
run_results = []
for i in range(n_runs):
r = rollout(platform, policy, n_steps, seed=seed + i)
run_results.append(r)
results[name] = {
'mean_reward': np.mean([r.total_reward for r in run_results]),
'std_reward': np.std([r.total_reward for r in run_results]),
'mean_pnl': np.mean([r.total_pnl for r in run_results]),
'mean_conversion': np.mean([r.avg_conversion for r in run_results]),
}
return results

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@@ -1,17 +0,0 @@
from .constants import Side, MechanismType, InstrumentType, OpportunityType, EventType, LogLevel
from .types import (Instrument, InstrumentSet, Quote, Opportunity, Execution,
StepEvent, StepLogs, StepMetrics, MarketState, HiddenState, Observation, StepResult)
from .stock import PositionModel, PositionConfig, make_instruments
from .platform import Platform, PlatformConfig
from .observation import DefaultObservationBuilder, ObservationConfig
from .mechanisms import PostedPriceMechanism, TwoSidedMechanism, AuctionMechanism
__all__ = [
'Side', 'MechanismType', 'InstrumentType', 'OpportunityType', 'EventType', 'LogLevel',
'Instrument', 'InstrumentSet', 'Quote', 'Opportunity', 'Execution',
'StepEvent', 'StepLogs', 'StepMetrics', 'MarketState', 'HiddenState', 'Observation', 'StepResult',
'PositionModel', 'PositionConfig', 'make_instruments',
'Platform', 'PlatformConfig',
'DefaultObservationBuilder', 'ObservationConfig',
'PostedPriceMechanism', 'TwoSidedMechanism', 'AuctionMechanism',
]

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@@ -1,83 +0,0 @@
"""
Constants and enumerations for the Quote-Control simulator.
This module defines the core enums used throughout the platform to ensure
type safety and consistent semantics across different pricing mechanisms.
"""
from enum import Enum, auto
class Side(Enum):
"""Transaction side indicator.
Attributes:
BUY: Buyer-initiated transaction (customer purchases, market buy order)
SELL: Seller-initiated transaction (market sell order, short sale)
"""
BUY = auto()
SELL = auto()
class MechanismType(Enum):
"""Pricing mechanism type defining how quotes translate to executions.
Attributes:
POSTED_PRICE: Single posted price per instrument (retail dynamic pricing)
TWO_SIDED_QUOTE: Bid-ask spread quoting (market making, liquidity provision)
AUCTION: Reserve price or bid shading (ad auctions, marketplaces)
"""
POSTED_PRICE = auto()
TWO_SIDED_QUOTE = auto()
AUCTION = auto()
class InstrumentType(Enum):
"""Type of instrument being priced.
Attributes:
SKU: Retail product with inventory constraints
ASSET: Financial instrument with position limits
LOAN: Credit product with interest rate pricing
SUBSCRIPTION: Recurring service with periodic fees
"""
SKU = auto()
ASSET = auto()
LOAN = auto()
SUBSCRIPTION = auto()
class OpportunityType(Enum):
"""Type of arrival opportunity.
Attributes:
SESSION: Retail browsing session with potential purchase intent
MARKET_ORDER: Financial market order arrival (buy or sell)
REQUEST: Service or credit request requiring quote response
"""
SESSION = auto()
MARKET_ORDER = auto()
REQUEST = auto()
class EventType(Enum):
"""Type of logged event during simulation.
Attributes:
ARRIVAL: New opportunity arrived in the system
EXPOSURE: Quote was shown to an arrival
EXECUTION: Transaction was executed
ABANDON: Opportunity abandoned without execution
CANCEL: Pending order was cancelled
"""
ARRIVAL = auto()
EXPOSURE = auto()
EXECUTION = auto()
ABANDON = auto()
CANCEL = auto()
class LogLevel(Enum):
"""Verbosity level for step logging.
Attributes:
NONE: No logging, fastest execution
AGG_ONLY: Only aggregate statistics per step
FULL: Full event-level logging with propensities for OPE
"""
NONE = auto()
AGG_ONLY = auto()
FULL = auto()

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@@ -1,86 +0,0 @@
"""
Gymnasium-compatible wrapper for the Quote-Control platform.
Provides a standard Gym interface for RL training:
- observation_space: Box space with flattened observation
- action_space: Box space with price multipliers [0.5, 2.0]
- reset(), step(), render(), close() methods
Example:
>>> from lab.config import make_retail_platform
>>> from lab.outlet.gym_wrapper import QuoteGymEnv
>>> env = QuoteGymEnv(make_retail_platform())
>>> obs, info = env.reset()
>>> obs, reward, done, truncated, info = env.step(env.action_space.sample())
"""
from __future__ import annotations
from typing import Any
import numpy as np
try:
import gymnasium as gym
from gymnasium import spaces
HAS_GYM = True
except ImportError:
HAS_GYM = False
from .platform import Platform, PlatformConfig
from .types import Quote, InstrumentSet, StepResult
class QuoteGymEnv:
"""Gymnasium-compatible environment wrapper.
Wraps a Platform instance with standard Gym interface.
Actions are price multipliers in [0.5, 2.0] applied to reference prices.
Observations are flattened numpy arrays containing quotes, fills, exposures.
"""
def __init__(self, platform: Platform):
if not HAS_GYM:
raise ImportError("gymnasium required for QuoteGymEnv")
self.platform = platform
self.n = platform.instruments.n
self._last_result: StepResult | None = None
# action space: price adjustments as multipliers [0.5, 2.0]
self.action_space = spaces.Box(low=0.5, high=2.0, shape=(self.n,), dtype=np.float32)
# observation space
obs_dim = self.n * 4 # quotes + fills + exposures + position
if platform.market:
obs_dim += self.n # competitor quotes
self.observation_space = spaces.Box(low=-np.inf, high=np.inf,
shape=(obs_dim,), dtype=np.float32)
def reset(self, seed: int | None = None, options: dict | None = None) -> tuple[np.ndarray, dict]:
result = self.platform.reset(seed)
self._last_result = result
return result.obs.to_flat().astype(np.float32), result.info
def step(self, action: np.ndarray) -> tuple[np.ndarray, float, bool, bool, dict]:
# convert action (multipliers) to absolute prices
refs = self.platform.instruments.refs
prices = refs * action
result = self.platform.step(prices)
self._last_result = result
return (result.obs.to_flat().astype(np.float32), result.reward,
result.terminated, result.truncated, result.info)
def render(self) -> None:
if self._last_result:
m = self._last_result.metrics
print(f"t={self.platform._t} pnl={m.pnl:.2f} units={m.units_traded:.0f} "
f"conv={m.conversion:.3f} vol={m.volatility:.3f}")
def close(self) -> None:
pass
def make_env(platform: Platform) -> QuoteGymEnv:
return QuoteGymEnv(platform)
if HAS_GYM:
# register if gymnasium available
try:
gym.register(id='QuoteControl-v0', entry_point='outlet.gym_wrapper:QuoteGymEnv')
except:
pass # already registered or other issue

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@@ -1,57 +0,0 @@
"""
Numerical utilities for stable computation.
This module provides numerically stable implementations of common operations:
- safe_exp, safe_log: Avoid overflow/underflow
- softmax: Numerically stable softmax
- sigmoid, clamp: Standard transformations
- intensity_decay: Avellaneda-Stoikov fill intensity
- inventory_penalty: Quadratic inventory risk
- poisson_arrivals, hawkes_intensity: Arrival process helpers
All functions accept both scalars and numpy arrays.
"""
import numpy as np
EPS = 1e-8 # small constant to avoid division by zero
MAX_EXP = 700.0 # maximum safe exponent to avoid overflow
def safe_exp(x: np.ndarray | float) -> np.ndarray | float:
return np.exp(np.clip(x, -MAX_EXP, MAX_EXP))
def safe_log(x: np.ndarray | float) -> np.ndarray | float:
return np.log(np.maximum(x, EPS))
def clamp(x: np.ndarray | float, lo: float, hi: float) -> np.ndarray | float:
return np.clip(x, lo, hi)
def sigmoid(x: np.ndarray | float) -> np.ndarray | float:
return 1.0 / (1.0 + safe_exp(-x))
def softmax(x: np.ndarray, axis: int = -1) -> np.ndarray:
x_max = np.max(x, axis=axis, keepdims=True)
exp_x = safe_exp(x - x_max)
return exp_x / (np.sum(exp_x, axis=axis, keepdims=True) + EPS)
def geometric_series(base: float, ratio: float, n: int) -> np.ndarray:
return base * (ratio ** np.arange(n))
def ema(old: float, new: float, alpha: float = 0.1) -> float:
return alpha * new + (1 - alpha) * old
def intensity_decay(distance: float, kappa: float = 1.0) -> float:
"""Avellaneda-Stoikov style fill intensity decay with quote distance"""
return safe_exp(-kappa * distance)
def inventory_penalty(q: float, gamma: float = 0.1, sigma: float = 1.0) -> float:
"""Quadratic inventory risk penalty"""
return gamma * sigma**2 * q**2 / 2
def poisson_arrivals(rate: float, dt: float, rng: np.random.Generator) -> int:
return rng.poisson(rate * dt)
def hawkes_intensity(base: float, history: np.ndarray, alpha: float, beta: float, t: float) -> float:
"""Self-exciting Hawkes process intensity"""
if len(history) == 0: return base
decays = safe_exp(-beta * (t - history[history < t]))
return base + alpha * np.sum(decays)

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@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
from .posted_price import PostedPriceMechanism
from .two_sided import TwoSidedMechanism
from .auction import AuctionMechanism
__all__ = ['PostedPriceMechanism', 'TwoSidedMechanism', 'AuctionMechanism']

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@@ -1,73 +0,0 @@
"""
Auction mechanism for reserve pricing and bid shading.
In this mechanism, the agent sets reserve prices that affect
win probability and clearing prices. Used for ad auctions,
marketplace auctions, and similar settings.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
from dataclasses import dataclass
import numpy as np
from ..types import Quote, Opportunity, Execution, InstrumentSet, MarketState
from ..constants import Side
from ..math_util import clamp, sigmoid
@dataclass
class AuctionConfig:
"""Configuration for auction mechanism.
Attributes:
min_reserve: Minimum reserve price
max_reserve: Maximum reserve price
base_win_prob: Baseline win probability at reference reserve
sensitivity: How much higher reserves reduce win probability
"""
min_reserve: float = 0.0
max_reserve: float = 100.0
base_win_prob: float = 0.3
sensitivity: float = 2.0
class AuctionMechanism:
"""Auction mechanism for reserve pricing.
The agent sets reserve prices that affect:
- Win probability: higher reserves reduce chance of winning
- Clearing price: bounded between reserve and simulated max bid
Win probability: base_prob * sigmoid(-sensitivity * (reserve - ref) / ref)
Clearing price: max(reserve, min(max_bid, reserve + random_increment))
Only BUY-side opportunities are processed (auction wins).
"""
def __init__(self, cfg: AuctionConfig | None = None):
self.cfg = cfg or AuctionConfig()
def apply_quote(self, quote: Quote, instruments: InstrumentSet,
rng: np.random.Generator) -> Quote:
reserves = clamp(quote.prices, self.cfg.min_reserve, self.cfg.max_reserve)
return Quote(prices=reserves, propensity=quote.propensity, metadata=quote.metadata)
def process_opportunity(self, opp: Opportunity, quote: Quote,
instruments: InstrumentSet, market: MarketState | None,
rng: np.random.Generator) -> Execution | None:
if opp.side != Side.BUY: return None
idx = int(opp.instrument_id)
reserve = float(quote.prices[idx])
ref = instruments.refs[idx]
# win probability decreases with higher reserve
relative_reserve = (reserve - ref) / (ref + 1e-8)
win_prob = self.cfg.base_win_prob * sigmoid(-self.cfg.sensitivity * relative_reserve)
if rng.random() > win_prob: return None
# clearing price is between reserve and some max bid (simulated)
max_bid = ref * (1 + rng.exponential(0.2))
clearing = max(reserve, min(max_bid, reserve + rng.exponential(0.1) * ref))
return Execution(
opportunity_id=opp.id, instrument_id=opp.instrument_id,
side=opp.side, size_requested=opp.size, size_filled=opp.size,
price=clearing, propensity=quote.propensity * win_prob, t=opp.t
)

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@@ -1,84 +0,0 @@
"""
Posted price mechanism for retail dynamic pricing.
In this mechanism, the agent posts a single price per instrument.
Buyers decide whether to purchase based on the posted price.
This is the standard e-commerce dynamic pricing model.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
from dataclasses import dataclass
import numpy as np
from ..types import Quote, Opportunity, Execution, InstrumentSet, MarketState
from ..constants import Side
from ..math_util import clamp
@dataclass
class PostedPriceConfig:
"""Configuration for posted price mechanism.
Attributes:
min_price: Absolute minimum price
max_price: Absolute maximum price
max_delta_pct: Maximum price change per step as fraction of previous
min_margin_pct: Minimum margin over cost basis
round_to: Price rounding granularity (None = no rounding)
"""
min_price: float = 0.01
max_price: float = 1000.0
max_delta_pct: float = 0.2
min_margin_pct: float = 0.05
round_to: float | None = 0.01
class PostedPriceMechanism:
"""Posted price mechanism for retail dynamic pricing.
The agent posts a single price per product. Constraints enforced:
- Prices within [min_price, max_price]
- Margin at least min_margin_pct above cost
- Price changes limited to max_delta_pct per step
- Prices rounded to round_to granularity
Only BUY-side opportunities are processed (customers purchasing).
"""
def __init__(self, cfg: PostedPriceConfig | None = None):
self.cfg = cfg or PostedPriceConfig()
def apply_quote(self, quote: Quote, instruments: InstrumentSet,
rng: np.random.Generator) -> Quote:
prices = quote.prices.copy()
costs = instruments.costs
refs = instruments.refs
c = self.cfg
# enforce min margin
min_prices = costs * (1 + c.min_margin_pct)
prices = np.maximum(prices, min_prices)
# enforce absolute bounds
prices = clamp(prices, c.min_price, c.max_price)
# enforce max delta if we have history
if 'prev_prices' in quote.metadata:
prev = quote.metadata['prev_prices']
max_change = prev * c.max_delta_pct
prices = clamp(prices, prev - max_change, prev + max_change)
# round prices
if c.round_to:
prices = np.round(prices / c.round_to) * c.round_to
return Quote(prices=prices, propensity=quote.propensity,
metadata={**quote.metadata, 'prev_prices': prices})
def process_opportunity(self, opp: Opportunity, quote: Quote,
instruments: InstrumentSet, market: MarketState | None,
rng: np.random.Generator) -> Execution | None:
if opp.side != Side.BUY: return None # posted price is buy-only
idx = int(opp.instrument_id)
price = float(quote.prices[idx])
return Execution(
opportunity_id=opp.id, instrument_id=opp.instrument_id,
side=opp.side, size_requested=opp.size, size_filled=opp.size,
price=price, propensity=quote.propensity, t=opp.t
)

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@@ -1,89 +0,0 @@
"""
Two-sided quoting mechanism for market making.
In this mechanism, the agent posts both bid and ask prices.
Execution depends on the distance from the market mid-price.
This models liquidity provision in financial markets.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
from dataclasses import dataclass
import numpy as np
from ..types import Quote, Opportunity, Execution, InstrumentSet, MarketState
from ..constants import Side
from ..math_util import clamp, intensity_decay
@dataclass
class TwoSidedConfig:
"""Configuration for two-sided quoting mechanism.
Attributes:
min_spread: Minimum bid-ask spread
max_spread: Maximum bid-ask spread
min_price: Absolute minimum price
max_price: Absolute maximum price
fill_kappa: Intensity decay parameter (higher = faster decay with distance)
"""
min_spread: float = 0.01
max_spread: float = 0.5
min_price: float = 0.01
max_price: float = 10000.0
fill_kappa: float = 1.5
class TwoSidedMechanism:
"""Two-sided quoting mechanism for market making.
The agent posts bid (buy) and ask (sell) prices around a mid-point.
Fill probability decays exponentially with distance from mid-price,
following the Avellaneda-Stoikov intensity model.
Both BUY and SELL opportunities are processed:
- BUY: customer buys at agent's ask price
- SELL: customer sells at agent's bid price
"""
def __init__(self, cfg: TwoSidedConfig | None = None):
self.cfg = cfg or TwoSidedConfig()
def apply_quote(self, quote: Quote, instruments: InstrumentSet,
rng: np.random.Generator) -> Quote:
prices = quote.prices.copy()
spreads = quote.spreads.copy() if quote.spreads is not None else np.full_like(prices, 0.02)
c = self.cfg
prices = clamp(prices, c.min_price, c.max_price)
spreads = clamp(spreads, c.min_spread, c.max_spread)
# ensure bids < asks
half_spread = spreads / 2
bids = prices - half_spread
asks = prices + half_spread
bids = np.maximum(bids, c.min_price)
asks = np.minimum(asks, c.max_price)
spreads = asks - bids
prices = (bids + asks) / 2
return Quote(prices=prices, spreads=spreads, propensity=quote.propensity,
metadata=quote.metadata)
def process_opportunity(self, opp: Opportunity, quote: Quote,
instruments: InstrumentSet, market: MarketState | None,
rng: np.random.Generator) -> Execution | None:
idx = int(opp.instrument_id)
mid = market.mid_prices[idx] if market and market.mid_prices is not None else quote.prices[idx]
if opp.side == Side.BUY:
price = float(quote.asks[idx]) if quote.asks is not None else float(quote.prices[idx])
distance = price - mid
else:
price = float(quote.bids[idx]) if quote.bids is not None else float(quote.prices[idx])
distance = mid - price
# probabilistic fill based on distance from mid
fill_prob = intensity_decay(abs(distance), self.cfg.fill_kappa)
if rng.random() > fill_prob: return None
return Execution(
opportunity_id=opp.id, instrument_id=opp.instrument_id,
side=opp.side, size_requested=opp.size, size_filled=opp.size,
price=price, propensity=quote.propensity * fill_prob, t=opp.t
)

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@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
from .base import BaseObjective, CompositeObjective
from .penalties import (PnLObjective, VolatilityPenalty, HoldingCostPenalty,
LostOpportunityCostPenalty, InventoryRiskPenalty, SpreadCaptureReward)
from .factory import make_objective, make_composite, retail_objective, market_making_objective
__all__ = [
'BaseObjective', 'CompositeObjective',
'PnLObjective', 'VolatilityPenalty', 'HoldingCostPenalty',
'LostOpportunityCostPenalty', 'InventoryRiskPenalty', 'SpreadCaptureReward',
'make_objective', 'make_composite', 'retail_objective', 'market_making_objective',
]

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@@ -1,48 +0,0 @@
"""
Base classes for reward objectives.
Objectives compute scalar rewards from step metrics. The CompositeObjective
allows combining multiple objectives with weights for multi-objective optimization.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
from abc import ABC, abstractmethod
from ..types import Quote, InstrumentSet, StepMetrics, HiddenState, Observation
class BaseObjective(ABC):
"""Abstract base class for reward objectives.
Subclasses must implement reward() and breakdown() methods.
"""
@abstractmethod
def reward(self, quote: Quote, instruments: InstrumentSet,
metrics: StepMetrics, hidden: HiddenState, obs: Observation) -> float: ...
@abstractmethod
def breakdown(self, quote: Quote, instruments: InstrumentSet,
metrics: StepMetrics, hidden: HiddenState, obs: Observation) -> dict[str, float]: ...
class CompositeObjective(BaseObjective):
"""Weighted sum of multiple objectives.
Allows combining multiple reward terms (e.g., PnL - holding_cost - volatility).
Args:
objectives: List of (objective, weight) tuples
"""
def __init__(self, objectives: list[tuple[BaseObjective, float]]):
self.objectives = objectives
def reward(self, quote: Quote, instruments: InstrumentSet,
metrics: StepMetrics, hidden: HiddenState, obs: Observation) -> float:
return sum(w * obj.reward(quote, instruments, metrics, hidden, obs)
for obj, w in self.objectives)
def breakdown(self, quote: Quote, instruments: InstrumentSet,
metrics: StepMetrics, hidden: HiddenState, obs: Observation) -> dict[str, float]:
bd = {}
for obj, w in self.objectives:
for k, v in obj.breakdown(quote, instruments, metrics, hidden, obs).items():
bd[k] = w * v
return bd

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@@ -1,82 +0,0 @@
"""
Factory functions for creating objectives.
Provides:
- make_objective: Create single objective by name
- make_composite: Create weighted combination of objectives
- retail_objective: Default objective for retail pricing
- market_making_objective: Default objective for market making
"""
from __future__ import annotations
from .base import BaseObjective, CompositeObjective
from .penalties import (PnLObjective, VolatilityPenalty, HoldingCostPenalty,
LostOpportunityCostPenalty, InventoryRiskPenalty, SpreadCaptureReward)
REGISTRY: dict[str, type[BaseObjective]] = {
'pnl': PnLObjective,
'volatility': VolatilityPenalty,
'holding_cost': HoldingCostPenalty,
'lost_opportunity': LostOpportunityCostPenalty,
'inventory_risk': InventoryRiskPenalty,
'spread_capture': SpreadCaptureReward,
}
def make_objective(name: str, **kwargs) -> BaseObjective:
"""Create an objective by name.
Args:
name: Objective name (pnl, volatility, holding_cost, lost_opportunity,
inventory_risk, spread_capture)
**kwargs: Passed to objective constructor
Returns:
Instantiated objective
"""
if name not in REGISTRY:
raise ValueError(f"Unknown objective: {name}. Available: {list(REGISTRY.keys())}")
return REGISTRY[name](**kwargs)
def make_composite(spec: list[tuple[str, float, dict]] | dict[str, float]) -> CompositeObjective:
"""Create composite objective from specification.
Args:
spec: Either:
- list of (name, weight, kwargs) tuples for full control
- dict of {name: weight} for simple cases
Returns:
CompositeObjective with specified components
"""
objectives = []
if isinstance(spec, dict):
for name, weight in spec.items():
objectives.append((make_objective(name), weight))
else:
for name, weight, kwargs in spec:
objectives.append((make_objective(name, **kwargs), weight))
return CompositeObjective(objectives)
def retail_objective(volatility_weight: float = 0.1, holding_weight: float = 0.5,
stockout_weight: float = 0.3) -> CompositeObjective:
"""Default objective for retail dynamic pricing.
Reward = PnL - volatility_weight*volatility - holding_weight*holding_cost
- stockout_weight*lost_opportunity
"""
return make_composite({
'pnl': 1.0,
'volatility': volatility_weight,
'holding_cost': holding_weight,
'lost_opportunity': stockout_weight,
})
def market_making_objective(gamma: float = 0.1, sigma: float = 1.0) -> CompositeObjective:
"""Default objective for market making.
Reward = PnL + 0.5*spread_capture - inventory_risk(gamma, sigma)
"""
return CompositeObjective([
(PnLObjective(), 1.0),
(SpreadCaptureReward(), 0.5),
(InventoryRiskPenalty(gamma=gamma, sigma=sigma), 1.0),
])

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@@ -1,101 +0,0 @@
"""
Standard objective components and penalties.
This module provides common reward terms:
- PnLObjective: Basic profit and loss
- VolatilityPenalty: Penalize price volatility for UX
- HoldingCostPenalty: Inventory holding cost
- LostOpportunityCostPenalty: Stockout/missed fill cost
- InventoryRiskPenalty: Quadratic inventory risk (market making)
- SpreadCaptureReward: Bid-ask spread capture (market making)
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import numpy as np
from .base import BaseObjective
from ..types import Quote, InstrumentSet, StepMetrics, HiddenState, Observation
from ..math_util import inventory_penalty
class PnLObjective(BaseObjective):
"""Profit and loss reward (revenue - cost)."""
def reward(self, quote: Quote, instruments: InstrumentSet,
metrics: StepMetrics, hidden: HiddenState, obs: Observation) -> float:
return metrics.pnl
def breakdown(self, quote: Quote, instruments: InstrumentSet,
metrics: StepMetrics, hidden: HiddenState, obs: Observation) -> dict[str, float]:
return {'pnl': metrics.pnl, 'revenue': metrics.revenue, 'cost': metrics.cost}
class VolatilityPenalty(BaseObjective):
"""Penalize price volatility for user experience."""
def __init__(self, scale: float = 1.0):
self.scale = scale
def reward(self, quote: Quote, instruments: InstrumentSet,
metrics: StepMetrics, hidden: HiddenState, obs: Observation) -> float:
return -self.scale * metrics.volatility
def breakdown(self, quote: Quote, instruments: InstrumentSet,
metrics: StepMetrics, hidden: HiddenState, obs: Observation) -> dict[str, float]:
return {'volatility_penalty': -self.scale * metrics.volatility}
class HoldingCostPenalty(BaseObjective):
"""Penalty for inventory holding costs."""
def __init__(self, scale: float = 1.0):
self.scale = scale
def reward(self, quote: Quote, instruments: InstrumentSet,
metrics: StepMetrics, hidden: HiddenState, obs: Observation) -> float:
return -self.scale * metrics.position_cost
def breakdown(self, quote: Quote, instruments: InstrumentSet,
metrics: StepMetrics, hidden: HiddenState, obs: Observation) -> dict[str, float]:
return {'holding_cost_penalty': -self.scale * metrics.position_cost}
class LostOpportunityCostPenalty(BaseObjective):
"""Penalty for lost sales due to stockouts or missed fills."""
def __init__(self, scale: float = 1.0):
self.scale = scale
def reward(self, quote: Quote, instruments: InstrumentSet,
metrics: StepMetrics, hidden: HiddenState, obs: Observation) -> float:
return -self.scale * metrics.lost_opportunity
def breakdown(self, quote: Quote, instruments: InstrumentSet,
metrics: StepMetrics, hidden: HiddenState, obs: Observation) -> dict[str, float]:
return {'lost_opportunity_penalty': -self.scale * metrics.lost_opportunity}
class InventoryRiskPenalty(BaseObjective):
"""Quadratic inventory risk penalty (Avellaneda-Stoikov style).
Penalty = gamma * sigma^2 * q^2 / 2, where q is total position.
Encourages market makers to keep inventory near zero.
"""
def __init__(self, gamma: float = 0.1, sigma: float = 1.0):
self.gamma = gamma
self.sigma = sigma
def reward(self, quote: Quote, instruments: InstrumentSet,
metrics: StepMetrics, hidden: HiddenState, obs: Observation) -> float:
if obs.position is None: return 0.0
q = np.sum(obs.position)
return -inventory_penalty(q, self.gamma, self.sigma)
def breakdown(self, quote: Quote, instruments: InstrumentSet,
metrics: StepMetrics, hidden: HiddenState, obs: Observation) -> dict[str, float]:
return {'inventory_risk_penalty': self.reward(quote, instruments, metrics, hidden, obs)}
class SpreadCaptureReward(BaseObjective):
"""Reward for capturing bid-ask spread in market making."""
def reward(self, quote: Quote, instruments: InstrumentSet,
metrics: StepMetrics, hidden: HiddenState, obs: Observation) -> float:
return metrics.spread_capture
def breakdown(self, quote: Quote, instruments: InstrumentSet,
metrics: StepMetrics, hidden: HiddenState, obs: Observation) -> dict[str, float]:
return {'spread_capture': metrics.spread_capture}

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@@ -1,92 +0,0 @@
"""
Observation construction with demand censoring.
This module provides the ObservationBuilder that constructs agent observations
from step data. The key invariant is that observations only contain censored
data (fills) and never true demand, ensuring proper research conditions.
The ObservationConfig controls what is included in observations:
- Position visibility
- Market/competitor visibility
- Demand proxy method
"""
from __future__ import annotations
from dataclasses import dataclass
import numpy as np
from .types import Quote, InstrumentSet, StepLogs, StepMetrics, MarketState, HiddenState, Observation
@dataclass
class ObservationConfig:
"""Configuration for observation construction.
Attributes:
include_position: Include current position in observation
include_market: Include market/competitor state in observation
mask_true_demand: If True, observation excludes true demand (research mode)
demand_proxy: Method for demand proxy ('fills', 'exposures', 'weighted')
exposure_weights: Weights for weighted demand proxy
"""
include_position: bool = True
include_market: bool = True
mask_true_demand: bool = True
demand_proxy: str = 'fills'
exposure_weights: dict[str, float] | None = None
class DefaultObservationBuilder:
"""Constructs censored observations for the agent.
Ensures the key research invariant: observations contain only
censored fills (realized sales), never true demand. True demand
is placed in the info dict for research analysis only.
"""
def __init__(self, cfg: ObservationConfig | None = None):
self.cfg = cfg or ObservationConfig()
def build(self, quote: Quote, instruments: InstrumentSet, logs: StepLogs,
metrics: StepMetrics, market: MarketState | None,
hidden: HiddenState, mask_demand: bool, t: int) -> Observation:
n = instruments.n
cfg = self.cfg
# always show censored fills
fills = logs.censored_fills if logs.censored_fills is not None else np.zeros(n)
# compute exposures from logs
if logs.events:
exposures = np.zeros(n)
for e in logs.events:
if e.instrument_id is not None:
exposures[e.instrument_id] += 1
else:
exposures = logs.aggregates.get('exposures', np.zeros(n))
# position - only if configured and available
position = None
if cfg.include_position and instruments.position is not None:
position = instruments.position.copy()
# market state - only if configured
obs_market = market if cfg.include_market else None
return Observation(
quotes=quote.prices.copy(),
position=position,
fills=fills,
exposures=exposures,
market=obs_market,
t=t
)
def make_space(self, n_instruments: int, include_market: bool = True) -> dict:
"""Returns dict describing observation space for gym"""
space = {
'quotes': {'shape': (n_instruments,), 'low': 0, 'high': np.inf},
'fills': {'shape': (n_instruments,), 'low': 0, 'high': np.inf},
'exposures': {'shape': (n_instruments,), 'low': 0, 'high': np.inf},
}
if self.cfg.include_position:
space['position'] = {'shape': (n_instruments,), 'low': -np.inf, 'high': np.inf}
if include_market:
space['competitor_quotes'] = {'shape': (n_instruments,), 'low': 0, 'high': np.inf}
return space

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@@ -1,285 +0,0 @@
"""
Main simulation platform orchestrating the Quote-Control loop.
The Platform class is the central coordinator that:
1. Receives pricing actions (quotes) from the agent
2. Generates arrivals via the ArrivalModel
3. Processes executions via Mechanism and ExecutionModel
4. Applies position censorship via PositionModel
5. Computes metrics and reward via Objective
6. Returns censored observations
Example:
>>> from lab.config import make_retail_platform
>>> platform = make_retail_platform()
>>> result = platform.reset(seed=42)
>>> result = platform.step(platform.instruments.refs * 1.1)
>>> print(f"PnL: {result.metrics.pnl:.2f}")
"""
from __future__ import annotations
from dataclasses import dataclass, field
from typing import Any
import numpy as np
from .types import (Quote, Opportunity, Execution, InstrumentSet, StepLogs, StepMetrics,
StepEvent, MarketState, HiddenState, Observation, StepResult)
from .constants import LogLevel, EventType, Side
from .protocols import Mechanism, ArrivalModel, ExecutionModel, PositionModel, MarketModel, ObservationBuilder, Objective
from .stock import PositionModel as DefaultPositionModel, PositionConfig
from .observation import DefaultObservationBuilder, ObservationConfig
from .objectives.factory import retail_objective
@dataclass
class PlatformConfig:
"""Configuration for the simulation platform.
Attributes:
n_instruments: Number of instruments in the simulation
max_steps: Maximum steps before episode terminates
dt: Time duration per step (affects arrival rates)
log_level: Verbosity of logging (NONE, AGG_ONLY, FULL)
mask_demand: If True, observations exclude true demand (research mode)
seed: Random seed for reproducibility
"""
n_instruments: int = 10
max_steps: int = 1000
dt: float = 1.0
log_level: LogLevel = LogLevel.AGG_ONLY
mask_demand: bool = True
seed: int | None = None
class Platform:
"""Main simulation orchestrator implementing Quote -> Arrival -> Execution -> Position.
The Platform coordinates all components to simulate a pricing environment:
- Mechanism: validates quotes and determines execution logic
- ArrivalModel: generates demand opportunities
- ExecutionModel: computes acceptance probabilities
- PositionModel: manages inventory/position and censorship
- MarketModel: updates competitor/market state
- ObservationBuilder: constructs censored observations
- Objective: computes reward from metrics
Attributes:
instruments: The instrument set being priced
mechanism: Quote validation and execution mechanism
arrival: Demand arrival generator
execution: Acceptance probability model
position: Inventory/position manager
market: Competitor/market dynamics (optional)
obs_builder: Observation constructor
objective: Reward function
cfg: Platform configuration
"""
def __init__(self, instruments: InstrumentSet, mechanism: Mechanism,
arrival: ArrivalModel, execution: ExecutionModel,
position: PositionModel | None = None,
market: MarketModel | None = None,
obs_builder: ObservationBuilder | None = None,
objective: Objective | None = None,
cfg: PlatformConfig | None = None):
self.instruments = instruments
self.mechanism = mechanism
self.arrival = arrival
self.execution = execution
self.position = position or DefaultPositionModel(PositionConfig())
self.market = market
self.obs_builder = obs_builder or DefaultObservationBuilder()
self.objective = objective or retail_objective()
self.cfg = cfg or PlatformConfig(n_instruments=instruments.n)
self._t: int = 0
self._rng: np.random.Generator = np.random.default_rng(self.cfg.seed)
self._quote: Quote | None = None
self._market_state: MarketState | None = None
self._hidden: HiddenState = HiddenState()
self._prev_prices: np.ndarray | None = None
def reset(self, seed: int | None = None) -> StepResult:
"""Reset the platform to initial state.
Args:
seed: Random seed (overrides config seed if provided)
Returns:
Initial StepResult with zeroed metrics and initial observation
"""
self._t = 0
self._rng = np.random.default_rng(seed or self.cfg.seed)
self._hidden = HiddenState()
self._prev_prices = self.instruments.refs.copy()
# reset position
self.position.reset(self.instruments, self._rng)
self.instruments.position = self.position.position
# initial quote at reference prices
self._quote = Quote(prices=self.instruments.refs.copy(), propensity=1.0,
metadata={'prev_prices': self._prev_prices})
self._quote = self.mechanism.apply_quote(self._quote, self.instruments, self._rng)
# initial market state
if self.market:
self._market_state = self.market.step(0, self._quote, self._hidden, self._rng)
# build initial observation
logs = StepLogs(aggregates={'reset': True},
true_demand=np.zeros(self.instruments.n),
censored_fills=np.zeros(self.instruments.n))
metrics = StepMetrics()
obs = self.obs_builder.build(self._quote, self.instruments, logs, metrics,
self._market_state, self._hidden, self.cfg.mask_demand, 0)
return StepResult(obs=obs, reward=0.0, terminated=False, truncated=False,
info={'true_demand': logs.true_demand}, metrics=metrics,
logs=logs, hidden=self._hidden)
def step(self, action: np.ndarray, propensity: float = 1.0) -> StepResult:
"""Execute one simulation step with the given pricing action.
The step proceeds as follows:
1. Apply quote constraints via mechanism
2. Update market/competitor state
3. Generate arrivals
4. Process arrivals -> executions with acceptance check
5. Apply position censorship to executions
6. Update position state
7. Compute metrics (PnL, costs, etc.)
8. Build logs with propensities
9. Construct censored observation
10. Compute reward
Args:
action: Price vector for all instruments
propensity: P(action | behavior policy) for OPE logging
Returns:
StepResult containing observation, reward, metrics, logs, and hidden state
"""
self._t += 1
cfg = self.cfg
# 1. apply quote from action
self._quote = Quote(prices=action, propensity=propensity,
metadata={'prev_prices': self._prev_prices})
self._quote = self.mechanism.apply_quote(self._quote, self.instruments, self._rng)
self._prev_prices = self._quote.prices.copy()
self._hidden.quote_history.append(self._quote.prices.copy())
# 2. update market/competitors
if self.market:
self._market_state = self.market.step(self._t, self._quote, self._hidden, self._rng)
self._hidden.market_history.append(self._market_state)
# 3. generate arrivals
opps = self.arrival.sample(self._t, cfg.dt, self.instruments,
self._market_state, self._hidden, self._rng)
# 4. process opportunities -> executions
executions: list[Execution] = []
events: list[StepEvent] = []
true_demand = np.zeros(self.instruments.n)
for opp in opps:
# log exposure
if cfg.log_level == LogLevel.FULL:
events.append(StepEvent(t=opp.t, type=EventType.EXPOSURE,
instrument_id=opp.instrument_id,
opportunity_id=opp.id,
price=float(self._quote.prices[opp.instrument_id]),
propensity=self._quote.propensity))
# check acceptance
prob = self.execution.prob(opp, self._quote, self.instruments,
self._market_state, self._rng)
if self._rng.random() < prob:
# create execution
exe = self.mechanism.process_opportunity(opp, self._quote, self.instruments,
self._market_state, self._rng)
if exe:
true_demand[exe.instrument_id] += exe.size_requested
# apply position censorship
exe = self.position.apply_execution(exe)
executions.append(exe)
if cfg.log_level == LogLevel.FULL:
events.append(StepEvent(t=exe.t, type=EventType.EXECUTION,
instrument_id=exe.instrument_id,
opportunity_id=exe.opportunity_id,
price=exe.price, size=exe.size_filled,
propensity=exe.propensity))
# 5. update position state
self.position.step(self._t)
self.instruments.position = self.position.position
# 6. compute metrics
censored_fills = np.zeros(self.instruments.n)
revenue = 0.0
cost = 0.0
spread_capture = 0.0
for exe in executions:
censored_fills[exe.instrument_id] += exe.size_filled
if exe.side == Side.BUY:
revenue += exe.price * exe.size_filled
cost += self.instruments.costs[exe.instrument_id] * exe.size_filled
else:
revenue -= exe.price * exe.size_filled
cost -= self.instruments.costs[exe.instrument_id] * exe.size_filled
# spread capture for market making
if self._quote.spreads is not None and self._market_state and self._market_state.mid_prices is not None:
mid = self._market_state.mid_prices[exe.instrument_id]
if exe.side == Side.BUY:
spread_capture += (exe.price - mid) * exe.size_filled
else:
spread_capture += (mid - exe.price) * exe.size_filled
pnl = revenue - cost
units = float(np.sum(censored_fills))
lost = float(np.sum(true_demand - censored_fills))
# volatility
volatility = 0.0
if len(self._hidden.quote_history) > 1:
prev = self._hidden.quote_history[-2]
volatility = float(np.mean(np.abs(self._quote.prices - prev) / (prev + 1e-8)))
metrics = StepMetrics(
pnl=pnl, revenue=revenue, cost=cost, units_traded=units,
position_cost=self.position.holding_cost,
lost_opportunity=self.position.shortage_cost + lost * np.mean(self._quote.prices) * 0.1,
spread_capture=spread_capture, volatility=volatility,
conversion=units / (len(opps) + 1e-8),
per_instrument={'fills': censored_fills, 'demand': true_demand}
)
# 7. build logs
logs = StepLogs(
events=events if cfg.log_level == LogLevel.FULL else None,
executions=executions if cfg.log_level == LogLevel.FULL else None,
aggregates={'n_arrivals': len(opps), 'n_executions': len(executions),
'exposures': np.bincount([o.instrument_id for o in opps],
minlength=self.instruments.n).astype(float)},
true_demand=true_demand,
censored_fills=censored_fills
)
# 8. build observation
obs = self.obs_builder.build(self._quote, self.instruments, logs, metrics,
self._market_state, self._hidden, cfg.mask_demand, self._t)
# 9. compute reward
reward = self.objective.reward(self._quote, self.instruments, metrics, self._hidden, obs)
breakdown = self.objective.breakdown(self._quote, self.instruments, metrics, self._hidden, obs)
# print(f"Step {self._t}: Reward={reward:.2f}, Breakdown={breakdown}")
# 10. check termination
terminated = self._t >= cfg.max_steps
truncated = False
info = {'true_demand': true_demand, 'breakdown': self.objective.breakdown(
self._quote, self.instruments, metrics, self._hidden, obs)}
return StepResult(obs=obs, reward=reward, terminated=terminated, truncated=truncated,
info=info, metrics=metrics, logs=logs, hidden=self._hidden)

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@@ -1,297 +0,0 @@
"""
Protocol definitions for pluggable simulator components.
This module defines the interfaces (Protocols) that allow swapping different
implementations for each stage of the Quote -> Arrival -> Execution -> Position
pipeline. All protocols use structural subtyping (duck typing).
Protocols:
Mechanism: How quotes translate to executions (posted price, two-sided, auction)
ArrivalModel: How opportunities arrive (Poisson, Hawkes, sessions)
ExecutionModel: Acceptance probability given quote (elasticity, intensity)
PositionModel: Inventory/position management and censorship
MarketModel: Competitor/market dynamics
ObservationBuilder: Constructs agent observations with censoring
Objective: Computes reward from metrics
"""
from __future__ import annotations
from typing import Protocol, Any, TYPE_CHECKING
import numpy as np
if TYPE_CHECKING:
from .types import (Quote, Opportunity, Execution, InstrumentSet, StepLogs,
StepMetrics, HiddenState, Observation, MarketState)
from .constants import LogLevel
class Mechanism(Protocol):
"""Defines how quotes translate to executions.
The Mechanism is the core abstraction that differentiates pricing domains:
- PostedPrice: single price, buyer decides to purchase or not
- TwoSided: bid/ask spread, execution depends on distance from mid
- Auction: reserve price affects win probability and clearing price
Methods:
apply_quote: Enforce constraints and return valid quote
process_opportunity: Determine execution given opportunity and quote
"""
def apply_quote(self, quote: Quote, instruments: InstrumentSet,
rng: np.random.Generator) -> Quote:
"""Apply mechanism-specific constraints to a quote.
Args:
quote: Raw quote from policy
instruments: Current instrument set with costs/refs
rng: Random generator for stochastic constraints
Returns:
Constrained quote satisfying mechanism rules (min margin, max delta, etc.)
"""
...
def process_opportunity(self, opp: Opportunity, quote: Quote,
instruments: InstrumentSet, market: MarketState | None,
rng: np.random.Generator) -> Execution | None:
"""Process an opportunity against the current quote.
Args:
opp: Incoming opportunity (session, order, request)
quote: Current posted quote
instruments: Instrument set
market: Current market state (competitor prices, mid-prices)
rng: Random generator
Returns:
Execution if opportunity converts, None otherwise
"""
...
class ArrivalModel(Protocol):
"""Generates opportunities (demand arrivals) for each step.
Different arrival models capture different demand dynamics:
- Poisson: constant rate, memoryless
- Hawkes: self-exciting, clustered arrivals
- Session: retail browsing with multi-product views
Methods:
sample: Generate opportunities for a time interval
"""
def sample(self, t: float, dt: float, instruments: InstrumentSet,
market: MarketState | None, hidden: HiddenState,
rng: np.random.Generator) -> list[Opportunity]:
"""Sample opportunities for time interval [t, t+dt).
Args:
t: Current time
dt: Time interval length
instruments: Available instruments
market: Current market state
hidden: Hidden state (contains demand intensity, contamination)
rng: Random generator
Returns:
List of opportunities arriving in this interval
"""
...
class ExecutionModel(Protocol):
"""Computes acceptance/execution probability given quote and context.
Different models capture different demand responses:
- Elasticity: price sensitivity with competitor cross-effects
- Intensity: distance-based fill probability (market making)
- Logit: discrete choice model
Methods:
prob: Compute acceptance probability
uncensor: Estimate true demand from censored fills
"""
def prob(self, opp: Opportunity, quote: Quote, instruments: InstrumentSet,
market: MarketState | None, rng: np.random.Generator) -> float:
"""Compute probability that opportunity accepts the quote.
Args:
opp: Opportunity to evaluate
quote: Current quote
instruments: Instrument set
market: Market state (competitor prices affect cross-elasticity)
rng: Random generator
Returns:
Probability in [0, 1] that opportunity executes
"""
...
def uncensor(self, fills: np.ndarray, instruments: InstrumentSet,
context: dict[str, Any] | None = None) -> np.ndarray:
"""Estimate true demand from censored fills.
Used for demand estimation research under inventory censorship.
Args:
fills: Observed (censored) fill counts
instruments: Instrument set
context: Additional context (exposures, prices shown)
Returns:
Estimated true demand counts
"""
...
class PositionModel(Protocol):
"""Manages inventory (retail) or position (finance).
Handles:
- Position constraints and censorship
- Holding costs (retail) or inventory risk (finance)
- Replenishment and order receipt
Methods:
reset: Initialize position state
available: Query available capacity for a trade
apply_execution: Censor execution by available position
step: Process time-based updates (replenishment, holding cost)
Properties:
position: Current position vector
holding_cost: Cost incurred this step from holding position
"""
def reset(self, instruments: InstrumentSet, rng: np.random.Generator) -> None:
"""Initialize position state for new episode."""
...
def available(self, instrument_id: int, side: Any) -> float:
"""Query available capacity for a trade.
Args:
instrument_id: Which instrument
side: BUY or SELL
Returns:
Maximum tradeable size given current position
"""
...
def apply_execution(self, exe: Execution) -> Execution:
"""Apply position constraints to an execution.
Args:
exe: Proposed execution with size_requested
Returns:
Censored execution with size_filled <= available capacity
"""
...
def step(self, t: float) -> None:
"""Process time-based position updates.
Handles replenishment receipt, holding cost calculation, etc.
"""
...
@property
def position(self) -> np.ndarray:
"""Current position vector (positive=long/inventory, negative=short)."""
...
@property
def holding_cost(self) -> float:
"""Holding cost incurred this step."""
...
class MarketModel(Protocol):
"""Models external market dynamics and competitor behavior.
For retail: competitor price dynamics (static, reactive, stochastic)
For finance: mid-price process (GBM, mean-reverting)
Methods:
step: Update market state given agent's quotes
"""
def step(self, t: float, self_quotes: Quote, hidden: HiddenState,
rng: np.random.Generator) -> MarketState:
"""Update market state for this timestep.
Args:
t: Current time
self_quotes: Agent's current quotes (competitors may react)
hidden: Hidden state (regime info)
rng: Random generator
Returns:
Updated market state with competitor prices, mid-prices, volatility
"""
...
class ObservationBuilder(Protocol):
"""Constructs agent observations with appropriate censoring.
Critical for research: ensures agent only sees censored fills,
never true demand (which goes in info dict).
Methods:
build: Construct observation from step data
"""
def build(self, quote: Quote, instruments: InstrumentSet, logs: StepLogs,
metrics: StepMetrics, market: MarketState | None,
hidden: HiddenState, mask_demand: bool, t: int) -> Observation:
"""Build observation for agent.
Args:
quote: Current quote
instruments: Instrument set with positions
logs: Step logs with true_demand and censored_fills
metrics: Computed metrics
market: Market state
hidden: Hidden state (not included in obs)
mask_demand: If True, exclude true demand from observation
t: Current timestep
Returns:
Observation containing only observable quantities
"""
...
class Objective(Protocol):
"""Computes reward from step metrics.
Supports composite objectives with weighted terms:
- PnL (profit)
- Position costs (holding, inventory risk)
- Lost opportunity (stockouts)
- Volatility penalty (UX)
- Spread capture (market making)
Methods:
reward: Compute scalar reward
breakdown: Get per-term contribution for analysis
"""
def reward(self, quote: Quote, instruments: InstrumentSet,
metrics: StepMetrics, hidden: HiddenState,
obs: Observation) -> float:
"""Compute scalar reward for this step.
Args:
quote: Current quote
instruments: Instrument set
metrics: Step metrics (pnl, costs, etc.)
hidden: Hidden state
obs: Agent observation
Returns:
Scalar reward value
"""
...
def breakdown(self, quote: Quote, instruments: InstrumentSet,
metrics: StepMetrics, hidden: HiddenState,
obs: Observation) -> dict[str, float]:
"""Get reward breakdown by component.
Useful for analyzing which terms dominate the reward.
Returns:
Dict mapping term names to their contributions
"""
...

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@@ -1,151 +0,0 @@
"""
Inventory/position management and instrument factories.
This module provides:
- PositionConfig: Configuration for position constraints and costs
- PositionModel: Manages inventory (retail) or position (finance)
- make_instruments: Factory for creating instrument sets
The PositionModel handles demand censorship by limiting executions
to available inventory, computing holding costs, and managing replenishment.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
from dataclasses import dataclass, field
import numpy as np
from .types import Instrument, InstrumentSet, Execution
from .constants import Side, InstrumentType
@dataclass
class PositionConfig:
"""Configuration for position/inventory management.
Attributes:
initial_position: Starting inventory (None = unlimited, float = same for all)
max_position: Maximum long position per instrument
min_position: Maximum short position (negative, for finance)
holding_cost_rate: Cost per unit per step for holding inventory
shortage_cost_rate: Opportunity cost rate for stockouts
lead_time: Steps until replenishment orders arrive
"""
initial_position: np.ndarray | float | None = None
max_position: float = 1000.0
min_position: float = -1000.0
holding_cost_rate: float = 0.001
shortage_cost_rate: float = 0.05
lead_time: int = 0
@dataclass
class PositionModel:
"""Manages inventory (retail) or position (finance) with censorship.
Key responsibilities:
- Track current position per instrument
- Censor executions when position is insufficient
- Compute holding costs per step
- Track shortage/stockout costs
- Handle replenishment orders with lead time
For retail: position is inventory (positive), selling reduces it
For finance: position can be positive (long) or negative (short)
"""
cfg: PositionConfig
n: int = 0
_position: np.ndarray = field(default_factory=lambda: np.array([]))
_pending_orders: list[tuple[int, np.ndarray]] = field(default_factory=list)
_step_holding_cost: float = 0.0
_step_shortage_cost: float = 0.0
def reset(self, instruments: InstrumentSet, rng: np.random.Generator) -> None:
self.n = instruments.n
if self.cfg.initial_position is None:
self._position = np.full(self.n, np.inf) # unlimited
elif isinstance(self.cfg.initial_position, (int, float)):
self._position = np.full(self.n, float(self.cfg.initial_position))
else:
self._position = self.cfg.initial_position.copy().astype(np.float64)
self._pending_orders = []
self._step_holding_cost = 0.0
self._step_shortage_cost = 0.0
def available(self, instrument_id: int, side: Side) -> float:
pos = self._position[instrument_id]
if np.isinf(pos): return np.inf
if side == Side.BUY:
return max(0, pos) # can sell up to current inventory
else:
return max(0, self.cfg.max_position - pos) # can buy up to max
def apply_execution(self, exe: Execution) -> Execution:
idx = int(exe.instrument_id)
avail = self.available(idx, exe.side)
filled = min(exe.size_requested, avail)
shortage = exe.size_requested - filled
if exe.side == Side.BUY:
self._position[idx] -= filled # sold from inventory
else:
self._position[idx] += filled # bought into inventory
if shortage > 0:
self._step_shortage_cost += shortage * exe.price * self.cfg.shortage_cost_rate
return Execution(
opportunity_id=exe.opportunity_id, instrument_id=exe.instrument_id,
side=exe.side, size_requested=exe.size_requested,
size_filled=filled, price=exe.price, propensity=exe.propensity, t=exe.t
)
def order(self, quantity: np.ndarray) -> None:
if self.cfg.lead_time > 0:
self._pending_orders.append((self.cfg.lead_time, quantity.copy()))
else:
self._position += quantity
def step(self, t: float) -> None:
# compute holding cost
pos = np.where(np.isinf(self._position), 0, self._position)
self._step_holding_cost = float(np.sum(np.abs(pos)) * self.cfg.holding_cost_rate)
# receive pending orders
new_pending = []
for (remaining, qty) in self._pending_orders:
if remaining <= 1:
self._position += qty
else:
new_pending.append((remaining - 1, qty))
self._pending_orders = new_pending
@property
def position(self) -> np.ndarray:
return np.where(np.isinf(self._position), -1, self._position)
@property
def holding_cost(self) -> float:
return self._step_holding_cost
@property
def shortage_cost(self) -> float:
return self._step_shortage_cost
def make_instruments(n: int, cost_range: tuple[float, float] = (1.0, 10.0),
margin_range: tuple[float, float] = (0.2, 0.5),
inst_type: InstrumentType = InstrumentType.SKU,
rng: np.random.Generator | None = None) -> InstrumentSet:
"""Factory function to create a random instrument set.
Args:
n: Number of instruments to create
cost_range: (min, max) for uniform cost sampling
margin_range: (min, max) for uniform margin sampling
inst_type: Type of instruments (SKU, ASSET, etc.)
rng: Random generator (uses default if None)
Returns:
InstrumentSet with n instruments having random costs and margins
"""
rng = rng or np.random.default_rng()
costs = rng.uniform(*cost_range, n)
margins = rng.uniform(*margin_range, n)
items = [Instrument(id=i, type=inst_type, cost_basis=c, reference_price=c*(1+m))
for i, (c, m) in enumerate(zip(costs, margins))]
return InstrumentSet(instruments=items)

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@@ -1,318 +0,0 @@
"""
Core data types for the Quote-Control simulator.
This module defines the fundamental data structures used throughout the platform:
- Identifiers (InstrumentId, OpportunityId, AgentId)
- Domain objects (Instrument, Quote, Opportunity, Execution)
- Logging structures (StepEvent, StepLogs, StepMetrics)
- State containers (MarketState, HiddenState, Observation, StepResult)
All dataclasses are designed to be serializable and numpy-compatible.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
from dataclasses import dataclass, field
from typing import Any, NewType
import numpy as np
from .constants import Side, InstrumentType, OpportunityType, EventType
InstrumentId = NewType('InstrumentId', int) # unique instrument index
OpportunityId = NewType('OpportunityId', str) # unique opportunity/session ID
AgentId = NewType('AgentId', str) # unique agent/actor ID
@dataclass
class Instrument:
"""Represents a priceable entity in the simulation.
An instrument can be a retail SKU, financial asset, loan product, or subscription.
The cost_basis represents the fundamental value (marginal cost for retail,
mid-price for assets, funding rate for loans).
Attributes:
id: Unique identifier for this instrument
type: Category of instrument (SKU, ASSET, LOAN, SUBSCRIPTION)
cost_basis: Fundamental cost or value (marginal cost, mid-price, funding rate)
reference_price: Base or fair price used for action scaling
attrs: Additional attributes (quality score, category, volatility, etc.)
"""
id: InstrumentId
type: InstrumentType
cost_basis: float
reference_price: float
attrs: dict[str, Any] = field(default_factory=dict)
@dataclass
class InstrumentSet:
"""Collection of instruments with optional position tracking.
Provides vectorized access to instrument properties for efficient computation.
Position can be positive (long/inventory) or negative (short) for financial assets.
Attributes:
instruments: List of Instrument objects
position: Current position per instrument (None = unlimited capacity)
Properties:
n: Number of instruments
costs: Vector of cost bases
refs: Vector of reference prices
"""
instruments: list[Instrument]
position: np.ndarray | None = None
@property
def n(self) -> int: return len(self.instruments)
@property
def costs(self) -> np.ndarray: return np.array([i.cost_basis for i in self.instruments], np.float32)
@property
def refs(self) -> np.ndarray: return np.array([i.reference_price for i in self.instruments], np.float32)
@dataclass
class Quote:
"""Price quote set by the policy - the action in the MDP.
Supports multiple quoting mechanisms:
- Posted price: only `prices` field used
- Two-sided: `prices` as mid, `spreads` for bid-ask width
- Auction: `prices` as reserve prices
The propensity field is critical for off-policy evaluation (OPE).
Attributes:
prices: Posted prices (retail) or mid-quotes (market making)
spreads: Bid-ask spread width for two-sided quoting (None for posted price)
propensity: P(this quote | behavior policy) for importance sampling
metadata: Additional info (prev_prices for delta constraints, etc.)
Properties:
bids: Computed bid prices (mid - spread/2)
asks: Computed ask prices (mid + spread/2)
"""
prices: np.ndarray
spreads: np.ndarray | None = None
propensity: float = 1.0
metadata: dict[str, Any] = field(default_factory=dict)
@property
def bids(self) -> np.ndarray | None:
return self.prices - self.spreads/2 if self.spreads is not None else None
@property
def asks(self) -> np.ndarray | None:
return self.prices + self.spreads/2 if self.spreads is not None else None
@dataclass
class Opportunity:
"""An arrival event that may result in a transaction.
Opportunities are the demand side of the simulation:
- Retail: browsing session with purchase intent
- Market making: incoming market order
- Lending: loan application
The context dict carries segment/type information used by execution models.
Attributes:
id: Unique identifier for this opportunity
type: Category (SESSION, MARKET_ORDER, REQUEST)
side: BUY or SELL intent
instrument_id: Which instrument the opportunity targets
size: Requested transaction size (units, shares, principal)
t: Arrival timestamp
context: Segment info (is_scraper, credit_score, urgency, etc.)
"""
id: OpportunityId
type: OpportunityType
side: Side
instrument_id: InstrumentId
size: float = 1.0
t: float = 0.0
context: dict[str, Any] = field(default_factory=dict)
@dataclass
class Execution:
"""A realized transaction after acceptance and position censorship.
The difference between size_requested and size_filled represents
censored demand due to inventory/position constraints.
Attributes:
opportunity_id: Links back to the originating Opportunity
instrument_id: Which instrument was traded
side: BUY or SELL
size_requested: Original requested size (true demand)
size_filled: Actual filled size after censorship
price: Execution price
propensity: Combined propensity for OPE (quote * acceptance)
t: Execution timestamp
"""
opportunity_id: OpportunityId
instrument_id: InstrumentId
side: Side
size_requested: float
size_filled: float
price: float
propensity: float = 1.0
t: float = 0.0
@dataclass
class StepEvent:
"""Generic logged event"""
t: float
type: EventType
instrument_id: InstrumentId | None = None
opportunity_id: OpportunityId | None = None
price: float | None = None
size: float | None = None
propensity: float = 1.0
metadata: dict[str, Any] = field(default_factory=dict)
@dataclass
class StepLogs:
"""Container for all logging data from a simulation step.
Supports both detailed event logging (for OPE) and aggregate-only mode
(for fast simulation). The true_demand vs censored_fills distinction
is critical for research on demand estimation under censorship.
Attributes:
events: Detailed event log (None if LogLevel != FULL)
executions: List of executed transactions (None if LogLevel != FULL)
aggregates: Always-available aggregate statistics
true_demand: Oracle demand before censorship (for research, not in obs)
censored_fills: Realized fills after position constraints (observable)
"""
events: list[StepEvent] | None = None
executions: list[Execution] | None = None
aggregates: dict[str, Any] = field(default_factory=dict)
true_demand: np.ndarray | None = None
censored_fills: np.ndarray | None = None
@dataclass
class StepMetrics:
"""Computed metrics for a single simulation step.
Metrics are domain-aware: retail uses revenue/cost/holding_cost,
market making uses spread_capture and inventory risk.
Attributes:
pnl: Profit and loss (revenue - cost for retail, mark-to-market for finance)
revenue: Gross revenue from sales/executions
cost: Cost of goods sold or position acquisition cost
units_traded: Total units/shares transacted
position_cost: Holding cost (retail) or inventory risk penalty (finance)
lost_opportunity: Cost of stockouts or missed fills
spread_capture: Bid-ask spread captured (market making)
volatility: Price volatility metric for UX consideration
conversion: Fill rate (executions / opportunities)
per_instrument: Per-instrument breakdowns (fills, demand, etc.)
"""
pnl: float = 0.0
revenue: float = 0.0
cost: float = 0.0
units_traded: float = 0.0
position_cost: float = 0.0
lost_opportunity: float = 0.0
spread_capture: float = 0.0
volatility: float = 0.0
conversion: float = 0.0
per_instrument: dict[str, np.ndarray] = field(default_factory=dict)
@dataclass
class MarketState:
"""External market conditions and competitor state.
For retail: competitor_quotes drives cross-elasticity effects.
For finance: mid_prices and volatility drive execution dynamics.
Attributes:
competitor_quotes: Competitor posted prices (retail)
mid_prices: Market mid-prices for assets (finance)
volatility: Per-instrument volatility estimate
regime: Market regime identifier (normal, price_war, high_vol, etc.)
t: Timestamp of this market state
"""
competitor_quotes: np.ndarray | None = None
mid_prices: np.ndarray | None = None
volatility: np.ndarray | None = None
regime: str = 'normal'
t: float = 0.0
@dataclass
class HiddenState:
"""Internal simulator state not exposed to the agent.
Contains oracle information for research analysis and
history needed for non-stationary dynamics.
Attributes:
true_demand_intensity: Latent demand multiplier
contamination: Fraction of arrivals that are adversarial/scraper
regime: Current market/competitor regime
quote_history: History of agent quotes for volatility calculation
market_history: History of market states for analysis
"""
true_demand_intensity: float = 1.0
contamination: float = 0.0
regime: str = 'normal'
quote_history: list[np.ndarray] = field(default_factory=list)
market_history: list[MarketState] = field(default_factory=list)
@dataclass
class Observation:
"""Observable state provided to the agent - censored view only.
Critical invariant: Observation never contains true_demand, only
censored fills. This enforces the censorship research setting.
Attributes:
quotes: Current posted quotes (the agent's last action)
position: Current inventory/position state
fills: Censored execution counts per instrument
exposures: Opportunity exposure counts per instrument
market: Observable market state (competitor prices, volatility)
t: Current timestep
extra: Additional observable features
Methods:
to_flat: Flatten to numpy array for gym compatibility
"""
quotes: np.ndarray
position: np.ndarray | None
fills: np.ndarray
exposures: np.ndarray
market: MarketState | None
t: int
extra: dict[str, Any] = field(default_factory=dict)
def to_flat(self) -> np.ndarray:
"""Flatten observation to 1D numpy array for gym environments."""
parts = [self.quotes, self.fills, self.exposures]
if self.position is not None: parts.append(self.position)
if self.market and self.market.competitor_quotes is not None:
parts.append(self.market.competitor_quotes)
return np.concatenate([p.flatten() for p in parts])
@dataclass
class StepResult:
"""Complete result from a simulation step.
Follows gymnasium convention for obs, reward, terminated, truncated, info.
Additionally provides metrics, logs, and hidden state for research.
Attributes:
obs: Observable state (censored)
reward: Scalar reward from objective function
terminated: Episode ended naturally (max_steps reached)
truncated: Episode ended early (bankruptcy, constraint violation)
info: Additional info dict (contains true_demand for research)
metrics: Computed metrics for this step
logs: Event logs and aggregates
hidden: Internal simulator state (oracle info)
"""
obs: Observation
reward: float
terminated: bool
truncated: bool
info: dict[str, Any]
metrics: StepMetrics
logs: StepLogs
hidden: HiddenState

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@@ -1,10 +0,0 @@
from .arrivals import PoissonArrivalModel, HawkesArrivalModel, SessionArrivalModel
from .execution import ElasticityExecutionModel, IntensityExecutionModel, LogitExecutionModel
from .competitors import (StaticCompetitorModel, ReactiveCompetitorModel,
StochasticCompetitorModel, GBMMarketModel)
__all__ = [
'PoissonArrivalModel', 'HawkesArrivalModel', 'SessionArrivalModel',
'ElasticityExecutionModel', 'IntensityExecutionModel', 'LogitExecutionModel',
'StaticCompetitorModel', 'ReactiveCompetitorModel', 'StochasticCompetitorModel', 'GBMMarketModel',
]

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@@ -1,168 +0,0 @@
"""
Arrival models for generating demand opportunities.
This module provides different arrival processes:
- PoissonArrivalModel: Constant-rate memoryless arrivals
- HawkesArrivalModel: Self-exciting clustered arrivals (market orders)
- SessionArrivalModel: Retail browsing sessions with multi-product views
Each model implements the ArrivalModel protocol and generates Opportunity objects
that flow through the execution pipeline.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
from dataclasses import dataclass
from typing import Callable
import numpy as np
from uuid import uuid4
from ..outlet.types import Opportunity, InstrumentSet, MarketState, HiddenState
from ..outlet.constants import Side, OpportunityType
from ..outlet.math_util import poisson_arrivals, hawkes_intensity
@dataclass
class PoissonArrivalConfig:
"""Configuration for Poisson arrival process.
Attributes:
base_rate: Expected arrivals per unit time (scaled by hidden.true_demand_intensity)
side_probs: Probability distribution over BUY/SELL sides
"""
base_rate: float = 10.0
side_probs: dict[Side, float] = None
def __post_init__(self):
if self.side_probs is None:
self.side_probs = {Side.BUY: 1.0}
class PoissonArrivalModel:
"""Homogeneous Poisson arrival process.
Generates arrivals at a constant rate (modulated by demand intensity).
Suitable for stationary demand or as a baseline model.
The actual arrival count follows Poisson(rate * dt * intensity).
"""
def __init__(self, cfg: PoissonArrivalConfig | None = None):
self.cfg = cfg or PoissonArrivalConfig()
def sample(self, t: float, dt: float, instruments: InstrumentSet,
market: MarketState | None, hidden: HiddenState,
rng: np.random.Generator) -> list[Opportunity]:
n_arrivals = poisson_arrivals(self.cfg.base_rate * hidden.true_demand_intensity, dt, rng)
opps = []
for _ in range(n_arrivals):
inst_id = rng.integers(0, instruments.n)
side = rng.choice(list(self.cfg.side_probs.keys()),
p=list(self.cfg.side_probs.values()))
opps.append(Opportunity(
id=str(uuid4())[:8], type=OpportunityType.SESSION,
side=side, instrument_id=inst_id, size=1.0, t=t,
context={'segment': 'default'}
))
return opps
@dataclass
class HawkesArrivalConfig:
"""Configuration for Hawkes self-exciting process.
Attributes:
base_rate: Baseline arrival intensity
alpha: Excitation strength (how much each arrival increases intensity)
beta: Decay rate (how quickly excitation fades)
side_probs: Probability distribution over BUY/SELL sides
"""
base_rate: float = 5.0
alpha: float = 0.5
beta: float = 1.0
side_probs: dict[Side, float] = None
def __post_init__(self):
if self.side_probs is None:
self.side_probs = {Side.BUY: 0.5, Side.SELL: 0.5}
class HawkesArrivalModel:
"""Self-exciting Hawkes point process for clustered arrivals.
Models order flow where arrivals cluster in time (momentum, herding).
Intensity: lambda(t) = base + alpha * sum(exp(-beta * (t - t_i)))
Used for market making scenarios where orders arrive in bursts.
"""
def __init__(self, cfg: HawkesArrivalConfig | None = None):
self.cfg = cfg or HawkesArrivalConfig()
self._history: np.ndarray = np.array([])
def sample(self, t: float, dt: float, instruments: InstrumentSet,
market: MarketState | None, hidden: HiddenState,
rng: np.random.Generator) -> list[Opportunity]:
intensity = hawkes_intensity(
self.cfg.base_rate * hidden.true_demand_intensity,
self._history, self.cfg.alpha, self.cfg.beta, t
)
n_arrivals = poisson_arrivals(intensity, dt, rng)
opps = []
for i in range(n_arrivals):
arr_t = t + rng.uniform(0, dt)
self._history = np.append(self._history, arr_t)
inst_id = rng.integers(0, instruments.n)
side = rng.choice(list(self.cfg.side_probs.keys()),
p=list(self.cfg.side_probs.values()))
opps.append(Opportunity(
id=str(uuid4())[:8], type=OpportunityType.MARKET_ORDER,
side=side, instrument_id=inst_id,
size=rng.exponential(1.0), t=arr_t,
context={'intensity': intensity}
))
# decay old history
self._history = self._history[self._history > t - 10]
return opps
@dataclass
class SessionArrivalConfig:
"""Configuration for retail session arrivals.
Attributes:
sessions_per_step: Number of browsing sessions per step
views_per_session: (min, max) product views per session
contamination: Fraction of sessions that are scrapers/bots
"""
sessions_per_step: int = 20
views_per_session: tuple[int, int] = (1, 5)
contamination: float = 0.0
class SessionArrivalModel:
"""Retail browsing session model with multi-product views.
Each session views multiple products, generating one opportunity per view.
Scraper sessions (controlled by contamination) view more products
but convert at lower rates (handled by ExecutionModel).
"""
def __init__(self, cfg: SessionArrivalConfig | None = None):
self.cfg = cfg or SessionArrivalConfig()
def sample(self, t: float, dt: float, instruments: InstrumentSet,
market: MarketState | None, hidden: HiddenState,
rng: np.random.Generator) -> list[Opportunity]:
n_sessions = self.cfg.sessions_per_step
contamination = hidden.contamination if hidden else self.cfg.contamination
opps = []
for _ in range(n_sessions):
is_scraper = rng.random() < contamination
n_views = rng.integers(*self.cfg.views_per_session)
sid = str(uuid4())[:8]
# scrapers view more products
if is_scraper:
n_views = min(instruments.n, n_views * 3)
viewed = rng.choice(instruments.n, size=min(n_views, instruments.n), replace=False)
for inst_id in viewed:
opps.append(Opportunity(
id=f"{sid}-{inst_id}", type=OpportunityType.SESSION,
side=Side.BUY, instrument_id=int(inst_id), size=1.0, t=t,
context={'session_id': sid, 'is_scraper': is_scraper, 'n_views': n_views}
))
return opps

View File

@@ -1,189 +0,0 @@
"""
Market and competitor models for external dynamics.
This module provides models for competitor pricing (retail) and market dynamics (finance):
- StaticCompetitorModel: Fixed competitor prices
- ReactiveCompetitorModel: Competitor reacts to agent's prices, can trigger price wars
- StochasticCompetitorModel: Random walk competitor prices
- GBMMarketModel: Geometric Brownian Motion for asset mid-prices
Each model implements the MarketModel protocol.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
from dataclasses import dataclass
import numpy as np
from ..outlet.types import Quote, MarketState, HiddenState
from ..outlet.math_util import clamp, ema
@dataclass
class StaticCompetitorConfig:
"""Configuration for static competitor.
Attributes:
markup: Fixed percentage markup over reference prices
"""
markup: float = 0.1
class StaticCompetitorModel:
"""Static competitor with fixed markup pricing.
Competitor prices = reference * (1 + markup).
Useful as a baseline or for testing without competitor dynamics.
"""
def __init__(self, cfg: StaticCompetitorConfig | None = None, refs: np.ndarray | None = None):
self.cfg = cfg or StaticCompetitorConfig()
self.refs = refs
def step(self, t: float, self_quotes: Quote, hidden: HiddenState,
rng: np.random.Generator) -> MarketState:
refs = self.refs if self.refs is not None else self_quotes.prices
comp_prices = refs * (1 + self.cfg.markup)
return MarketState(competitor_quotes=comp_prices, regime='static', t=t)
@dataclass
class ReactiveCompetitorConfig:
"""Configuration for reactive competitor.
Attributes:
follow_weight: Smoothing weight for price following (0=ignore, 1=instant)
band_pct: Maximum deviation from reference prices
war_threshold: Relative price diff that triggers price war
war_aggression: How much competitor cuts prices during war
"""
follow_weight: float = 0.3
band_pct: float = 0.1
war_threshold: float = -0.15
war_aggression: float = 0.2
class ReactiveCompetitorModel:
"""Competitor that reacts to agent's prices with price war dynamics.
The competitor follows the agent's prices with smoothing.
If the agent undercuts significantly (beyond war_threshold),
a price war is triggered where the competitor becomes more aggressive.
This creates non-stationary dynamics that test policy robustness.
"""
def __init__(self, cfg: ReactiveCompetitorConfig | None = None, refs: np.ndarray | None = None):
self.cfg = cfg or ReactiveCompetitorConfig()
self.refs = refs
self._prices: np.ndarray | None = None
self._in_war: bool = False
def step(self, t: float, self_quotes: Quote, hidden: HiddenState,
rng: np.random.Generator) -> MarketState:
refs = self.refs if self.refs is not None else self_quotes.prices
c = self.cfg
if self._prices is None:
self._prices = refs.copy()
# check for price war trigger
relative_diff = (self_quotes.prices - self._prices) / (self._prices + 1e-8)
if np.any(relative_diff < c.war_threshold):
self._in_war = True
elif np.all(relative_diff > -c.war_threshold / 2):
self._in_war = False
# update prices
if self._in_war:
target = self_quotes.prices * (1 - c.war_aggression)
hidden.regime = 'price_war'
else:
target = self_quotes.prices * (1 + c.follow_weight * 0.05)
hidden.regime = 'normal'
# follow with smoothing
new_prices = np.array([ema(old, new, c.follow_weight)
for old, new in zip(self._prices, target)])
# stay within band
new_prices = clamp(new_prices, refs * (1 - c.band_pct), refs * (1 + c.band_pct))
self._prices = new_prices
return MarketState(competitor_quotes=new_prices, regime=hidden.regime, t=t)
@dataclass
class StochasticCompetitorConfig:
"""Configuration for stochastic competitor.
Attributes:
drift: Price drift per step
volatility: Price volatility (std of random shocks)
mean_revert: Mean reversion strength toward reference
"""
drift: float = 0.0
volatility: float = 0.02
mean_revert: float = 0.1
class StochasticCompetitorModel:
"""Ornstein-Uhlenbeck style stochastic competitor prices.
Prices follow: dP = drift + mean_revert*(ref - P) + volatility*P*dW
Provides non-stationary competitor dynamics independent of agent actions.
Useful for testing robustness to market noise.
"""
def __init__(self, cfg: StochasticCompetitorConfig | None = None, refs: np.ndarray | None = None):
self.cfg = cfg or StochasticCompetitorConfig()
self.refs = refs
self._prices: np.ndarray | None = None
def step(self, t: float, self_quotes: Quote, hidden: HiddenState,
rng: np.random.Generator) -> MarketState:
refs = self.refs if self.refs is not None else self_quotes.prices
c = self.cfg
if self._prices is None:
self._prices = refs.copy()
# Ornstein-Uhlenbeck style dynamics
n = len(self._prices)
noise = rng.normal(0, c.volatility, n)
reversion = c.mean_revert * (refs - self._prices)
self._prices = self._prices + c.drift + reversion + noise * self._prices
self._prices = np.maximum(self._prices, refs * 0.5)
return MarketState(competitor_quotes=self._prices.copy(), regime='stochastic', t=t)
@dataclass
class GBMMarketConfig:
"""Configuration for GBM market model.
Attributes:
mu: Price drift (expected return)
sigma: Price volatility
dt: Time step size
"""
mu: float = 0.0
sigma: float = 0.1
dt: float = 1.0
class GBMMarketModel:
"""Geometric Brownian Motion model for asset mid-prices.
Standard Black-Scholes dynamics: dS = mu*S*dt + sigma*S*dW
Used for market making scenarios where the underlying asset price
follows a random walk. The agent quotes around this moving mid-price.
"""
def __init__(self, cfg: GBMMarketConfig | None = None, initial: np.ndarray | None = None):
self.cfg = cfg or GBMMarketConfig()
self._mids = initial
def step(self, t: float, self_quotes: Quote, hidden: HiddenState,
rng: np.random.Generator) -> MarketState:
if self._mids is None:
self._mids = self_quotes.prices.copy()
c = self.cfg
n = len(self._mids)
z = rng.standard_normal(n)
self._mids = self._mids * np.exp((c.mu - 0.5*c.sigma**2)*c.dt + c.sigma*np.sqrt(c.dt)*z)
vol = np.full(n, c.sigma)
return MarketState(mid_prices=self._mids.copy(), volatility=vol, regime='gbm', t=t)

View File

@@ -1,174 +0,0 @@
"""
Execution models for computing acceptance/fill probabilities.
This module provides different models for how opportunities convert to executions:
- ElasticityExecutionModel: Price elasticity with competitor cross-effects (retail)
- IntensityExecutionModel: Distance-based fill intensity (market making)
- LogitExecutionModel: Discrete choice model
Each model implements the ExecutionModel protocol.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
from dataclasses import dataclass
from typing import Any
import numpy as np
from ..outlet.types import Opportunity, Quote, InstrumentSet, MarketState
from ..outlet.constants import Side
from ..outlet.math_util import sigmoid, safe_log, intensity_decay, EPS
@dataclass
class ElasticityConfig:
"""Configuration for price elasticity execution model.
Attributes:
base_prob: Baseline purchase probability at reference price
price_sensitivity: Own-price elasticity coefficient
cross_elasticity: Competitor price cross-elasticity
scraper_conversion: Multiplier for scraper conversion (typically << 1)
"""
base_prob: float = 0.3
price_sensitivity: float = 2.0
cross_elasticity: float = 0.5
scraper_conversion: float = 0.01
class ElasticityExecutionModel:
"""Price elasticity model for retail dynamic pricing.
P(buy) = base_prob * exp(-sensitivity * log(price/ref)) * cross_effect * scraper_mult
Higher prices reduce purchase probability exponentially.
Competitor undercutting shifts demand away from the platform.
Scrapers convert at a much lower rate (reconnaissance, not purchase).
"""
def __init__(self, cfg: ElasticityConfig | None = None):
self.cfg = cfg or ElasticityConfig()
def prob(self, opp: Opportunity, quote: Quote, instruments: InstrumentSet,
market: MarketState | None, rng: np.random.Generator) -> float:
idx = int(opp.instrument_id)
price = quote.prices[idx]
ref = instruments.refs[idx]
# base probability adjusted by price ratio
log_ratio = safe_log(price / ref)
prob = self.cfg.base_prob * np.exp(-self.cfg.price_sensitivity * log_ratio)
# cross-elasticity: competitor undercutting increases their share
if market and market.competitor_quotes is not None:
comp_price = market.competitor_quotes[idx]
if comp_price < price:
prob *= np.exp(-self.cfg.cross_elasticity * (price - comp_price) / ref)
# scrapers convert at much lower rate
if opp.context.get('is_scraper', False):
prob *= self.cfg.scraper_conversion
return float(np.clip(prob, 0, 1))
def uncensor(self, fills: np.ndarray, instruments: InstrumentSet,
context: dict[str, Any] | None = None) -> np.ndarray:
# simple imputation: assume fills = prob * exposures, invert
exposures = context.get('exposures', fills) if context else fills
avg_prob = self.cfg.base_prob
return fills / (avg_prob + EPS)
@dataclass
class IntensityConfig:
"""Configuration for intensity-based execution model.
Attributes:
base_intensity: Baseline fill intensity
kappa: Decay rate with distance from mid-price
vol_scale: Volatility multiplier for fill intensity
"""
base_intensity: float = 1.0
kappa: float = 1.5
vol_scale: float = 0.5
class IntensityExecutionModel:
"""Avellaneda-Stoikov style fill intensity for market making.
Fill probability decays exponentially with distance from mid-price:
P(fill) = base * exp(-kappa * |quote - mid|) * (1 + vol_scale * sigma)
Tighter spreads (closer to mid) have higher fill probability.
Higher volatility increases fill probability (more aggressive traders).
"""
def __init__(self, cfg: IntensityConfig | None = None):
self.cfg = cfg or IntensityConfig()
def prob(self, opp: Opportunity, quote: Quote, instruments: InstrumentSet,
market: MarketState | None, rng: np.random.Generator) -> float:
idx = int(opp.instrument_id)
# get mid price from market or use quote price
if market and market.mid_prices is not None:
mid = market.mid_prices[idx]
else:
mid = quote.prices[idx]
# compute distance from mid
if opp.side == Side.BUY:
exec_price = quote.asks[idx] if quote.asks is not None else quote.prices[idx]
distance = exec_price - mid
else:
exec_price = quote.bids[idx] if quote.bids is not None else quote.prices[idx]
distance = mid - exec_price
# intensity decays with distance
intensity = self.cfg.base_intensity * intensity_decay(abs(distance), self.cfg.kappa)
# volatility increases fill probability
if market and market.volatility is not None:
vol = market.volatility[idx]
intensity *= (1 + self.cfg.vol_scale * vol)
return float(np.clip(intensity, 0, 1))
def uncensor(self, fills: np.ndarray, instruments: InstrumentSet,
context: dict[str, Any] | None = None) -> np.ndarray:
return fills # market making doesn't have same censorship concept
@dataclass
class LogitConfig:
"""Configuration for logit discrete choice model.
Attributes:
beta_0: Intercept (base utility)
beta_price: Price coefficient (typically negative)
beta_quality: Quality attribute coefficient
"""
beta_0: float = 0.5
beta_price: float = -1.5
beta_quality: float = 0.3
class LogitExecutionModel:
"""Discrete choice logit model for purchase probability.
Utility: U = beta_0 + beta_price * (price/ref) + beta_quality * quality
P(buy) = sigmoid(U)
Provides a theoretically grounded demand model from economics literature.
"""
def __init__(self, cfg: LogitConfig | None = None):
self.cfg = cfg or LogitConfig()
def prob(self, opp: Opportunity, quote: Quote, instruments: InstrumentSet,
market: MarketState | None, rng: np.random.Generator) -> float:
idx = int(opp.instrument_id)
price = quote.prices[idx]
ref = instruments.refs[idx]
quality = instruments.instruments[idx].attrs.get('quality', 0.5)
# utility
u = self.cfg.beta_0 + self.cfg.beta_price * (price / ref) + self.cfg.beta_quality * quality
# choice probability via sigmoid
return float(sigmoid(u))
def uncensor(self, fills: np.ndarray, instruments: InstrumentSet,
context: dict[str, Any] | None = None) -> np.ndarray:
return fills / (self.cfg.beta_0 + EPS)

View File

@@ -1,59 +0,0 @@
#!/usr/bin/env python
"""Example script demonstrating the Quote-Control platform"""
import sys
from pathlib import Path
sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).parent.parent))
import numpy as np
from lab.config import make_retail_platform, make_market_making_platform
from lab.experiments.eval import (rollout, compare_policies, fixed_price_policy,
cost_plus_margin_policy, random_walk_policy)
def demo_retail():
print("=" * 60)
print("RETAIL DYNAMIC PRICING DEMO")
print("=" * 60)
platform = make_retail_platform()
print(f"Instruments: {platform.instruments.n}")
print(f"Reference prices: {platform.instruments.refs[:5].round(2)}...")
# compare policies
policies = {
'fixed': fixed_price_policy(platform.instruments.refs),
'cost_plus_30%': cost_plus_margin_policy(platform.instruments.costs, 0.3),
'cost_plus_50%': cost_plus_margin_policy(platform.instruments.costs, 0.5),
'random_walk': random_walk_policy(platform.instruments.refs, 0.03),
}
results = compare_policies(platform, policies, n_steps=100, n_runs=3)
print("\nPolicy Comparison (100 steps, 3 runs):")
print("-" * 50)
for name, r in sorted(results.items(), key=lambda x: -x[1]['mean_pnl']):
print(f"{name:20s} PnL={r['mean_pnl']:8.1f} +/- {r['std_reward']:6.1f} "
f"conv={r['mean_conversion']:.3f}")
def demo_market_making():
print("\n" + "=" * 60)
print("MARKET MAKING DEMO")
print("=" * 60)
platform = make_market_making_platform()
print(f"Instruments: {platform.instruments.n}")
print(f"Initial mids: {platform.instruments.refs.round(2)}")
# simple policy: quote at mid with fixed spread
def mm_policy(obs: np.ndarray, t: int):
mids = platform.instruments.refs # would use obs in real policy
return mids, 1.0
result = rollout(platform, mm_policy, n_steps=200, seed=42)
print(f"\nRollout (200 steps):")
print(f" Total PnL: {result.total_pnl:.2f}")
print(f" Avg conversion: {result.avg_conversion:.3f}")
print(f" Total spread capture: {sum(m.spread_capture for m in result.metrics):.2f}")
if __name__ == '__main__':
demo_retail()
demo_market_making()

View File

@@ -1,8 +1,6 @@
$pdf_mode = 1; $pdf_mode = 1;
$pdflatex = 'pdflatex -synctex=1 -interaction=nonstopmode -file-line-error %O %S'; $pdflatex = 'pdflatex -synctex=1 -interaction=nonstopmode -file-line-error %O %S';
$aux_dir = 'build'; $bibtex_use = 2; # run bibtex when needed
$out_dir = 'build';
$use_biber = 0; # force bibtex
$bibtex = 'bibtex %O %B'; $bibtex = 'bibtex %O %B';
$pdf_previewer = 'zathura %O %S'; $pdf_previewer = 'zathura %O %S';
$clean_ext = 'synctex.gz bbl bcf run.xml fls fdb_latexmk glg glo gls ist blg lof lot out toc'; $clean_ext = 'synctex.gz bbl bcf run.xml fls fdb_latexmk glg glo gls ist blg lof lot out toc';

View File

@@ -43,22 +43,22 @@ EOF
echo "Concatenating code from source directories..." echo "Concatenating code from source directories..."
# Backend # Backend
find "$PROJECT_ROOT/backend" -type f \( -name "*.py" -o -name "*.js" -o -name "*.sh" -o -name "*.yml" -o -name "*.yaml" \) | sort | while read -r file; do find "$PROJECT_ROOT/backend" -type d \( -name ".venv" -o -name "__pycache__" -o -name "*.egg-info" -o -name "node_modules" -o -name ".pytest_cache" \) -prune -o -type f \( -name "*.py" -o -name "*.js" -o -name "*.sh" -o -name "*.yml" -o -name "*.yaml" \) ! -name "*.pyc" ! -name "*.pyo" -print | sort | while read -r file; do
add_file "$file" add_file "$file"
done done
# Experiments # Experiments
find "$PROJECT_ROOT/experiments" -type f \( -name "*.py" -o -name "*.js" -o -name "*.sh" -o -name "*.yml" -o -name "*.yaml" \) | sort | while read -r file; do find "$PROJECT_ROOT/experiments" -type d \( -name ".venv" -o -name "__pycache__" -o -name "*.egg-info" -o -name "node_modules" -o -name ".pytest_cache" -o -name ".ipynb_checkpoints" \) -prune -o -type f \( -name "*.py" -o -name "*.js" -o -name "*.sh" -o -name "*.yml" -o -name "*.yaml" \) ! -name "*.pyc" ! -name "*.pyo" -print | sort | while read -r file; do
add_file "$file" add_file "$file"
done done
# Docker # Docker
find "$PROJECT_ROOT/docker" -type f \( -name "*.py" -o -name "*.sh" -o -name "*.yml" -o -name "*.yaml" -o -name "Dockerfile*" \) | sort | while read -r file; do find "$PROJECT_ROOT/docker" -type d \( -name ".venv" -o -name "__pycache__" -o -name "node_modules" \) -prune -o -type f \( -name "*.py" -o -name "*.sh" -o -name "*.yml" -o -name "*.yaml" -o -name "Dockerfile*" \) ! -name "*.pyc" ! -name "*.pyo" -print | sort | while read -r file; do
add_file "$file" add_file "$file"
done done
# Web/src # Web/src
find "$PROJECT_ROOT/web/src" -type f \( -name "*.js" -o -name "*.jsx" -o -name "*.ts" -o -name "*.tsx" \) | sort | while read -r file; do find "$PROJECT_ROOT/web/src" -type d \( -name "node_modules" -o -name ".next" -o -name "dist" -o -name "build" \) -prune -o -type f \( -name "*.js" -o -name "*.jsx" -o -name "*.ts" -o -name "*.tsx" \) -print | sort | while read -r file; do
add_file "$file" add_file "$file"
done done

View File

@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
(setq TeX-command-extra-options (setq TeX-command-extra-options
"-file-line-error -interaction=nonstopmode") "-file-line-error -interaction=nonstopmode")
(TeX-add-to-alist 'LaTeX-provided-class-options (TeX-add-to-alist 'LaTeX-provided-class-options
'(("report" "12pt") ("article" "12pt") ("acmart" "sigconf" "nonacm" "natbib=false"))) '(("report" "12pt") ("acmart" "sigconf" "nonacm" "natbib=false" "manuscript") ("article" "12pt" "letterpaper")))
(TeX-run-style-hooks (TeX-run-style-hooks
"latex2e" "latex2e"
"preamble" "preamble"
@@ -17,8 +17,7 @@
"chapters/05-discussion" "chapters/05-discussion"
"chapters/06-conclusion" "chapters/06-conclusion"
"../build/concatenated_code" "../build/concatenated_code"
"acmart" "article"
"acmart10") "art12"))
(TeX-add-symbols
'("footnotetextcopyrightpermission" 1)))
:latex) :latex)

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,425 @@
@article{arnoud_v_den_boer_dynamic_2015,
title = {Dynamic pricing and learning: {Historical} origins, current research, and new directions},
volume = {20},
url = {https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1876735415000021},
doi = {10.1016/j.sorms.2015.03.001},
number = {1},
journal = {Surveys in Operations Research and Management Science},
author = {{Arnoud V. den Boer}},
month = jun,
year = {2015},
pages = {1--18},
file = {PDF:/home/velocitatem/Zotero/storage/NUAGDYER/memo2025.pdf:application/pdf},
}
@article{iliou_detection_2021,
title = {Detection of {Advanced} {Web} {Bots} by {Combining} {Web} {Logs} with {Mouse} {Behavioural} {Biometrics}},
volume = {2},
url = {https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3447815},
doi = {10.1145/3447815},
number = {3},
journal = {Digital Threats: Research and Practice},
author = {Iliou, Christos and Kostoulas, Theodoros and Tsikrika, Theodora and Katos, Vasilis and Vrochidis, Stefanos and Kompatsiaris, Ioannis},
year = {2021},
pages = {1--26},
file = {PDF:/home/velocitatem/Zotero/storage/Q7J5EBEJ/3447815.pdf:application/pdf},
}
@phdthesis{salassa_politecnico_nodate,
title = {Politecnico di {Torino} {Algorithmic} {Pricing} in the digital age "{Ethical} considerations on its economic and social implications, and an analysis of possible solutions to overcome its critical issues" {Tutor}: {Candidate}},
abstract = {Algorithmic pricing is an emerging business practice that uses computational algorithms to determine
the prices of products and services based on a number of dynamic factors. The aim of this thesis is to
draw attention to the existence of these business practices, and the ethical and social implications that
derive from them, and then focus on what could be effective solutions to increase the well-being of
the community.
In Chapter 2 of the thesis, a general introduction to the topic will be made, starting from its history
and its evolution over the years; Chapter 3 will examine the different types of pricing algorithms.
Subsequently, in Chapter 4 we will analyze the sectors in which they are most applicable, and the
relative advantages and disadvantages they bring with them, with a critical analysis of the trade-offs
generated. The effect of algorithmic pricing on competition will be studied, considering how the
ability of algorithms to adapt quickly to market conditions can foster anti-competitive practices, such
as price discrimination. Later, in Chapter 5, we will look at the issue of price transparency and how
the opacity of algorithms can make it difficult for consumers to understand the pricing process and
assess whether they are receiving fair treatment.
To address these ethical issues, several possible solutions will be brought to light, described in
Chapter 6, which will focus on the role of the government, as a regulatory, of the end consumer, who
must be encouraged to educate and inform himself about the use of these practices, and of the
company, as responsible for making its customers aware and acting in compliance with government
laws, for fair and non-discriminatory use.},
urldate = {2025-11-12},
school = {Politecnico di Torino},
author = {Salassa, Fabio and Pautassi, Paolo},
file = {PDF:/home/velocitatem/Zotero/storage/L95WYQ8B/m-api-06aad998-d926-0d59-5593-82fdce5a678b.pdf:application/pdf},
}
@inproceedings{mueller_low-rank_2019,
title = {Low-{Rank} {Bandit} {Methods} for {High}-{Dimensional} {Dynamic} {Pricing}},
booktitle = {Advances in {Neural} {Information} {Processing} {Systems} 32 ({NeurIPS} 2019)},
author = {Mueller, Jonas W and Syrgkanis, Vasilis and Taddy, Matt},
year = {2019},
pages = {15442--15452},
file = {PDF:/home/velocitatem/Zotero/storage/IZD3C5SR/m-api-26f6207c-cc89-4aed-29b6-34629f18fe9b.pdf:application/pdf},
}
@article{shahidi_coasean_nodate,
title = {The {Coasean} {Singularity}? {Demand}, {Supply}, and {Market} {Design} with {AI} {Agents}},
abstract = {AI agents—autonomous systems that perceive, reason, and act on behalf of human principals—are poised to transform digital markets by dramatically reducing transaction costs. This chapter evaluates the economic implications of this transition, adopting a consumeroriented view of agents as market participants that can search, negotiate, and transact directly. From the demand side, agent adoption reflects derived demand: users trade off decision quality against effort reduction, with outcomes mediated by agent capability and task context. On the supply side, firms will design, integrate, and monetize agents, with outcomes hinging on whether agents operate within or across platforms. At the market level, agents create efficiency gains from lower search, communication, and contracting costs, but also introduce frictions such as congestion and price obfuscation. By lowering the costs of preference elicitation, contract enforcement, and identity verification, agents expand the feasible set of market designs but also raise novel regulatory challenges. While the net welfare effects remain an empirical question, the rapid onset of AI-mediated transactions presents a unique opportunity for economic research to inform real-world policy and market design.},
language = {en},
author = {Shahidi, Peyman and Rusak, Gili and Manning, Benjamin S and Fradkin, Andrey and Horton, John J},
file = {PDF:/home/velocitatem/Zotero/storage/TQCAPJDP/Shahidi et al. - The Coasean Singularity Demand, Supply, and Market Design with AI Agents.pdf:application/pdf},
}
@misc{byrnes_intro_2025,
title = {Intro to {Brain}-{Like}-{AGI} {Safety}},
url = {https://osf.io/fe36n_v1},
doi = {10.31219/osf.io/fe36n_v1},
abstract = {Suppose we someday build an Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) algorithm using similar principles of learning and cognition as the human brain. How would we use such an algorithm safely? I argue that this is an open technical problem, and my goal is to bring readers with no prior knowledge all the way up to the front-line of unsolved problems. Chapter 1 has background and motivation; Chapters 2-7 are on neuroscience, arguing for a picture of the brain that combines large-scale learning algorithms (e.g. in the cortex) and specific evolved reflexes (e.g. in the hypothalamus and brainstem); and Chapters 8-15 apply those neuroscience ideas to AGI safety. A major theme is the idea that the brain has something like a reinforcement learning reward function, which says that pain is bad, eating-when-hungry is good, etc. I argue that this reward function is centered around the hypothalamus and brainstem, and that all human desires—even "higher" desires for things like compassion and justice—come directly or indirectly from that innate reward function. If future programmers build brain-like AGI, they will likewise have a reward function slot in their source code, in which they can put whatever they want. If they put the wrong thing, the resulting AGI will wind up callously indifferent to human welfare. How might they avoid that? That's an open technical problem, but I will review some ideas and research directions.},
language = {en},
urldate = {2025-12-31},
publisher = {Open Science Framework},
author = {Byrnes, Steven J.},
month = mar,
year = {2025},
file = {PDF:/home/velocitatem/Zotero/storage/ZLJQ4DQ9/Byrnes - 2025 - Intro to Brain-Like-AGI Safety.pdf:application/pdf},
}
@article{shannon_mathematical_nodate,
title = {A {Mathematical} {Theory} of {Communication}},
language = {en},
author = {Shannon, C E},
file = {PDF:/home/velocitatem/Zotero/storage/FJRFRWK2/Shannon - A Mathematical Theory of Communication.pdf:application/pdf},
}
@misc{noauthor_order_stats_nodate,
title = {order\_stats},
file = {PDF:/home/velocitatem/Zotero/storage/D3QRGY9Z/order_stats.pdf:application/pdf},
}
@article{devine_nonlinear_nodate,
title = {Nonlinear {Pricing} with {Costly} {Information} {Acquisition}},
abstract = {This paper examines a nonlinear pricing model where the firm can choose to acquire costly information prior to offering contract menus to consumers; such as paying a consultant or investing in machine learning technologies. Information provides the firm with a signal about consumers types, whose accuracy increases as the firm acquires larger amounts of information. We show that the firm chooses to acquire information, only if it can purchase a sufficient amount that could alter its initial prior beliefs. Relative to standard settings where firms cannot acquire information, we identify how information acquisition changes optimal contract offers, equilibrium profits, information rents, and welfare. A better-informed firm increases its expected profits, but it can also increase expected utility when the cost of information is intermediate. Our results recommend balanced online privacy laws.},
language = {en},
author = {Devine, Brett R and Munoz-Garcia, Felix},
file = {PDF:/home/velocitatem/Zotero/storage/GQ28KVBF/Devine and Munoz-Garcia - Nonlinear Pricing with Costly Information Acquisition.pdf:application/pdf},
}
@misc{wang_learning_2025,
title = {Learning {Optimal} {Distributionally} {Robust} {Stochastic} {Control} in {Continuous} {State} {Spaces}},
url = {http://arxiv.org/abs/2406.11281},
doi = {10.48550/arXiv.2406.11281},
abstract = {We study data-driven learning of robust stochastic control for infinite-horizon systems with potentially continuous state and action spaces. In many managerial settingssupply chains, finance, manufacturing, services, and dynamic gamesthe state-transition mechanism is determined by system design, while available data capture the distributional properties of the stochastic inputs from the environment. For modeling and computational tractability, a decision maker often adopts a Markov control model with i.i.d. environment inputs, which can render learned policies fragile to internal dependence or external perturbations. We introduce a distributionally robust stochastic control paradigm that promotes policy reliability by introducing adaptive adversarial perturbations to the environment input, while preserving the modeling, statistical, and computational tractability of the Markovian formulation. From a modeling perspective, we examine two adversary modelscurrent-action-aware and current-action-unawareleading to distinct dynamic behaviors and robust optimal policies. From a statistical learning perspective, we characterize optimal finite-sample minimax rates for uniform learning of the robust value function across a continuum of states under ambiguity sets defined by the fk-divergence and Wasserstein distance. To efficiently compute the optimal robust policies, we further propose algorithms inspired by deep reinforcement learning methodologies. Finally, we demonstrate the applicability of the framework to real managerial problems.},
language = {en},
urldate = {2025-12-29},
publisher = {arXiv},
author = {Wang, Shengbo and Meng, Jason and Si, Nian and Blanchet, Jose and Zhou, Zhengyuan},
month = nov,
year = {2025},
note = {arXiv:2406.11281 [stat]},
keywords = {Computer Science - Machine Learning, Statistics - Machine Learning},
file = {PDF:/home/velocitatem/Zotero/storage/RQ8XDSSG/Wang et al. - 2025 - Learning Optimal Distributionally Robust Stochastic Control in Continuous State Spaces.pdf:application/pdf},
}
@misc{ie_recsim_2019,
title = {{RecSim}: {A} {Configurable} {Simulation} {Platform} for {Recommender} {Systems}},
shorttitle = {{RecSim}},
url = {http://arxiv.org/abs/1909.04847},
doi = {10.48550/arXiv.1909.04847},
abstract = {We propose RecSim, a configurable platform for authoring simulation environments for recommender systems (RSs) that naturally supports sequential interaction with users. RecSim allows the creation of new environments that reflect particular aspects of user behavior and item structure at a level of abstraction well-suited to pushing the limits of current reinforcement learning (RL) and RS techniques in sequential interactive recommendation problems. Environments can be easily configured that vary assumptions about: user preferences and item familiarity; user latent state and its dynamics; and choice models and other user response behavior. We outline how RecSim offers value to RL and RS researchers and practitioners, and how it can serve as a vehicle for academic-industrial collaboration.},
urldate = {2025-12-29},
publisher = {arXiv},
author = {Ie, Eugene and Hsu, Chih-wei and Mladenov, Martin and Jain, Vihan and Narvekar, Sanmit and Wang, Jing and Wu, Rui and Boutilier, Craig},
month = sep,
year = {2019},
note = {arXiv:1909.04847 [cs]},
keywords = {Computer Science - Machine Learning, Statistics - Machine Learning, Computer Science - Human-Computer Interaction, Computer Science - Information Retrieval},
file = {Preprint PDF:/home/velocitatem/Zotero/storage/CJJI2VQF/Ie et al. - 2019 - RecSim A Configurable Simulation Platform for Recommender Systems.pdf:application/pdf;Snapshot:/home/velocitatem/Zotero/storage/8XJKJTHE/1909.html:text/html},
}
@misc{kuhn_wasserstein_2024,
title = {Wasserstein {Distributionally} {Robust} {Optimization}: {Theory} and {Applications} in {Machine} {Learning}},
shorttitle = {Wasserstein {Distributionally} {Robust} {Optimization}},
url = {http://arxiv.org/abs/1908.08729},
doi = {10.48550/arXiv.1908.08729},
abstract = {Many decision problems in science, engineering and economics are affected by uncertain parameters whose distribution is only indirectly observable through samples. The goal of data-driven decision-making is to learn a decision from finitely many training samples that will perform well on unseen test samples. This learning task is difficult even if all training and test samples are drawn from the same distribution—especially if the dimension of the uncertainty is large relative to the training sample size. Wasserstein distributionally robust optimization seeks data-driven decisions that perform well under the most adverse distribution within a certain Wasserstein distance from a nominal distribution constructed from the training samples. In this tutorial we will argue that this approach has many conceptual and computational benefits. Most prominently, the optimal decisions can often be computed by solving tractable convex optimization problems, and they enjoy rigorous out-of-sample and asymptotic consistency guarantees. We will also show that Wasserstein distributionally robust optimization has interesting ramifications for statistical learning and motivates new approaches for fundamental learning tasks such as classification, regression, maximum likelihood estimation or minimum mean square error estimation, among others.},
language = {en},
urldate = {2025-12-27},
publisher = {arXiv},
author = {Kuhn, Daniel and Esfahani, Peyman Mohajerin and Nguyen, Viet Anh and Shafieezadeh-Abadeh, Soroosh},
month = nov,
year = {2024},
note = {arXiv:1908.08729 [stat]},
keywords = {Computer Science - Machine Learning, Statistics - Machine Learning, Mathematics - Optimization and Control},
file = {PDF:/home/velocitatem/Zotero/storage/FAWJEK6J/Kuhn et al. - 2024 - Wasserstein Distributionally Robust Optimization Theory and Applications in Machine Learning.pdf:application/pdf},
}
@misc{arunachaleswaran_learning_2025,
title = {Learning to {Play} {Against} {Unknown} {Opponents}},
url = {http://arxiv.org/abs/2412.18297},
doi = {10.48550/arXiv.2412.18297},
abstract = {We consider the problem of a learning agent who has to repeatedly play a general sum game against a strategic opponent who acts to maximize their own payoff by optimally responding against the learners algorithm. The learning agent knows their own payoff function, but is uncertain about the payoff of their opponent (knowing only that it is drawn from some distribution D). What learning algorithm should the agent run in order to maximize their own total utility, either in expectation or in the worst-case over D? When the learning algorithm is constrained to be a no-regret algorithm, we demonstrate how to efficiently construct an optimal learning algorithm (asymptotically achieving the optimal utility) in polynomial time for both the in-expectation and worst-case problems, independent of any other assumptions. When the learning algorithm is not constrained to no-regret, we show how to construct an ε-optimal learning algorithm (obtaining average utility within ε of the optimal utility) for both the in-expectation and worst-case problems in time polynomial in the size of the input and 1/ε, when either the size of the game or the support of D is constant. Finally, for the special case of the maximin objective, where the learner wishes to maximize their minimum payoff over all possible optimizer types, we construct a learner algorithm that runs in polynomial time in each step and guarantees convergence to the optimal learner payoff. All of these results make use of recently developed machinery that converts the analysis of learning algorithms to the study of the class of corresponding geometric objects known as menus.},
language = {en},
urldate = {2025-12-27},
publisher = {arXiv},
author = {Arunachaleswaran, Eshwar Ram and Collina, Natalie and Schneider, Jon},
month = feb,
year = {2025},
note = {arXiv:2412.18297 [cs]},
keywords = {Computer Science - Machine Learning, Computer Science - Computer Science and Game Theory},
file = {PDF:/home/velocitatem/Zotero/storage/M6V9LLCS/Arunachaleswaran et al. - 2025 - Learning to Play Against Unknown Opponents.pdf:application/pdf},
}
@misc{li_distributionally_2025,
title = {Distributionally {Robust} {Optimization} with {Adversarial} {Data} {Contamination}},
url = {http://arxiv.org/abs/2507.10718},
doi = {10.48550/arXiv.2507.10718},
abstract = {Distributionally Robust Optimization (DRO) provides a framework for decision-making under distributional uncertainty, yet its effectiveness can be compromised by outliers in the training data. This paper introduces a principled approach to simultaneously address both challenges. We focus on optimizing Wasserstein-1 DRO objectives for generalized linear models with convex Lipschitz loss functions, where an \$ε\$-fraction of the training data is adversarially corrupted. Our primary contribution lies in a novel modeling framework that integrates robustness against training data contamination with robustness against distributional shifts, alongside an efficient algorithm inspired by robust statistics to solve the resulting optimization problem. We prove that our method achieves an estimation error of \$O({\textbackslash}sqrtε)\$ for the true DRO objective value using only the contaminated data under the bounded covariance assumption. This work establishes the first rigorous guarantees, supported by efficient computation, for learning under the dual challenges of data contamination and distributional shifts.},
language = {en},
urldate = {2025-12-27},
publisher = {arXiv},
author = {Li, Shuyao and Diakonikolas, Ilias and Diakonikolas, Jelena},
month = nov,
year = {2025},
note = {arXiv:2507.10718 [cs]},
keywords = {Computer Science - Machine Learning, Mathematics - Optimization and Control, Computer Science - Data Structures and Algorithms},
file = {PDF:/home/velocitatem/Zotero/storage/H6AXDTLX/Li et al. - 2025 - Distributionally Robust Optimization with Adversarial Data Contamination.pdf:application/pdf},
}
@misc{karten_llm_2025,
title = {{LLM} {Economist}: {Large} {Population} {Models} and {Mechanism} {Design} in {Multi}-{Agent} {Generative} {Simulacra}},
shorttitle = {{LLM} {Economist}},
url = {http://arxiv.org/abs/2507.15815},
doi = {10.48550/arXiv.2507.15815},
abstract = {We present the LLM Economist, a novel framework that uses agent-based modeling to design and assess economic policies in strategic environments with hierarchical decision-making. At the lower level, bounded rational worker agents—instantiated as persona-conditioned prompts sampled from U.S. Census-calibrated income and demographic statistics—choose labor supply to maximize text-based utility functions learned in-context. At the upper level, a planner agent employs in-context reinforcement learning to propose piecewise-linear marginal tax schedules anchored to the current U.S. federal brackets. This construction endows economic simulacra with three capabilities requisite for credible fiscal experimentation: (i) optimization of heterogeneous utilities, (ii) principled generation of large, demographically realistic agent populations, and (iii) mechanism design—the ultimate nudging problem—expressed entirely in natural language. Experiments with populations of up to one hundred interacting agents show that the planner converges near Stackelberg equilibria that improve aggregate social welfare relative to Saez solutions, while a periodic, persona-level voting procedure furthers these gains under decentralized governance. These results demonstrate that large language model-based agents can jointly model, simulate, and govern complex economic systems, providing a tractable test bed for policy evaluation at the societal scale to help build better civilizations.},
language = {en},
urldate = {2025-12-27},
publisher = {arXiv},
author = {Karten, Seth and Li, Wenzhe and Ding, Zihan and Kleiner, Samuel and Bai, Yu and Jin, Chi},
month = jul,
year = {2025},
note = {arXiv:2507.15815 [cs]},
keywords = {Computer Science - Machine Learning, Computer Science - Multiagent Systems},
file = {PDF:/home/velocitatem/Zotero/storage/U7A5Q78V/Karten et al. - 2025 - LLM Economist Large Population Models and Mechanism Design in Multi-Agent Generative Simulacra.pdf:application/pdf},
}
@techreport{mullapudi_reinforcement_nodate,
title = {A {Reinforcement} {Learning} {Approach} to {Dynamic} {Pricing}},
abstract = {Dynamic pricing represents a critical strategic challenge in modern e-commerce, where firms must navigate fluctuating demand, inventory constraints, and aggressive competitor actions. Traditional static and heuristic-based pricing models often fail to capture the complex, non-linear dynamics of competitive digital markets, leading to suboptimal profitability. This paper proposes a model-free reinforcement learning (RL) framework to address this challenge. Specifically, we design, implement, and evaluate a Q-learning agent capable of learning an optimal, state-dependent pricing policy. The agent is trained and evaluated within a simulated market environment constructed from the publicly available "Retail Price Optimization" dataset from Kaggle, which provides a rich feature set including historical sales, product characteristics, seasonality, and, crucially, competitor pricing data. The problem is formulated as a Markov Decision Process (MDP), where the agent's state incorporates its price position relative to competitors, competitor price trends, and seasonal factors. The agent's performance is benchmarked against three baseline strategies: static pricing, a reactive "follow-the-leader" heuristic, and random pricing. The results demonstrate that the Q-learning agent achieves a substantial increase in total cumulative profit over the evaluation period, outperforming all baselines by learning a nuanced policy that strategically balances price adjustments in response to market conditions. This work provides a practical and reproducible blueprint for applying reinforcement learning to optimize pricing decisions in a simulated yet realistic competitive retail environment, highlighting the potential of RL to automate complex strategic decision-making.},
author = {Mullapudi, Pavan},
note = {Publication Title: International Journal on Science and Technology (IJSAT) IJSAT25049558
Volume: 16
Issue: 4},
keywords = {Index Terms: Dynamic Pricing, Markov Decision Process, Price Optimization, Q-Learning, Reinforcement Learning, Retail Analytics},
file = {PDF:/home/velocitatem/Zotero/storage/G95TBLF7/9558.pdf:application/pdf},
}
@techreport{roughgarden_cs364a_2013,
title = {{CS364A}: {Algorithmic} {Game} {Theory} {Lecture} \#5: {Revenue}-{Maximizing} {Auctions} *},
author = {Roughgarden, Tim},
year = {2013},
file = {PDF:/home/velocitatem/Zotero/storage/C39VM7N9/l5.pdf:application/pdf},
}
@techreport{kuhn_distributionally_2025,
title = {Distributionally {Robust} {Optimization}},
abstract = {Distributionally robust optimization (DRO) studies decision problems under uncertainty where the probability distribution governing the uncertain problem parameters is itself uncertain. A key component of any DRO model is its ambiguity set, that is, a family of probability distributions consistent with any available structural or statistical information. DRO seeks decisions that perform best under the worst distribution in the ambiguity set. This worst case criterion is supported by findings in psychology and neuroscience, which indicate that many decision-makers have a low tolerance for distributional ambiguity. DRO is rooted in statistics, operations research and control theory, and recent research has uncovered its deep connections to regularization techniques and adversarial training in machine learning. This survey presents the key findings of the field in a unified and self-contained manner.},
author = {Kuhn, Daniel and Shafiee, Soroosh and Wiesemann, Wolfram},
year = {2025},
note = {arXiv: 2411.02549v3},
file = {PDF:/home/velocitatem/Zotero/storage/IXTTMD7G/full-text.pdf:application/pdf},
}
@article{parkes_economic_2015,
title = {Economic reasoning and artificial intelligence},
volume = {349},
issn = {10959203},
doi = {10.1126/science.aaa8403},
abstract = {The field of artificial intelligence (AI) strives to build rational agents capable of perceiving the world around them and taking actions to advance specified goals. Put another way, AI researchers aim to construct a synthetic homo economicus, the mythical perfectly rational agent of neoclassical economics.We review progress toward creating this new species of machine, machina economicus, and discuss some challenges in designing AIs that can reason effectively in economic contexts. Supposing that AI succeeds in this quest, or at least comes close enough that it is useful to think about AIs in rationalistic terms, we ask how to design the rules of interaction in multi-agent systems that come to represent an economy of AIs.Theories of normative design from economics may prove more relevant for artificial agents than human agents, with AIs that better respect idealized assumptions of rationality than people, interacting through novel rules and incentive systems quite distinct from those tailored for people.},
number = {6245},
journal = {Science},
author = {Parkes, David C. and Wellman, Michael P.},
month = jul,
year = {2015},
pmid = {26185245},
note = {Publisher: American Association for the Advancement of Science},
pages = {267--272},
file = {PDF:/home/velocitatem/Zotero/storage/27KLNFRU/_aiEcon.pdf:application/pdf},
}
@article{yokoo_effect_2004,
title = {The effect of false-name bids in combinatorial auctions: {New} fraud in internet auctions},
volume = {46},
issn = {08998256},
doi = {10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00045-9},
abstract = {We examine the effect of false-name bids on combinatorial auction protocols. False-name bids are bids submitted by a single bidder using multiple identifiers such as multiple e-mail addresses. The obtained results are summarized as follows: (1) the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism, which is strategy-proof and Pareto efficient when there exists no false-name bid, is not false-name-proof; (2) there exists no false-name-proof combinatorial auction protocol that satisfies Pareto efficiency; (3) one sufficient condition where the VCG mechanism is false-name-proof is identified, i.e., the concavity of a surplus function over bidders. © 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.},
number = {1},
journal = {Games and Economic Behavior},
author = {Yokoo, Makoto and Sakurai, Yuko and Matsubara, Shigeo},
year = {2004},
note = {Publisher: Academic Press Inc.},
keywords = {Auction, Mechanism design, Strategy-proof},
pages = {174--188},
file = {PDF:/home/velocitatem/Zotero/storage/LUVQV6WT/Yokoo04.pdf:application/pdf},
}
@inproceedings{feldman_free-riding_2004,
title = {Free-riding and whitewashing in peer-to-peer systems},
isbn = {1-58113-942-X},
doi = {10.1145/1016527.1016539},
abstract = {We develop a model to study the phenomenon of free-riding in peer-to-peer (P2P) systems. At the heart of our model is a user of a certain type, an intrinsic and private parameter that reflects the user's willingness to contribute resources to the system. A user decides whether to contribute or free-ride based on how the current contribution cost in the system compares to her type. When the societal generosity (i.e., the average type) is low, intervention is required in order to sustain the system. We present the effect of mechanisms that exclude low type users or, more realistic, penalize free-riders with degraded service. We also consider dynamic scenarios with arrivals and departures of users, and with whitewashers: users who leave the system and rejoin with new identities to avoid reputational penalties. We find that when penalty is imposed on all newcomers in order to avoid whitewashing, system performance degrades significantly only when the turnover rate among users is high.},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the {ACM} {SIGCOMM} 2004 {Workshops}},
publisher = {Association for Computing Machinery},
author = {Feldman, Michal and Papadimitriou, Christos and Chuang, John and Stoica, Ion},
year = {2004},
keywords = {Cheap pseudonyms, Cooperation, Equilibrium, Exclusion, Free-riding, Identity cost, Incentives, Peer-to-peer, Whitewashing},
pages = {228--235},
file = {PDF:/home/velocitatem/Zotero/storage/K32WH6SB/1016527.1016539.pdf:application/pdf},
}
@article{calvano_artificial_2018,
title = {Artificial {Intelligence}, {Algorithmic} {Pricing} and {Collusion}},
url = {https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3304991},
doi = {10.2139/ssrn.3304991},
journal = {SSRN Electronic Journal},
author = {Calvano, Emilio and Calzolari, Giacomo and Denicolo, Vincenzo and Pastorello, Sergio},
year = {2018},
file = {PDF:/home/velocitatem/Zotero/storage/WYTSSZBR/ssrn-3304991.pdf:application/pdf},
}
@techreport{varian_economic_1995,
title = {Economic {Mechanism} {Design} for {Computerized} {Agents}},
abstract = {The eeld of economic mechanism design has been an active area of research in economics for at least 20 years. This eld uses the tools of economics and game theory to design {\textbackslash}rules of interaction" for economic transactions that will, in principle , yield some desired outcome. In this paper I provide an overview of this subject for an audience interested in applications to electronic commerce and discuss some special problems that arise in this context.},
author = {Varian, Hal R},
year = {1995},
file = {PDF:/home/velocitatem/Zotero/storage/S8635QX6/varian95a.pdf:application/pdf},
}
@book{russell_artificial_nodate,
title = {Artificial {Intelligence} {A} {Modern} {Approach} {Fourth} {Edition} {Global} {Edition}},
isbn = {978-1-292-40117-1},
author = {Russell, Stuart and Norvig, Peter},
file = {PDF:/home/velocitatem/Zotero/storage/6B8W8S27/efdd4d1d4c2087fe1cbe03d9ced67f34.pdf:application/pdf},
}
@techreport{wellman_price_2004,
title = {Price {Prediction} in a {Trading} {Agent} {Competition} {Yevgeniy} {Vorobeychik}},
abstract = {The 2002 Trading Agent Competition (TAC) presented a challenging market game in the domain of travel shopping. One of the pivotal issues in this domain is uncertainty about hotel prices, which have a significant influence on the relative cost of alternative trip schedules. Thus, virtually all participants employ some method for predicting hotel prices. We survey approaches employed in the tournament, finding that agents apply an interesting diversity of techniques, taking into account differing sources of evidence bearing on prices. Based on data provided by entrants on their agents' actual predictions in the TAC-02 finals and semifinals, we analyze the relative efficacy of these approaches. The results show that taking into account game-specific information about flight prices is a major distinguishing factor. Machine learning methods effectively induce the relationship between flight and hotel prices from game data, and a purely analytical approach based on competitive equilibrium analysis achieves equal accuracy with no historical data. Employing a new measure of prediction quality, we relate absolute accuracy to bottom-line performance in the game.},
author = {Wellman, Michael P and Reeves, Daniel M and Lochner, Kevin M and Edu, Yvorobey@umich},
year = {2004},
note = {Publication Title: Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Volume: 21},
pages = {19--36},
file = {PDF:/home/velocitatem/Zotero/storage/N9JNXFJW/live-1333-2265-jair.pdf:application/pdf},
}
@techreport{shoham_multiagent_nodate,
title = {Multiagent {Systems}: {Algorithmic}, {Game}-{Theoretic}, and {Logical} {Foundations}},
url = {http://www.masfoundations.org.},
author = {Shoham, Yoav and Leyton-Brown, Kevin},
keywords = {algorithms, auctions, communication, competition, cooperation, distributed problem solving, game theory, learning, logic, mechanism design, social choice},
file = {PDF:/home/velocitatem/Zotero/storage/QZVYS7V9/shoham09a.pdf:application/pdf},
}
@article{xia_evaluation-driven_2025,
title = {Evaluation-{Driven} {Development} and {Operations} of {LLM} {Agents}: {A} {Process} {Model} and {Reference} {Architecture}},
url = {http://arxiv.org/abs/2411.13768},
abstract = {Large Language Models (LLMs) have enabled the emergence of LLM agents, systems capable of pursuing under-specified goals and adapting after deployment. Evaluating such agents is challenging because their behavior is open ended, probabilistic, and shaped by system-level interactions over time. Traditional evaluation methods, built around fixed benchmarks and static test suites, fail to capture emergent behaviors or support continuous adaptation across the lifecycle. To ground a more systematic approach, we conduct a multivocal literature review (MLR) synthesizing academic and industrial evaluation practices. The findings directly inform two empirically derived artifacts: a process model and a reference architecture that embed evaluation as a continuous, governing function rather than a terminal checkpoint. Together they constitute the evaluation-driven development and operations (EDDOps) approach, which unifies offline (development-time) and online (runtime) evaluation within a closed feedback loop. By making evaluation evidence drive both runtime adaptation and governed redevelopment, EDDOps supports safer, more traceable evolution of LLM agents aligned with changing objectives, user needs, and governance constraints.},
author = {Xia, Boming and Lu, Qinghua and Zhu, Liming and Xing, Zhenchang and Zhao, Dehai and Zhang, Hao},
month = nov,
year = {2025},
note = {arXiv: 2411.13768},
file = {PDF:/home/velocitatem/Zotero/storage/H8IS64AW/2411.13768v2.pdf:application/pdf},
}
@techreport{xie_osworld_nodate,
title = {{OSWORLD}: {Benchmarking} {Multimodal} {Agents} for {Open}-{Ended} {Tasks} in {Real} {Computer} {Environments}},
url = {https://os-world.github.io},
abstract = {Autonomous agents that accomplish complex computer tasks with minimal human interventions have the potential to transform human-computer interaction, significantly enhancing accessibility and productivity. However, existing benchmarks either lack an interactive environment or are limited to environments specific to certain applications or domains, failing to reflect the diverse and complex nature of real-world computer use, thereby limiting the scope of tasks and agent scalability. To address this issue, we introduce OSWORLD, the first-of-its-kind scalable, real computer environment for multimodal agents, supporting task setup, execution-based evaluation, and interactive learning across various operating systems such as Ubuntu, Windows, and macOS. OSWORLD can serve as a unified, integrated computer environment for assessing open-ended computer tasks that involve arbitrary applications. Building upon OSWORLD, we create a benchmark of 369 computer tasks involving real web and desktop apps in open domains, OS file I/O, and workflows spanning multiple applications. Each task example is derived from real-world computer use cases and includes a detailed initial state setup configuration and a custom execution-based evaluation script for reliable, reproducible evaluation. Extensive evaluation of state-of-the-art LLM/VLM-based agents on OSWORLD reveals significant deficiencies in their ability to serve as computer assistants. While humans can accomplish over 72.36\% of the tasks, the best model achieves only 12.24\% success, primarily struggling with GUI grounding and operational knowledge. Comprehensive analysis using OSWORLD provides valuable insights for developing multimodal generalist agents that were not possible with previous benchmarks. Our code, environment, baseline models, and data are publicly available at https://os-world.github.io.},
author = {Xie, Tianbao and Zhang, Danyang and Chen, Jixuan and Li, Xiaochuan and Zhao, Siheng and Cao, Ruisheng and Jing Hua, Toh and Cheng, Zhoujun and Shin, Dongchan and Lei, Fangyu and Liu, Yitao and Xu, Yiheng and Zhou, Shuyan and Savarese, Silvio and Xiong, Caiming and Zhong, Victor and Yu, Tao},
note = {arXiv: 2404.07972v2},
file = {PDF:/home/velocitatem/Zotero/storage/LLRKXIC7/full-text.pdf:application/pdf},
}
@techreport{imperva_rapid_2025,
title = {The {Rapid} {Rise} of {Bots} and the {Unseen} {Risk} for {Business} \#{2025BADBOTREPORT}},
author = {{Imperva}},
year = {2025},
file = {PDF:/home/velocitatem/Zotero/storage/AWR9IQRD/2025-Bad-Bot-Report.pdf:application/pdf},
}
@article{perez-ricardo_exploring_2025,
title = {Exploring booking intentions through price elasticity of demand in tourism accommodations using large-scale data analytics},
volume = {31},
issn = {24448834},
doi = {10.1016/j.iedeen.2025.100271},
abstract = {The study aims to explore tourists' booking intentions by analyzing the price elasticity of demand in tourist accommodations. This analysis should reveal how changes in price affect booking behavior across different customer segments, using online booking records. A dataset was compiled from 106 hotels in Malaga, Spain, comprising 27,910 online bookings sourced exclusively from hotel websites. To understand the price elasticity of demand, a simple log-log regression was applied, segmenting the data based on key revenue-related variables. Subsequently, a cluster segmentation was performed using the Elbow method and K-means algorithm to identify distinct market segments. The findings highlighted that Family Travelers and Short Stay Travelers segments exhibited elastic demand, indicating higher sensitivity to price fluctuations. In contrast, Early Bookers and Mid-Season Long Stayers demonstrated inelastic demand, with lower responsiveness to changes in tourist accommodation prices. The number of variables analyzed in this study, along with the cluster analysis, represent a novelty and contribute to the existing literature on market segmentation and price elasticity of demand. This integration enriches both fields of research, offering mutual benefits and deeper insights that enhance the understanding of booking intention and pricing strategies.},
number = {1},
urldate = {2025-11-28},
journal = {European Research on Management and Business Economics},
author = {Pérez-Ricardo, Elizabeth del Carmen and García-Mestanza, Josefa},
month = jan,
year = {2025},
note = {Publisher: European Academy of Management and Business Economics},
keywords = {Booking intention, Price elasticity, Tourist segmentation},
file = {PDF:/home/velocitatem/Zotero/storage/QNXZJLRM/S2444883425000038.pdf:application/pdf},
}
@misc{ghaffary_amazon_nodate,
title = {Amazon {Sues} to {Stop} {Perplexity} {From} {Using} {AI} {Tool} to {Buy} {Stuff}},
url = {https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-11-04/amazon-demands-perplexity-stop-ai-agent-from-making-purchases},
author = {Ghaffary, Shirin and Day, Matt},
file = {PDF:/home/velocitatem/Zotero/storage/IQL6FPWE/Amazon Sues to Stop Perplexity From Using AI Tool to Buy Stuff - Bloomberg.pdf:application/pdf},
}
@techreport{besbes_dynamic_nodate,
title = {Dynamic {Pricing} {Without} {Knowing} the {Demand} {Function}: {Risk} {Bounds} and {Near}-{Optimal} {Algorithms} *},
abstract = {We consider a single product revenue management problem where, given an initial inventory, the objective is to dynamically adjust prices over a finite sales horizon to maximize expected revenues. Realized demand is observed over time, but the underlying functional relationship between price and mean demand rate that governs these observations (otherwise known as the demand function or demand curve), is not known. We consider two instances of this problem: i.) a setting where the demand function is assumed to belong to a known parametric family with unknown parameter values; and ii.) a setting where the demand function is assumed to belong to a broad class of functions that need not admit any parametric representation. In each case we develop policies that learn the demand function "on the fly," and optimize prices based on that. The performance of these algorithms is measured in terms of the regret: the revenue loss relative to the maximal revenues that can be extracted when the demand function is known prior to the start of the selling season. We derive lower bounds on the regret that hold for any admissible pricing policy, and then show that our proposed algorithms achieve a regret that is "close" to this lower bound. The magnitude of the regret can be interpreted as the economic value of prior knowledge on the demand function; manifested as the revenue loss due to model uncertainty.},
author = {Besbes, Omar and Zeevi, Assaf},
note = {Publication Title: Operations Research},
keywords = {learning, asymptotic analysis, estimation, exploration-exploitation, pricing, Revenue management, value of information},
file = {PDF:/home/velocitatem/Zotero/storage/SBAIB4V2/Dp_wo_demand_risk_ob_az_posted.pdf:application/pdf},
}
@techreport{markntel_advisors_global_2025,
address = {Noida, Uttar Pradesh, India},
title = {Global {AI} {Agent} {Market} {Research} {Report}: {Forecast} (20262032)},
url = {https://www.marknteladvisors.com/research-library/ai-agent-market.html},
urldate = {2025-12-12},
institution = {MarkNtel Advisors},
author = {{MarkNtel Advisors}},
year = {2025},
}
@article{amjad_censored_2017,
title = {Censored {Demand} {Estimation} in {Retail}},
volume = {1},
url = {https://par.nsf.gov/servlets/purl/10066022},
doi = {10.1145/3154489},
abstract = {In this paper, the question of interest is estimating true demand of a product at a given store location and time period in the retail environment based on a single noisy and potentially censored observation. To address this question, we introduce a \%non-parametric framework to make inference from multiple time series. Somewhat surprisingly, we establish that the algorithm introduced for the purpose of "matrix completion" can be used to solve the relevant inference problem. Specifically, using the Universal Singular Value Thresholding (USVT) algorithm [7], we show that our estimator is consistent: the average mean squared error of the estimated average demand with respect to the true average demand goes to 0 as the number of store locations and time intervals increase to \${\textbackslash}infty\$. We establish naturally appealing properties of the resulting estimator both analytically as well as through a sequence of instructive simulations. Using a real dataset in retail (Walmart), we argue for the practical relevance of our approach.},
number = {2},
urldate = {2025-11-12},
journal = {Proceedings of the ACM on Measurement and Analysis of Computing Systems},
author = {Amjad, Muhammad J. and Shah, Devavrat},
month = dec,
year = {2017},
note = {Publisher: Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)},
pages = {1--28},
file = {PDF:/home/velocitatem/Zotero/storage/5ZYADDT4/10066022.pdf:application/pdf},
}
@misc{ganie_uncertainty_2025,
title = {Uncertainty in {Authorship}: {Why} {Perfect} {AI} {Detection} {Is} {Mathematically} {Impossible}},
shorttitle = {Uncertainty in {Authorship}},
url = {http://arxiv.org/abs/2509.11915},
doi = {10.48550/arXiv.2509.11915},
abstract = {As large language models (LLMs) become more advanced, it is increasingly difficult to distinguish between human-written and AI-generated text. This paper draws a conceptual parallel between quantum uncertainty and the limits of authorship detection in natural language. We argue that there is a fundamental trade-off: the more confidently one tries to identify whether a text was written by a human or an AI, the more one risks disrupting the text's natural flow and authenticity. This mirrors the tension between precision and disturbance found in quantum systems. We explore how current detection methods--such as stylometry, watermarking, and neural classifiers--face inherent limitations. Enhancing detection accuracy often leads to changes in the AI's output, making other features less reliable. In effect, the very act of trying to detect AI authorship introduces uncertainty elsewhere in the text. Our analysis shows that when AI-generated text closely mimics human writing, perfect detection becomes not just technologically difficult but theoretically impossible. We address counterarguments and discuss the broader implications for authorship, ethics, and policy. Ultimately, we suggest that the challenge of AI-text detection is not just a matter of better tools--it reflects a deeper, unavoidable tension in the nature of language itself.},
language = {en},
urldate = {2026-01-05},
publisher = {arXiv},
author = {Ganie, Aadil Gani},
month = sep,
year = {2025},
note = {arXiv:2509.11915 [cs]},
keywords = {Computer Science - Computation and Language},
file = {PDF:/home/velocitatem/Zotero/storage/3Z2XK4QC/Ganie - 2025 - Uncertainty in Authorship Why Perfect AI Detection Is Mathematically Impossible.pdf:application/pdf},
}

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@@ -8,9 +8,50 @@
\section{Introduction} \section{Introduction}
Research Objectives and Contribution: What are we making, why and who should care? In this paper we present an exploration and defense against the presence of new commercial entities in digitally powered platforms, preserving market equilibrium in the age of AI. This research establishes the following contributions: definition and formalization of non-human transactors in e-commerce platforms, development of a testing-ground for capturing the behavioral essence of these transactors across a large variety of digital systems, construction of a discriminative model (to prove separability) as a strong learner for downstream mitigation of contamination by non-human entities, translation of such learned separability into existing dynamic pricing machine learning loops, and finally establishment of a high-level KPI-affecting causal effect and cost-saving framework for the future of internet commerce in the presence of such non-human learners.
This research effort touches a large variety of domains, spanning behavioral economics for understanding the rationality of behavior as theorized by the concept of homo economicus, agent-based modeling to translate our learned separability into disjoint dynamic pricing systems, reinforcement learning which serves as the SOTA for price-learners, and dynamic pricing and market equilibrium theory to understand the risks of possible supra-competitive pricing phenomena in cases of adversarial pricing systems driving the market out of equilibrium.
\subsection{Motivation and Market Context} \subsection{Motivation and Market Context}
Current market dynamics and trends of dynamic pricing and AI agents. Future projections of AI agents. Key stakeholders that are discussing this and reporting on it (Thales). Who is most affected
The current innovation boom in generative artificial intelligence and its applications to knowledge-based work tasks has brought many competing technologies for browser-use automation, with benchmarks and evaluations \cite{xia_evaluation-driven_2025} motivating the development of capabilities focused on commercial research, understanding, and transaction execution \cite{xie_osworld_nodate}. The ``AI Agent'' market is forecasted to grow from around USD 5-8 billion in 2025 to USD 42-52 billion by 2030. This surge reflects adoption in e-commerce, customer service, and enterprise automation, where agents handle interactions previously done by humans, raising the question of how these systems should be designed for future robustness as well as how to maintain a competitive edge in the analytical components of e-commerce platforms \cite{markntel_advisors_global_2025}.
The key stakeholders affected by the threat of increasing agent-driven traffic include online businesses and platform operators (especially in bot-heavy sectors like retail, travel, and financial services), their security, fraud, and engineering teams, end users whose accounts and data are exposed and whose experience degrades, regulators and legal stakeholders responding to breaches and fraud, and the attackers or bot operators driving the automation \cite{imperva_rapid_2025}.
The industry has already seen legal action in cases like Amazon against Perplexity \cite{ghaffary_amazon_nodate}, stemming from the difficulty of identifying traffic from hybrid systems like the Commet browser. This paper explores such systems to better understand what the interaction data looks like and what it means for dynamic pricing and recommendation systems downstream. This observed impact indicates a need for prevention of secondary negative effects on the ``legacy'' systems which power modern revenue sources for many companies. Dynamic pricing algorithms rely on directly translating demand features $q$ to new price assignments $\hat{p}$ across a catalogue of products of size $N$. This opens opportunities to design a \textit{tabula rasa} of digital market mechanisms that will shape the future of commerce in the age of artificial intelligence.
\subsection{Solution Space Overview} \subsection{Solution Space Overview}
Different approaches and perspectives, here also add a preview of what will be developed and explored in the lit review. Dynamic pricing systems, as presented in \cite{mueller_low-rank_2019}, often deal with sparse low-rank data of demand signals which, combined with contamination from agents, creates complex interactions that impact pricing. To further complicate the problem, certain commercial settings such as the one presented in \cite{amjad_censored_2017} must address the true demand of products under censored observations. This provides a formulation for handling demand in our case with multiple kinds of commercial mediators: $\hat{q} \gets q_A + q_H$ where $q_A$ represents the distribution of demand generated by agentic mediators and $q_H$ represents that of true human demand, these are two distinct populations with divergent objective functions.
We formally define interaction data as coming from some actor which can either be an agent ($A$) or human ($H$). For purposes of this research, an agent is an algorithmic loop with the ability to access a web platform and perform actions such as clicks, scrolls, and input field fills. The loop terminates when the internal large language model judges the provided task definition as complete. A detailed breakdown can be found in \cref{algagent-loop}.
\begin{algorithm}[t]
\DontPrintSemicolon
\SetKwInOut{Input}{Input}
\SetKwInOut{Output}{Output}
\Input{Goal $G$, Platform URL $u$, LLM $\mathcal{M}$}
\Output{Task completion result $r$}
Initialize browser instance $\mathcal{B}$ with connection to $u$\;
Construct prompt $\pi \gets \textsc{BuildPrompt}(G, u)$\;
$\text{done} \gets \text{False}$\;
\While{$\neg \text{done}$}{
Observe current page state $s_t$ from $\mathcal{B}$\;
Query $\mathcal{M}$ with $(\pi, s_t)$ to determine next action $a_t \in \{\text{click}, \text{scroll}, \text{fill}, \text{navigate}\}$\;
Execute $a_t$ on $\mathcal{B}$ to transition to state $s_{t+1}$\;
$\text{done} \gets \mathcal{M}.\textsc{JudgeCompletion}(G, s_{t+1})$\;
}
Extract final result $r$ from terminal state\;
\Return{$r$}\;
\caption{AI Agent's Interaction Loop}
\label{algagent-loop}
\end{algorithm}
The previously described goal of separability allows us to formulate a task which entails taking raw interaction data for either actor and creating a composite demand estimate $\hat{q}$. We propose a robust optimization objective defined in our methodology, transforming the pricing problem into a form of Distributionally Robust Optimization \cite{kuhn_distributionally_2025} where the learner must guard against adversarial contamination in observed demand distributors. In this setting we must learn to make decision that perform under the assumption of not having a single estimated probability distribution but under an ambiguity set of any distribution, of which we have limited information. In our case as stated is a mixture of distributions with a parameter which is unknown and non-stationary.

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@@ -1,15 +1,44 @@
\section{Literature Review} \section{Literature Review}
\subsection{Foundational Concepts} To better understand all wedges of the work, we must start by exploring the nature of agents and agentic computer use and web automation, complementing that with economic reasoning and strategic interaction. The final surface to cover, leads us to data-driven dynamic pricing under uncertainty. The key technical risk is not ``agents buying things'' per se, but agents shaping the behavioral and demand signals that downstream pricing systems consume and depend on. The introduction of these mediating actor entities into economic systems, is further creating a threat of false-name bidding \cite{yokoo_effect_2004}, which prior research has explored in a trading context. Other research on pseudonyms in dynamic systems, demonstrate whitewashing in AI agents which can ignore defensive mechanisms by re-entry with different identities \cite{feldman_free-riding_2004}. Dynamic pricing assumes demand proxies are behaviorally meaningful, while bot detection aims at security and access control. The missing bridge is a principled framework for separating non-human reconnaissance from genuine human demand expression and integrating that separation into pricing heuristics without degrading legitimate user experience (in our research tracked by the user-experience index). This gap, is what our contribution aims to address, particularly for the aforementioned stakeholder groups.
\subsection{Agent Taxonomy and Definitions}
An agent in the context of artificial intelligence is generally defined by anything that can reason and act upon observations of its environments (collected through some sensory inputs) and carry out actions through effectors. Moreover, a rational agent is an entity that is capable of perceiving the world around them and taking actions to advance specified goals. This definition by \cite{russell_artificial_nodate} is further developed in an economic context by \cite{parkes_economic_2015}, suggesting AI research attempts to construct a synthetic \textit{homo economicus}, which may also be termed \textit{machina economicus}.
A specific class or taxon of this \textit{machina economicus}, the Large Language Model (LLM) agent, is defined as an autonomous system capable of achieving goals and adapting post-training, often without needing explicit code or fundamental model changes. \cite{xia_evaluation-driven_2025}
We must however acknowledge the current SOTA as presented by OSWORLD simulations in \cite{xie_osworld_nodate} have demonstrated that multi-modal tasks across desktop and web interaction modes, have a top-performing score of only 12.24\% success, whereas humans have a higher 72\% success rate. This weakness matters for this research because it clarifies the near-term threat model: practical exploitation does not require a fully competent ``computer assistant'', only enough automation to perform high-volume reconnaissance actions (search/filter/open product pages, probe availability/price boundaries) that can contaminate behavioral signals. With the expected growth of these capabilities, this threat only becomes more perilous to revenue management systems.
We model an agent session as producing some events with lower in-session conversion levels relative to humans, this we state in our assumption that $P(\text{purchase} \vert A) \ll P(\text{purchase} \vert H)$ but with a potentially higher volatility in $\hat{q}$, which we observe through the look-to-book metrics in our simulation.
\subsection{Economic Agents: From Homo Economicus to Machina Economicus}
Existing behavioral economic models tend to be criticized for the assumption of rational behavior, as is embodied in the term of homo economicus. The definition of a machina economicus by \cite{parkes_economic_2015} is quite appropriate for our case, particularly because these assumptions of rationality have been argued to be a very adequate reference for AI research by \cite{varian_economic_1995}. For modeling this behavior, the trajectories of these agents can be formally defined to be partially observable Markov decision processes. \cite{xie_osworld_nodate} Agents are however not to be confused with web-bots which have previously been known as automated software applications or scrapers which are set with a purpose of carrying out specific tasks on the internet, without a higher level of internal judgement. \cite{imperva_rapid_2025} In our research, we refer to this actor simply as an Agent belonging to the distribution $A$.
This economic framing also helps separate two related but distinct phenomena of agents as buyers (changing market demand composition), and agents as information gatherers (changing the observed interactions used by pricing/recommendation systems). The thesis focuses on the second, where information acquisition strategically precedes purchase execution. We do not however dismiss the proposed expectation that existing economic systems serving humans, will not be populated by AIs across multiple channels and with various possibly misaligned goals as stated by \cite{parkes_economic_2015}.
What is the taxonomy and definition of an agent and an actor in this case, a bit more about interaction models in sessions and about dynamic pricing algorithms.
\subsection{Problem Evidence and Market Impact} \subsection{Problem Evidence and Market Impact}
Documented instances of agent-driven market disruptions - Quantitative evidence of pricing manipulation - Case studies from affected industries
\subsection{Theoretical Foundations: Economic Prallels} The statistical issue of contamination in dynamic pricing systems that observe demand features as a means to update prices has been documented in various previous contexts. The airline industry (which has accounted for 24\% of observed disruptions) has seen malicious activity with a measureable impact on skewing key performance indicators by behavior visible in the look-to-book metrics. Excessive reconnaissance traffic inflates search volume without corresponding completed bookings, thereby skewing demand forecasts and disrupting dynamic pricing models. Demand proxies have also been observed to cause significant threat to inventory management by creating artificial scarcity that distorts the demand-supply relationships in the enterprise model. Censored demand as shown in \cite{amjad_censored_2017} can also be observed in low-bias demand under-estimation caused by a distortion effect coming from non-human traffic data. \cite{imperva_rapid_2025}
When dynamic pricing algorithms operate on highly contaminated or noisy data, the risk grows significantly in creating inaccurate price inferences. The emergent mitigation driven by un-informed reward and regret signals might lead to price suppression for sales continuity which results in harming margins and resulting in a revenue loss. System that poorly fit undesired behavior might result in price gouging, which calls for strong guardrails while preserving targeted business strategy. \cite{mullapudi_reinforcement_nodate}
%Documented instances of agent-driven market disruptions - Quantitative evidence of pricing manipulation - Case studies from affected industries
\subsection{Theoretical Foundations: Economic Parallels}
Early hints of exploration of prices in a standard English auction explored in \cite{varian_economic_1995} which hints at exploration of prices in a sequential manner, which leads to a marginally different cost to the bidder than the reservation price of the seller. This is a setting in which there is no cost incured by the buyer for their actions or exploring prices in the market. They propose that any agent responsable for the pricing of a good must be imune to dynamic strategies which might extract private information from a market. A key take-away which relates to the Vickery auction mechanism (also called a \textit{direct mechanism}) suggests that not only would defenses against such exploitation be necessary, but the construction of a mechanism in which revelation of the true willingness to pay is the dominant strategy for commerce.
Like in classical revenue-maximizing auctions \cite{roughgarden_cs364a_2013} we assume that the human actor in our system has a private valuation $v$ which we formally draw from later defined distributions. The important note here is that the agent proxy does not have a mechanism to convey this private information into the demand data which directly impacts the pricing systems.
% Economic foundations: relating the problem to options pricing theory. Cost of Information (COI) concept and its relevance
% Link Coasean Singularity and other economic market theory and highlight specific information of supra competitive pricing.
Economic foundations: relating the problem to options pricing theory. Cost of Information (COI) concept and its relevance
\subsection{Landscape of Existing Work} \subsection{Landscape of Existing Work}

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@@ -1,68 +1,251 @@
\section{Methodology} \section{Methodology}
This section details the theoretical and practical framework developed to address dynamic pricing under the influence of non-human actors. We begin by formalizing the problem environment and the nature of the actors. We then derive the \textit{Cost of Information} (COI) theorem, proving the erosion of pricing power in the limit of agent saturation. Following this, we outline our generative contamination strategy using GOFAI-driven separability and transition probability learning. Finally, we formulate the robust control problem as a Stackelberg game solved via Distributionally Robust Reinforcement Learning (DR-RL) with constructed ambiguity sets.
\subsection{Problem Formalization} \subsection{Problem Formalization}
Mathematical formalization of agent-induced pricing distortions. Formal definition of potential loss mechanisms $\alpha D$ We define a commercial environment where the platform interacts with a stream of sessions. Let $\mathcal{S}$ denote the set of all sessions. Each session $s \in \mathcal{S}$ is generated by an actor belonging to a latent class $Y_s \in \{H, A\}$, where $H$ denotes Human and $A$ denotes Agent.
We consider a business across time during which we have an evolving vector $p_t \in \Re^N$ where $N$ is the number of products in our catalogue. our price vector is directly dependent on a demand function $q_t$ which we define as a linear method of a price elasticity matrix $B_t$. This is the same setup that Microsoft created in their research. Each session produces a trajectory of observable events $\tau_s = (e_{s,1}, \ldots, e_{s,L_s})$. An event $e_{s,k}$ is a tuple defined as:
\begin{equation}
e_{s,k} = (a_{s,k}, i_{s,k}, t_{s,k})
\end{equation}
where:
\begin{itemize}
\item $a_{s,k} \in \mathcal{A}$ is the action taken (e.g., \texttt{view\_item}, \texttt{add\_to\_cart}).
\item $i_{s,k} \in \{1, \ldots, N\}$ is the target item index.
\item $t_{s,k} \in \mathbb{R}_+$ is the continuous timestamp.
\end{itemize}
We gether interaction data from users interacting with a sample platform simulating a hotel/airline which generates interaction distributions $I_t = \{(p_t, q_t^\text{obs}, \pi_t)\}_{t=1}^T$ The platform does not directly observe the true underlying demand function $d(p)$. Instead, it observes a behavioral proxy $\hat{q}_t$, which is a composite signal derived from the mixture of actor types. We define the demand proxy for product $i$ at epoch $t$ as a weighted aggregation of events:
\begin{equation}
\hat{q}_{t,i} = \sum_{s \in \mathcal{S}_t} \sum_{k=1}^{L_s} \omega(a_{s,k}) \cdot \mathbb{1}[i_{s,k} = i]
\end{equation}
where $\omega: \mathcal{A} \to \mathbb{R}_+$ assigns weights to actions based on their signal strength regarding willingness to pay.
\subsubsection{Actor Types and Demand Curves}
We formalize the heterogeneity of actors by introducing a type space $\Theta$. An actor of class $Y_s$ is further parameterized by a type $\theta \sim \mathcal{D}_{Y}$. This type determines the actor's demand response function $d(p; \theta)$, sampled from a distribution of possible demand curves. The total observed demand is a stochastic process governed by the mixture:
\begin{equation}
Q(p) = (1-\alpha) \cdot \mathbb{E}_{\theta \sim \mathcal{D}_H}[d(p; \theta)] + \alpha \cdot \mathbb{E}_{\theta \sim \mathcal{D}_A}[d(p; \theta)] + \epsilon_t
\end{equation}
where $\alpha \in [0, 1]$ represents the contamination parameter (proportion of agents) and $\epsilon_t$ is non-stationary market noise.
\subsection{Cost of Information Framework}
Mathematical demonstration and validation of the COI and citation backed evidence, and framework overview + show harm to user via other cost distortions. Maybe split into 3.2.1 (COI Theory) and 3.2.2 (Framework Design) \subsection{Cost of Information (COI) Framework}
The \textit{Cost of Information} (COI) represents the markup a pricing policy $\pi$ attempts to extract from the market by leveraging demand signals. We define COI as the expected premium over the minimum viable price $\underline{p}$ (or marginal cost). This also speaks to the financial urgency as a consequence of information asymmetry between the platform and the actors.
\begin{definition}[Cost of Information]
Let $\pi(\tau)$ be a pricing policy mapping interaction histories to prices. The COI is defined as:
\begin{align}
\text{COI} &= \mathbb{E}[P] - \underline{p} \\
&= \int_{\underline{p}}^{\bar{p}} (1 - F_\pi(p)) \, dp
\end{align}
where $F_\pi(p)$ is the cumulative distribution function of prices generated by $\pi$ under standard operating conditions.
\end{definition}
\subsection{System Architecture}
\begin{figure}[ht] \begin{figure}[ht]
\centering \centering
\begin{tikzpicture}[ \begin{tikzpicture}[scale=1.2]
node distance=1.5cm and 2.5cm, % Define the Gaussian function: centered at 2
box/.style={rectangle, draw, thick, minimum height=1cm, minimum width=3cm, align=center, fill=blue!10}, \def\bellcurve(#1){1.5 * exp(-0.5*((#1-2)/0.6)^2)}
kafka/.style={rectangle, draw=orange, thick, minimum height=1cm, minimum width=3cm, align=center, fill=orange!15},
arrow/.style={thick,->,>=Stealth}
]
% Nodes % Draw the main axis
\node[box] (webapp) {Web Application \\ (Producer \& Consumer)}; \draw[->, thick] (0, 0) -- (4.5, 0) node[right] {$p$};
\node[kafka, below=of webapp] (kafka) {Apache Kafka \\ Cluster}; \draw[->, thick] (0, 0) -- (0, 2) node[above] {Density};
\node[box, below=of kafka] (backend) {Backend Services / Microservices \\ (Producers and Consumers)};
% Connections \draw[thick, smooth, samples=100] plot[domain=0:4] (\x, {\bellcurve(\x)});
\draw[arrow] (webapp) to[out=210,in=150] node[above]{Publish} (kafka); \node at (3.2, 1.2) {$f_\pi(p)$};
\draw[arrow] (kafka) to[out=50,in=330] node[below]{Consume} (webapp);
\draw[arrow] (backend) -- node[above]{Publish/Consume} (kafka);
% Optional: Kafka internal components % Define p_min and E[p]
%\node[below=0.7cm of kafka, align=center] (topics) {Topics \\ Partitions}; \def\pmin{0.8}
\def\mean{2}
% Optional background % Vertical lines
\begin{scope}[on background layer] \draw[dashed] (\pmin, 0) -- (\pmin, 2.0);
\node[draw, rounded corners, fill=orange!5, fit=(kafka), inner sep=0.3cm] {}; \draw[dashed] (\mean, 0) -- (\mean, 2.0);
\end{scope}
\end{tikzpicture} % Labels on axis
\caption{Technical Diagram} \node[below] at (\pmin, 0) {$\underline{p}$};
\node[below] at (\mean, 0) {$\mathbb{E}[p]$};
\draw[<->, thick, red] (\pmin, 2.0) -- (\mean, 2.0) node[midway, above] {COI};
\end{tikzpicture}
\caption{Illustration of the Cost of Information (COI). The COI is defined as the difference between the expected price $\mathbb{E}[p]$ realized by the policy and the minimum viable price $\underline{p}$.}
\label{fig:coi_illustration}
\end{figure} \end{figure}
High level overview of how it works We now formally demonstrate that standard dynamic pricing mechanisms are not incentive-compatible with high-frequency agentic traffic. As the number of independent competitive agents $N$ querying the system grows, the platform's ability to sustain a COI vanishes.
\begin{theorem}[COI Erosion in the Limit]
Let $N$ be the number of independent, utility-maximizing agents querying the platform. Let $p_{(1)}$ be the first order statistic (minimum) of the prices offered to these agents. As $N \to \infty$, the Cost of Information converges to 0.
\end{theorem}
\begin{proof}
Let $p_1, \ldots, p_N$ be independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) price samples drawn from the policy's distribution $F(p)$ with support $[\underline{p}, \bar{p}]$. The realizable price for an optimal searching agent is the first order statistic $p_{(1)} = \min(p_1, \ldots, p_N)$.
The survival function (or reliability function) of the minimum price is given by:
\begin{equation}
S_{p_{(1)}}(t) = P(p_{(1)} > t) = [1 - F(t)]^N
\end{equation}
To determine the expected value $\mathbb{E}[p_{(1)}]$, we recall the property that for any continuous random variable $X$ with support $[A, B]$, the expectation can be expressed as the lower bound plus the integral of the survival function:
\begin{equation}
\mathbb{E}[X] = A + \int_{A}^{B} P(X > t) \, dt
\end{equation}
Applying this to our pricing statistic where the lower bound is $\underline{p}$:
\begin{align}
\mathbb{E}[p_{(1)}] &= \underline{p} + \int_{\underline{p}}^{\bar{p}} P(p_{(1)} > t) \, dt \\
&= \underline{p} + \int_{\underline{p}}^{\bar{p}} [1 - F(t)]^N \, dt
\end{align}
Since $F(t)$ is a valid CDF, for any $t > \underline{p}$, we have strict inequality $F(t) > 0$, implying $0 \le 1 - F(t) < 1$. By the properties of limits, as $N \to \infty$, the term $[1 - F(t)]^N$ converges to 0 pointwise for all $t > \underline{p}$.
Applying the Lebesgue Dominated Convergence Theorem (noting that the integrand is bounded by 1 on the finite interval $[\underline{p}, \bar{p}]$):
\begin{equation}
\lim_{N \to \infty} \int_{\underline{p}}^{\bar{p}} [1 - F(t)]^N \, dt = \int_{\underline{p}}^{\bar{p}} 0 \, dt = 0
\end{equation}
Substituting this back into the expression for COI:
\begin{align}
\lim_{N \to \infty} \text{COI} &= \lim_{N \to \infty} (\mathbb{E}[p_{(1)}] - \underline{p}) \\
&= \lim_{N \to \infty} \left( (\underline{p} + 0) - \underline{p} \right) \\
&= 0
\end{align}
\end{proof}
This result proves that standard pricing policies $\pi$ fail to extract surplus in the presence of large-scale agentic search, necessitating a robust counter-mechanism.
% The DRO objective creates a lower bound on COI extraction, effectively guaranteeing a minimum margin even in the presence of adversarial agents. we need to prove this and demonstrate that in a theorem.
%Mathematical demonstration and validation of the COI and citation backed evidence, and framework overview + show harm to user via other cost distortions. Maybe split into 3.2.1 (COI Theory) and 3.2.2 (Framework Design)
\subsection{System Architecture: Hybrid Kappa-Lambda Architecture}
In order for our research to have grounding in interactions we built a robust e-commerce web-platform. We initially conducted a survey of the leading platforms of airlines and hotel booking sites to identify the specific interface patterns that effectively manage complex travel data. Our analysis revealed a clear industry standard: while both sectors rely on tabbed service selection and left-sidebar filtering to streamline navigation, they diverge in result presentation: airlines utilize visual date-price bars and multi-step wizards to optimize for logistical transparency, whereas hotel platforms leverage image-led cards and scarcity triggers to drive emotional engagement and urgency. Our web framework defines a highly agnostic boilerplate which can be seeded with any data-modality with an easy-to-tailor pattern, which we leverage to define a \texttt{hotel} and \texttt{airline} mode. Both modes are then individually deployed via an environment level argument which adjusts the proxy routing with a custom middleware inside next.js to render only the desired mode. The purpose of this was to create a baseline adaptable to any use-case or desired commercial application.
The architecture of this platform begins with the deployed web-apps posting interaction data to our backend which processes them and stores each ingested interaction into a kafka cluster. This serves as our data reservoir tracking and associating each interaction with its session and importantly with which experiment it belongs to. Not only do we track the behavioral interactions, but our pricing provider micro-service, once called by the frontend reports the observed/queried price-product into kafka. This kafka cluster is subscribed to by our pipeline which is configured on a schedule in Airflow, with the possibility of manual trigger. The final stage of the pricing pipeline, submits computed dynamic pricing results into a redis database for quick updates which is then read by the pricing provider and displayed on the webapp. This is a very generic end-to-end mechanism which is applicable to a variety of different e-commerce tasks. We intentionally put emphasis on the development of this infrastructure to establish a reproducible framework for interaction and to minimize any noise.
\subsubsection{DevOps Principles}
\subsubsection{Online Dynamic Pricing}
The dynamic pricing done is handled by a pipeline which computes a demand estimate on a per-product basis of a specific window of the data, defined by the period $T$ which by default is 5 minutes. This dynamic pricing pipeline computes a demand estimate vector $\hat{q} \in \mathbb{R}^N$ by a weighted sum of interactions for each product, it additionally computes a price elasticity vector $\hat{\epsilon}$ in the same dimensions as our demand. The final features matrix is of the size $N \times 2$ which we translate to a new price vector $\hat{p} \in \mathbb{R}^N$. The transformation that governs this dynamic pricing is a very simple surge-based pricing (a special case of our later defined policy $\pi$):
\begin{equation}
\hat{p}_i = \begin{cases}
p_{0,i} \cdot \lambda_{\text{surge}} & \text{if } \hat{q}_i \geq \theta_{\text{high}} \\
p_{0,i} \cdot \lambda_{\text{disc}} & \text{if } \hat{q}_i \leq \theta_{\text{low}} \\
p_{0,i} & \text{otherwise}
\end{cases}
\quad \forall i \in \{1, \ldots, N\}
\end{equation}
where $p_0 \in \mathbb{R}^N$ is the base price vector (which is seeded into our database distinctly for each mode of the commerce platform), $\theta_{\text{high}}, \theta_{\text{low}} \in \mathbb{R}$ are demand thresholds defining surge and discount regions, and $\lambda_{\text{surge}}, \lambda_{\text{disc}} \in \mathbb{R}^+$ are multiplicative factors with typical values $\lambda_{\text{surge}} = 1.2$ and $\lambda_{\text{disc}} = 0.9$. This piecewise function enables rapid price adjustment in response to observed demand without requiring complex elasticity estimation or historical calibration, allowing us to expose actors within our experiments to a system with a dynamic component of pricing.
We will for our offilne experimental intents generalize a master function for encompasing distinct demand estimation and pricing strategies.
\begin{align}
V(\cdot) = \max_{p_t} \min_{Q \in \mathcal{U}(\hat{d})}{\mathbb{E}_{d\sim Q} [p_t \times d(p_t, x_t ; \theta) + \psi V_{t+1}(\cdot)]}
\end{align}
We follow differnet substitutouns which will server as hyperparameters later on.
\subsection{Experimental Design} \subsection{Experimental Design}
Study methodology and approach. Data acquisition strategy. Defined objectives and success criteria. Observable metrics and KPIs
\subsection{Dynamic Pricing Algorithm Analysis} The experimentation begins with the design of goals, with careful consideration to assure a uniform spanning across different variables within each product-architecture of either the hotel or airline platforms. Our crafted collection of goals (jobs to be done) is then tracked in a postgress database with one table to track goals and another table to track different experiment runs, and their associated goals in a experiment-goal one-to-one relationship.
Deep dive into how the algorithm works, different kinds and justification for chosen appraoches + agent impact modeling and quantification.
\subsection{Reinforcement Learning Formulation} The purpose of this effort to gather data on interactions, is the first half of our research. With this collected data on behavioral characteristics, enhanced by our feature augmentation, we can create distribution separation into two bins $y \in \{A,H\}$ with a certain probability $p$ dependent on the session-specific features. To address the second loop of our system, we use this gained capability of discrimination to enhance the learner design involved in our surrogate dynamic pricing task which simulates an independent dynamic pricing scenario under which we can train a more controlled policy with the ability to account for true demand signals under conditions of contamination from non-human actors.
How do we define the state space, action space and reward function breakdown and algorithm benchmarking.
POSSIBLY: Expand into full subsections: 3.6.1 (State-Action Space), 3.6.2 (Reward Design), 3.6.3 (Benchmarking)
\begin{algorithm}[t] Our approach can be well summarized by a three-stage division, first we intend to observe and \textit{vectorize} the behavioral interaction data from our experiments, we then develop the separability which helps us deepen the semantic understanding of the behavioral patterns. Finally we use our newly gained learner to leverage a defensive mechanism within the simulation stage of a controlled dynamic pricing loop.
\DontPrintSemicolon
\KwIn{stepsize $\eta$, smoothing $\delta$, rank $d$} \begin{figure}[ht]
\For{$t=1$ \KwTo $T$}{ \resizebox{\columnwidth}{!}{%
Sample $u_t$ on unit sphere; set $x_t^\prime=x_t+\delta u_t$\; \input{chapters/loop_figure.tex}
Set $p_t \gets U x_t^\prime$ and observe $q_t, R_t(p_t)$\; }
$x_{t+1} \gets \Pi\_{\mathcal{X}}(x_t-\eta R_t(p_t) u_t)$\; \caption{Overview of the Dynamic Pricing Tasks.}
} \end{figure}
\caption{Online Pricing Optimization (template)}
\end{algorithm}
Study methodology and approach. Data acquisition strategy. Defined objectives and success criteria. Observable metrics and KPIs.
\subsection{Generative Contamination and Separability}
To develop a robust pricing agent, we require a simulation environment capable of generating realistic, contaminated interaction data. We achieve this by learning from our Phantom platform data using a two-stage approach.
\subsubsection{GOFAI-Based Separability}
We employ Good Old-Fashioned AI (GOFAI) heuristics to generate initial weak labels for separability. We define a set of rule-based predicates $\phi_j: \tau \to \{0, 1\}$ to partition the dataset $\mathcal{D}$ into high-confidence sets $\mathcal{D}_H$ and $\mathcal{D}_A$. We construct distinct MDPs per each behavioral profile of humans and agents and from those we establish $D_{KL}$. From initial findings we compute a KL divergence of $\approx 2.0236$ across transition probabilities between states which can be seen in \ref{fig:human_mdp_viz} and \ref{fig:agent_mdp_viz}.
\begin{figure}[ht]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.8\textwidth]{chapters/mdp_human.pdf}
\caption{Markov Decision Process visualization illustrating the behavioral transition dynamics for human actions.}
\label{fig:human_mdp_viz}
\end{figure}
\begin{figure}[ht]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.8\textwidth]{chapters/mdp_agent.pdf}
\caption{Markov Decision Process visualization illustrating the behavioral transition dynamics for \textbf{agent} behavior profiles. The state space and transition probabilities are learned from observed session trajectories to enable generative contamination.}
\label{fig:agent_mdp_viz}
\end{figure}
\subsubsection{Transition Probability Estimation}
For both subsets, we model the session dynamics as a Markov Decision Process (MDP) and estimate the transition kernel $\mathcal{T}$. The probability of transitioning to state $s'$ given state $s$ is estimated via maximum likelihood:
\begin{equation}
\hat{P}(s' \mid s) = \frac{N(s, s')}{\sum_{k \in \mathcal{S}} N(s, k)}
\end{equation}
where $N(s, s')$ is the count of observed transitions. This allows us to construct a \textit{Contamination Generator} $\mathcal{G}(\alpha)$. Given a clean trajectory dataset, $\mathcal{G}$ injects synthetic agent trajectories sampled from the learned transition matrix $\hat{P}_A$ until the effective mixing ratio reaches $\alpha$.
\subsection{Distributionally Robust Reinforcement Learning (DR-RL)}
We formulate the pricing problem as a Stackelberg Game where the Platform (Leader) sets prices $p_t$ and the Aggregate Demand (Follower) responds. However, the exact mixing parameter $\alpha$ and the demand distribution shift are non-stationary and unknown in online settings. Relying on a simple error term $\epsilon$ is insufficient. Instead, we adopt a Distributionally Robust Optimization (DRO) objective.
\subsubsection{Ambiguity Set Construction}
We define an ambiguity set $\mathcal{U}_p(\hat{P}_N)$ centered around our empirical reference distribution $\hat{P}_N$ (derived from the generator $\mathcal{G}$). We utilize the Wasserstein distance metric to define the set of plausible demand distributions the agent might face:
\begin{equation}
\mathcal{U}_\epsilon(\hat{P}_N) = \left\{ Q \in \mathcal{P}(\Xi) : W_p(Q, \hat{P}_N) \le \epsilon \right\}
\end{equation}
This set captures all distributions that are statistically close to our observed training data but allows for adversarial shifts (e.g., sudden bot spikes).
\subsubsection{The Min-Max Objective}
The robust policy $\pi^*$ is obtained by solving the maximin problem:
\begin{equation}
\pi^* = \arg \max_{\pi} \min_{Q \in \mathcal{U}_\epsilon} \mathbb{E}_{d \sim Q} \left[ R(p, d) - \lambda \cdot \text{COI}(p) \right]
\end{equation}
where $R(p, d)$ is the revenue function and $\lambda$ weighs the penalty for information leakage (COI).
\subsubsection{Actor Implementation}
In our simulation, the "Follower" is implemented as a set of Actors. Each Actor is initialized with a type $\theta$ which samples a specific demand curve $d(p; \theta)$ from the latent distribution. This formalization ensures that our DR-RL agent does not overfit to a single deterministic demand function but learns a policy robust to the distributional uncertainty defined by $\mathcal{U}_\epsilon$.
As part of our reward engineering we think about the UX factor ($UX \in [0,1]$) whic his our proxy for user experience degradation, this is computed as a mixture of contribution from the separability model metric of $\frac{1}{\text{Specificity}}$.
\begin{figure}[ht]
\centering
\resizebox{0.5\columnwidth}{!}{%
\input{chapters/balance_figure.tex}
}
\caption{Introducing the UX index allows us to better distinguish the kind of impact different methods have and allows us to compare them on this Pareto-like scale.}
\end{figure}
We also need to think about a policy like taxation to the agents Strategy-Proof Mechanism Design, specifically the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) payment rule. We link and prove that this would create an incentive for the dominant strategy to become truth-telling.
\section{Heuristics as part of neuro-inspired steering systems}
Steve Burns, superior culliculus (face heuristics) we create this sort of part of the 'brain' + amortized inference.
We could say that a DQN for example is the learnin subsystem and then within our reward mechanism or some other computational method we introduce a steering subsystem which acts as the proposed ``pricing heuristic'' against the given non human transaction data.
\section{Market construction}

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@@ -1,5 +1,15 @@
\section{Discussion} \section{Discussion}
\subsection{Transition to Agentic Market Microstructure}
Our analysis of the interaction dynamics between the platform and non-human actors suggests that the current static pricing models are insufficient for an agent-mediated economy. If we assume a transition toward a direct revelation mechanism, where actors must reveal their true valuation of a good through bidding dynamics, we inevitably introduce significant stochasticity into the pricing system. Unlike traditional e-commerce where prices are relatively sticky, such a mechanism implies a high volatility characteristic of financial equity markets (without the fungability however).
However, ecommerce commodities differ fundamentally from financial securities: they possess a hard floor defined by unit economics and reservation prices. The market might react enthusiastically to an iPhone priced at \$1, such a transaction is not permissible. The platform must establish an initial valuation anchor ($P_{0}$) defined by the marginal cost plus a target margin, around which the market price is permitted to fluctuate. We propose the introduction of GenAI Agents as Institutional Market Makers.
This is also under the assumption of expected transactional capabilities being given to AI Agents.
\subsection{Risk Assessment and Limitations} \subsection{Risk Assessment and Limitations}
Acknowledge risks and constraints and data sizes. Acknowledge risks and constraints and data sizes.

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@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
\section{Conclusion} \section{Conclusion}
\subsection{Summary of contributions } \subsection{Summary of contributions}
Restate the thesis and key findings with validation of research objectives. Restate the thesis and key findings with validation of research objectives.
\subsection{Future Works and Next Steps} \subsection{Future Works and Next Steps}

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\begin{table}[ht]
\centering
\small
\resizebox{\columnwidth}{!}{%
\begin{tabular}{p{4.5cm}p{1.5cm}p{6cm}}
\hline
\textbf{Feature} & \textbf{Type} & \textbf{Description} \\
\hline
\multicolumn{3}{l}{\textit{Session Identifiers}} \\
sessionId & object & Unique identifier for user session \\
experimentId & object & Experiment run identifier \\
\hline
\multicolumn{3}{l}{\textit{Temporal Features}} \\
session\_duration\_sec & float & Total session duration in seconds \\
avg\_time\_between\_events & float & Mean inter-event time \\
std\_time\_between\_events & float & Standard deviation of inter-event times \\
min\_time\_between\_events & float & Minimum time between consecutive events \\
session\_start\_hour & int & Hour of day when session started \\
\hline
\multicolumn{3}{l}{\textit{Interaction Metrics}} \\
total\_interactions & int & Count of all user interactions \\
total\_events & int & Total number of tracked events \\
interaction\_velocity & float & Rate of interactions per time unit \\
max\_velocity\_5min & int & Peak interaction count in any 5-minute window \\
\hline
\multicolumn{3}{l}{\textit{Navigation Behavior}} \\
unique\_pages & int & Number of distinct pages visited \\
page\_views & int & Total page view events \\
\hline
\multicolumn{3}{l}{\textit{Product Engagement}} \\
item\_views & int & Number of product detail views \\
unique\_products\_viewed & int & Count of distinct products examined \\
product\_view\_depth & int & Repeat views of same products \\
\hline
\multicolumn{3}{l}{\textit{Conversion Funnel}} \\
cart\_adds & int & Number of items added to cart \\
purchases & int & Completed transactions \\
cart\_to\_view\_ratio & float & Ratio of cart additions to item views \\
conversion\_rate & float & Purchase to view conversion \\
\hline
\multicolumn{3}{l}{\textit{Interaction Quality}} \\
hover\_events & int & Mouse hover event count \\
hover\_intensity & float & Hover events per interaction \\
\hline
\multicolumn{3}{l}{\textit{Price Behavior}} \\
avg\_price\_seen & float & Mean price across viewed products \\
min\_price\_seen & float & Lowest price encountered \\
max\_price\_seen & float & Highest price encountered \\
price\_range & float & Difference between max and min prices seen \\
\hline
\multicolumn{3}{l}{\textit{Technical Fingerprinting}} \\
is\_headless & bool & Headless browser detection flag \\
is\_automation & bool & Automation framework detection flag \\
browser\_family & object & Browser type classification \\
\hline
\multicolumn{3}{l}{\textit{Experimental Labels}} \\
is\_agent & bool & Ground truth agent classification \\
xp\_human\_only & bool & Human-only experiment indicator \\
xp\_market\_mode & object & Market context (hotel/airline) \\
\hline
\end{tabular}%
}
\caption{Feature matrix schema for session-level behavioral classification (32 features total).}
\label{tab:features}
\end{table}

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% -*- TeX-master: t -*- % -*- TeX-master: t -*-
\documentclass[sigconf,nonacm,natbib=false]{acmart} \documentclass[12pt,letterpaper]{article}
% Remove ACM copyright/conference info for thesis
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\pagestyle{plain} \pagestyle{plain}
\input{preamble} \input{preamble}
\begin{document} \begin{document}
\title{Pricing Heuristics Against Non-human Transaction Orchestration Mechanisms} \title{Adversarially Distributionally Robust Optimization and Reinforcement Learning for Informed Dynamic Pricing under Strategic Demand Contamination}
\author{Daniel Rösel} \author{
\email{daniel@alves.world} Daniel Rösel\thanks{Primary author and student researcher. Email: daniel@alves.world} \\
\affiliation{% IE University, Madrid, Spain \\[1em]
\institution{IE University} Alberto Martín Izquierdo\thanks{Thesis advisor. Email: amartini@faculty.ie.edu} \\
\city{Madrid} IE University, Madrid, Spain
\country{Spain}
} }
\author{Alberto Martín Izquierdo} \date{\today}
\email{amartini@faculty.ie.edu}
\affiliation{%
\institution{IE University}
\city{Madrid}
\country{Spain}
}
\begin{abstract}
The primary objective of this thesis is to develop and validate pricing heuristics that protect e-commerce platforms from systematic exploitation by Large Language Model (LLM) agents within dynamic pricing environments. As AI agents increasingly mediate consumer transactions, they enable users to circumvent the Cost of Information (the price premium accumulated through demand signal expression) by conducting reconnaissance in isolated sessions before executing purchases through clean sessions at base prices. This research will make an anticipatory contribution by adapting recommendation system methodologies to distinguish between genuine human browsing behaviour and agent-orchestrated information gathering, thereby enabling pricing systems to maintain margin integrity without degrading the user experience for legitimate customers or getting rid of leads generated by LLMs.
\end{abstract}
\maketitle \maketitle
\begin{abstract}
The primary objective of this thesis is to develop and validate pricing heuristics that protect e-commerce platforms from systematic exploitation by Large Language Model (LLM) agents within dynamic pricing environments. As AI agents increasingly mediate consumer transactions, they enable users to circumvent the Cost of Information (the price premium accumulated through demand signal expression) by conducting reconnaissance in isolated sessions before executing purchases through clean sessions at base prices. This research will make an anticipatory contribution by adapting recommendation system methodologies to distinguish between genuine human browsing behavior and agent-orchestrated information gathering, thereby enabling pricing systems to maintain margin integrity without degrading the user experience for legitimate customers or getting rid of leads generated by LLMs.
\end{abstract}
\input{chapters/01-intro} \input{chapters/01-intro}
\input{chapters/02-literature-review} \input{chapters/02-literature-review}
\input{chapters/03-methodology} \input{chapters/03-methodology}
@@ -42,11 +33,19 @@ The primary objective of this thesis is to develop and validate pricing heuristi
\input{chapters/06-conclusion} \input{chapters/06-conclusion}
\section*{Acknowledgments}
Eugene Bykovets, PhD - ETH for helping with problem formulation.
Research supported with Cloud TPUs from Google's TPU Research Cloud (TRC).
\printbibliography \printbibliography
\clearpage \clearpage
\onecolumn
\appendix \appendix
\section{Terminology}
\begin{description}
\item[Agent $A$] An actor of non-human nature, powered by an LLM.
\item[Human $H$] An individual human with some job to be done.
\end{description}
\input{../build/concatenated_code} \input{../build/concatenated_code}
\end{document} \end{document}

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\usepackage{subcaption} \usepackage{subcaption}
\usepackage{siunitx} \usepackage{siunitx}
@@ -8,6 +27,10 @@
\usepackage{listings} \usepackage{listings}
\usepackage{xcolor} \usepackage{xcolor}
\usepackage[ruled,vlined]{algorithm2e} \usepackage[ruled,vlined]{algorithm2e}
\usepackage{cleveref}
% Configure cleveref for algorithm2e
\crefname{algocf}{Algorithm}{Algorithms}
\usetikzlibrary{positioning, shapes, arrows.meta, fit, backgrounds} \usetikzlibrary{positioning, shapes, arrows.meta, fit, backgrounds}
\lstset{ \lstset{

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@@ -18,8 +18,6 @@ try:
except ImportError: except ImportError:
lib_make_state_repr = None lib_make_state_repr = None
lib_transition_histogram = None lib_transition_histogram = None
print("lib no includable")
class BehaviorModel: class BehaviorModel:
@@ -226,7 +224,7 @@ if __name__ == "__main__":
agent_model = AgentBehaviorModel(agent_dir) agent_model = AgentBehaviorModel(agent_dir)
agent_mdp = agent_model.build_MDP() agent_mdp = agent_model.build_MDP()
print(agent_mdp)
print(f"AGENT... Built MDP: {agent_mdp['num_states']} states, " print(f"AGENT... Built MDP: {agent_mdp['num_states']} states, "
f"{sum(len(t) for t in agent_mdp['transitions'].values())} transitions") f"{sum(len(t) for t in agent_mdp['transitions'].values())} transitions")
if not agent_mdp['states']: if not agent_mdp['states']:
@@ -235,8 +233,6 @@ if __name__ == "__main__":
human_evt = aggregate_event_transitions(human_mdp) human_evt = aggregate_event_transitions(human_mdp)
agent_evt = aggregate_event_transitions(agent_mdp) agent_evt = aggregate_event_transitions(agent_mdp)
print(agent_evt)
common = set(human_evt.keys()) & set(agent_evt.keys()) common = set(human_evt.keys()) & set(agent_evt.keys())

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@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
from os import kill
import numpy as np import numpy as np
import pandas as pd import pandas as pd
from abc import ABC, abstractmethod from abc import ABC, abstractmethod
from typing import Dict, Any from typing import Dict, Any
from sim.rl.environment import BusinessLogicConstraints from sim.rl.environment import BusinessLogicConstraints
""" """
An angine by default should have its own demand estimation mechanism from the observed observations whihc are the computer feature. An angine by default should have its own demand estimation mechanism from the observed observations whihc are the computer feature.
From these features we then follow the researc hstructure of q -> p with a testable and must be updatable mechanism. From these features we then follow the researc hstructure of q -> p with a testable and must be updatable mechanism.
@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ class BasePricingEngine(ABC):
def reset(self): def reset(self):
"""reset engine state for new episode""" """reset engine state for new episode"""
self.step_count = 0 self.step_count = 0
@@ -68,15 +69,16 @@ class WildPricingEngine(BasePricingEngine):
def reset(self): def reset(self):
super().reset() super().reset()
self.e_hat = np.full((self.c.product_catalogue_size,), -1.3, dtype=np.float32) self.e_hat = np.full((self.c.product_catelogue_size,), -1.3, dtype=np.float32)
self.mu_logp = np.zeros(self.c.product_catalogue_size, dtype=np.float32) self.mu_logp = np.zeros(self.c.product_catelogue_size, dtype=np.float32)
self.mu_logq = np.zeros(self.c.product_catalogue_size, dtype=np.float32) self.mu_logq = np.zeros(self.c.product_catelogue_size, dtype=np.float32)
self.cov_pq = np.zeros(self.c.product_catalogue_size, dtype=np.float32) self.cov_pq = np.zeros(self.c.product_catelogue_size, dtype=np.float32)
self.var_p = np.ones(self.c.product_catalogue_size, dtype=np.float32) self.var_p = np.ones(self.c.product_catelogue_size, dtype=np.float32)
def compute_prices(self, current_prices: np.ndarray, observation: Dict[str, Any]) -> np.ndarray: def compute_prices(self, current_prices: np.ndarray, observation: Dict[str, Any]) -> np.ndarray:
self.step_count += 1 self.step_count += 1
demand = _extract_demand(observation, self.c.product_catalogue_size) # extract demand signal (from env observation) as proxy for sales
demand = observation.get('demand', np.zeros(self.c.product_catelogue_size, dtype=np.float32))
return self._update_from_demand(current_prices, demand) return self._update_from_demand(current_prices, demand)
def _update_from_demand(self, prices: np.ndarray, sold: np.ndarray) -> np.ndarray: def _update_from_demand(self, prices: np.ndarray, sold: np.ndarray) -> np.ndarray:

7
tests/e2e/.env.example Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
WEB_URL=http://localhost:3000
BACKEND_URL=http://localhost:5000
PRICING_PROVIDER_URL=http://localhost:5001
AIRFLOW_URL=http://localhost:8085
AIRFLOW_USER=admin
AIRFLOW_PASS=admin
HEADLESS=true